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"THE LAW IS WHATEVER THE NOBLES
Do": UNDUE PROCESS AT THE FCC
Barbara Esbin and Adam Marcus
t
Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the small group of nobles
who rule us. We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered;
nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not
know.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Franz Kafka's parable The Problem of Our Laws, describes the problem of
living under laws, the "very existence [of which] is at most a matter of pre-
sumption."2 The problem is not that of discrepancies in interpretation of the
law, but conflicting views of its very existence and how to orient one's behav-
ior in such an uncertain atmosphere. In Kafka's tale, one tradition holds that
the laws "exist and that they are a mystery confided to the nobility."3 But this
tradition cannot be proven because "the essence of a secret code is that it
should remain a mystery." 4 Adherents of this tradition, although unable to di-
rectly know the law, study the actions of the nobles in order to conform their
behavior, and "have attentively scrutinized the doings of the nobility since the
earliest times," trying to discern main tendencies and draw logically ordered
t Barbara Esbin is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Communications and
Competition Policy at The Progress & Freedom Foundation ("PFF"). Adam Marcus is a PFF
Research Fellow & Senior Technologist. The views expressed in this article are those of the
authors, and are not necessarily the views of the PFF board, fellows or staff. A shorter ver-
sion of this article under the same title originally appeared on Aug. 15, 2008, prior to the
release of the order under discussion, as a PFF "Progress on Point," available at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop 15.12undueprocess.pdf.
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conclusions, only to find "that everything becomes uncertain, and [the] work
seems only an intellectual game, for perhaps these laws.. . do not exist at all."'
Others hold this opinion and "try to show that, if any law exists, it can only
be this: The Law is whatever the nobles do. 6 Those that hold this opinion re-
ject the popular tradition as giving a false sense of security for confronting
coming events: "This party see everywhere only the arbitrary acts of the nobil-
ity."7 Paradoxically, the party believing there is no law remains small, because
such a belief would also mean unacceptable repudiation of both the law and the
nobility. The parable concludes: "The sole visible and indubitable law that is
imposed upon us is the nobility, and must we ourselves deprive ourselves of
that one law?"'
Kafka's parable holds certain applicability to the August 2008 decision of
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") to extend
regulatory authority over the broadband network management practices of
Comcast Corporation ("Comcast") and "adjudicate" its behavior against a set
of policy principles.' The FCC's means of asserting regulatory authority over
broadband Internet service providers' ("ISP") network management practices
is unprecedented, sweeping in its breadth, and seemingly unbounded by con-
ventional rules of interpretation and procedure. We should all be concerned,
for apparently what we have on our hands is a runaway agency, unconstrained
in its vision of its powers.
In a sharply divided ruling, a majority of the FCC found that Comcast's
management of its broadband Internet network contravened federal policies
aimed at protecting "the vibrant and open nature of the Internet."' ° The ruling
was made on the allegations contained in a self-styled Formal Complaint" filed
5 Id. at 437-38.
6 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
7 Id. (quote as it appears in original).
8 Id.
9 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices,
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 1
(Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast P2P Order].
10 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Orders Comcast to End Dis-
criminatory Network Management Practices (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order
Press Release], http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-284286A 1.pdf;
Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9 (noting that two out of five Commissioner's dissented
from the Commission's action).
" See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Formal Complaint, (Nov. 1,
2007) [hereinafter Free Press Complaint], available at www.freepress.net/files/fp_pk
comcast complaint.pdf. The complaint alleged that Comcast blocked innovative applica-
tions and that its methods were deliberatively secretive. Id. at 9. The complaint further al-
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in November 2007 by Free Press and Public Knowledge, as well as a related
petition for declaratory ruling, 12 sought an FCC ruling "that an Internet service
provider violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally
degrades a targeted Internet application." 3 In its Comcast P2P Order, the
Commission concluded that Comcast had "unduly interfered with Internet us-
ers' right to access the lawful Internet content and to use the applications of
their choice ... [by deploying] equipment throughout its network to monitor
the content of its customers' Internet connections and selectively block specific
types of connections known as peer-to-peer connections." 4
The Commission characterized the question before it as "whether Comcast,
a provider of broadband Internet access over cable lines, may selectively target
leged, as a general matter that "degrading applications violates the Commission's Internet
Policy Statement, which the FCC has vowed to enforce." Id. at 16. Free Press argued that
Comcast's actions with respect to its cable modem subscribers who utilize "peer-to-peer
protocols"---particularly the BitTorrent application-violate three out of four of the FCC's
Internet principles regarding consumers rights: to run applications and use services of their
choice; access lawful content of their choice; and enjoy "competition among network pro-
viders, application and service providers, and content providers." Id. at 13. In addition, it is
alleged that "[slecretly degrading applications constitutes a deceptive practice." Id. at 22.
Free Press requested that, before ruling on the merits, the FCC issue a preliminary injunc-
tion immediately, forbidding "Comcast from degrading any applications until" the Com-
plaint was resolved. Id. And, when ruling on the merits, Free Press requested that the FCC
impose a permanent injunction, and "the maximum forfeitures," under 47 U.S.C. §
503(b)(2)(D). Id. at 33-35.
12 In re Petition of Free Press, et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet
Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception
for "Reasonable Network Management"; Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent
LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remanding Proceed-
ings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory
Review-Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Con-
cerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over
Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the
Internet Over Cable Facilities; Broadband Industry Practices, Petition for Declaratory Rul-
ing, CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-337, 95-20, 98-10, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No.
02-52; WC Docket No. 07-52, at i (Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Free Press Petition for De-
claratory Ruling]; Comment Sought on Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Internet
Management Policies, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 340 (Jan. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Free
Press Declaratory Ruling Public Notice]("The Wireline Competition Bureau seeks com-
ment on a petition filed by Free Press et al. (Petitioners), seeking a declaratory ruling 'that
the practice by broadband service providers of degrading peer-to-peer traffic violates the
FCC's Internet Policy Statement' and that such practices do not meet the Commission's
exception for reasonable network management;" the matter was designated "permit but
disclose" and parties were instructed to file comments on the petition by referencing WC
Docket No. 07-52).
13 Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12, at i.
14 Comcast Order Press Release, supra note 10; see Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9,
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and interfere with connections of peer-to-peer ... applications under the facts
of this case."' 5 After rejecting the Comcast's defense that its conduct was nec-
essary to ease network congestion, the Commission concluded: "[T]he com-
pany's discriminatory and arbitrary practice unduly squelches the dynamic
benefits of an open and accessible Internet and does not constitute reasonable
network management."' 6 The harm was compounded, according to the Com-
mission, by the Comcast's failure to disclose the practice to its customers.'
7
Free Press and Public Knowledge asked the FCC to "impose a permanent in-
junction and the maximum forfeitures," which they calculated to be $195,000
per customer harmed. 8 The Commission was a little more lenient; it only re-
quired Comcast, within thirty days of the release of the Order, to provide in-
formation to the FCC regarding "the precise contours of the network manage-
ment practices at issue here" and to submit a compliance plan together with
disclosure concerning its transition to "non-discriminatory network manage-
ment practices by the end of the year."' 9
Thus, Comcast was adjudged guilty of violating an FCC policy statement-
not a rule-regarding the rights of consumers of Internet access or Internet-
Protocol-enabled ("IP-enabled") services articulated by the FCC in its Internet
Policy Statement." Inasmuch as no notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM")
or declaratory ruling was issued in the docket regarding the Commission's ac-
15 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 1.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Free Press Complaint, supra note 11, at 24, 34.
19 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 54. Specifically, the Commission required Com-
cast to:
(1) disclose to the Commission the precise contours of the network management prac-
tices at issue here, including what equipment has been utilized, when it began to be
employed, when and under what circumstances it has been used, how it has been con-
figured, what protocols have been affected, and where it has been deployed; (2) submit
a compliance plan to the Commission with interim benchmarks that describes how it
intends to transition from discriminatory to nondiscriminatory network management
practices by the end of the year; and (3) disclose to the Commission and the public the
details of the network management practices that it intends to deploy following the
termination of its current practices, including the thresholds that will trigger any limits
on customers' access to bandwidth.
Id.
20 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy State-
ment].
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tion against Comcast,2' the only source of the behavioral constraint trans-
gressed by Comcast was Commission policy, not law. Yet it must surely be a
painful thing for Comcast to be judged by laws that it did not know existed, for
surely only a rule of behavior-a law-properly can be enforced through
agency adjudication.
It undoubtedly is true, as the FCC majority stated, that the agency in carry-
ing out its statutory obligations under the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended ("Communications Act" or "Act"),22 has discretion to choose to pro-
ceed by either adjudication-via enforcement actions directed at specific past
behaviors-or by means of a prospective notice and comment rulemaking to
establish industry-wide rules of behavior. 3 However, the Commission broke
new ground from a legal and procedural perspective when it decided to com-
bine these forms and find that one industry participant, Comcast, violated a set
of policy principles the FCC itself had heretofore declared unenforceable. 4
21 Parties seeking an FCC ruling with regard to the consistency of specific industry
practices with the 1934 Communications Act, as amended ("Communications Act"), may
file either a Petition for Declaratory Ruling or a Petition for Rulemaking. Both types of pro-
ceedings are treated as notice and comment rulemaking dockets and are ordinarily used to
resolve issues of prospective, industry-wide application. Usually, following action upon a
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, the FCC will issue a document entitled Declaratory Ruling,
as it did in the case of the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling establishing the appropriate
regulatory classification of broadband Internet access services provided over cable systems.
See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 2 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem De-
claratory Ruling].
22 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 43 Stat. 1064 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.), amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
23 See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
24 Kevin Martin, Acting FCC Chairman at the time of the Comcast P2P Order stated
upon the adoption of the Internet Policy Statement three years earlier that "policy statements
do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents." News Release, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5,
2005) [hereinafter Martin Statement]. It was widely recognized both at the time of their
adoption and subsequently thereafter, that the policy principles contained in the Internet
Policy Statement were merely aspirational, and were intended to provide nothing more than
"guidance and insight" into the FCC's approach to the Internet. See Internet Policy State-
ment, supra note 20, 3. Thomas Navin, then-Wireline Competition Bureau Chief, ex-
plained in a press conference immediately following adoption of the Internet Policy State-
ment that the principles it set forth "are not enforceable." FCC Adopts a Policy Statement
Regarding Network Neutrality, TECH L.J., Aug. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2005/20050805.asp. This understanding is further
reflected in the subsequent Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, where the Commission
again hypothesized that it possessed ancillary jurisdiction to "adopt and enforce the net neu-
trality principles announced in the Internet Policy Statement," but then sought comment on
the critical question whether it in fact has "the legal authority to enforce the Policy State-
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Dissenting from the Comcast P2P Order, Commissioner Robert McDowell
called it "rulemaking by adjudication."25 Conversely, one might think of the
Commission's action as "adjudi-making."26
Whatever this innovative legal form is called, it appears to have resulted in
factual findings that a single industry participant violated rules of behavior
articulated for the first time in the very proceeding in which the accused was
found guilty as charged. More troubling still, the adjudi-making was wholly
lacking the protections afforded the subjects of more traditional administrative
adjudications, such as the need for sworn testimony, adherence to the rules of
evidence, and the other procedural safeguards of a restricted adjudication.27
Instead, Comcast appears to have been tried by the FCC in an open docket and
through a series of en banc public hearings, been found wanting, and has been
subjected to various compliance obligations while threatened with additional
regulatory punishment if it fails to adhere to the obligations.
Initial reaction to the FCC's action largely focused on the merits or draw-
backs of the decision to initiate regulation of the network management prac-
tices of the nation's broadband ISPs.2  In other words, reaction focused on
ment." In re Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 4, 10
(Mar. 22,' 2007) [hereinafter Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry]. Commissioner Copps,
in reference to the Internet Policy Statement, wrote "[w]hile I would have preferred a rule
that we could use to bring enforcement action, this is a critical step." In re Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities; Universal Ser-
vice Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incum-
bent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remand Pro-
ceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regula-
tory Review-Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional
Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c)
with regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Veri-
zon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with
Regard to Broadband Services Provided via Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in
the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R.
14,853, 14,980 (Aug. 5, 2005) (Copps, Comm'r, Concurring) [hereinafter Wireline Broad-
band Order].
25 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,090 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
26 5 U.S.C. §551(4)-(8) (2006) (explaining that an agency action is, by definition, either
a rulemaking or an adjudication; rulemaking is the process for making a rule and adjudica-
tion is the process for adopting an order). There is, therefore, no authority for the FCC's sui
generis "adjudi-making."
27 In a restricted proceeding, decision-makers cannot be lobbied outside the presence of
other parties. See FCC Restricted Proceedings, 47 C.F.R. § 1.1208 (2008); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d) (2006).
28 See Laura H. Phillips, Deborah J. Salons & Alisa R. Lahey, Future of Telecommuni-
ations, in 26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 135,
155-56 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 14384, 2008); see also Letter from Lawrence Lessig, C. Wendell and Edith M.
Carlsmith Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford
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whether enforcing the Internet Policy Statement against Comcast was a good
or bad policy decision. From a policy perspective, most experts seem to agree
that broadband ISPs should: (1) deliver the services they have contracted to
deliver; (2) adequately inform their subscribers about the services they have
purchased; (3) not impede consumer access to or use of lawful content, appli-
cations, and devices; and (4) generally behave in a neutral manner with respect
to transmission of bits to the greatest extent possible.29 But that is not to say
that consumers will invariably benefit if non-technical government officials are
making decisions, on a case-by-case basis, about what is and what is not rea-
sonable management of the networks that collectively comprise the Internet.
This Article will focus on the significant defects in the FCC's dual claims
that it has ancillary authority to enforce national Internet policy and that it may
simultaneously exercise that authority by adjudicating the merits of the Free
Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc'n. Comm'n., available at
http://lessig.org/blog/2FCC.pdf; Saul Hansell, F.C.C. Vote Sets Precedent on Unfettered
Web Usage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at Cl; Grant Gross, FCC Action Against Comcast
Meets Mixed Reactions, PC WORLD, Aug. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/149277/fcc-actionagainst-comcast-meets_
mixed reactions.html; John Eggerton, Reaction to FCC's Comcast Ruling, BROAD. & CA-
BLE, Aug. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articlelD=CA6583693;
Ted Hearn, FCC Hammers Comcast On File Sharing, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Aug. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/134182-
FCCHammersComcastOnFileSharing.php.
29 See, e.g., Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Ac-
cess: Hearing Before the Telecom & Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Timothy Wu, Professor, Columbia Law School) (discuss-
ing rules regarding rules governing discriminatory actions by broadband providers); US
Broadband Coalition, A Call to Action for a National Broadband Strategy,
http://bb4us.net/idl0.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2008) (outlining the goals of a national
broadband strategy adopted by a broad coalition of communications providers, consumers,
public interest groups, and state and local governments, which include broadband Internet
access that is, to the maximum extent possible, open to all users and service, content and
applications providers; network operators must have the right to manage their networks
responsibly, pursuant to clear standards; markets for the Internet and broadband should be as
competitive as reasonably possible; and broadband networks should provide network per-
formance, capacity and connections necessary to enable America to be globally competi-
tive); In re Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Comments of Google,
Inc., at 21-22 (June 15, 2007) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System)
(commenting that most participants in net neutrality debate agree that prohibited practices
include blocking, impairing, or degrading Internet traffic, and the unilateral imposition of
terminating charges on Web companies; most also agree that permitted practices include
reasonable network management and differential, but not discriminatory, business prac-
tices); In re Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Comments of the United
States Telecom Association, at 9-10 (June 10, 2007) (explaining that industry-developed




Press Complaint. The remainder of this Article is divided into four sections:
Part II discusses the regulatory history relevant to the Comcast P2P Order.
Part III examines the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and the FCC's unavail-
ing extension of that doctrine in the Comcast P2P Order. Part IV analyzes de-
fects in the FCC's approach to the controversy together with the manner in
which it resolved the dispute. Finally, Part V discusses policy implications.
II. THE FCC'S APPROACH TO BROADBAND NETWORK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
In the last seven years, the FCC has determined that it is preferable to treat
broadband Internet access services as information services subject only to its
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.0 As will be explained in Part 1II, the FCC's Title I
ancillary jurisdiction must be exercised ancillary to regulatory mandates con-
tained elsewhere in the Communications Act. The Act's regulatory mandates
are split into separate titles by type of service or provider: Title II for common
carriers; Title III for radio communications; Title VI for cable communica-
tions.3 Converged Internet Protocol-based digital broadband services delivered
anytime, anywhere over a multiplicity of physical platforms have long chal-
lenged this framework.32 Therefore, it is necessary to review the agency's prior
decisions and actions concerning the cable modem service specifically, and
broadband Internet access service more generally, before assessing the Corn-
cast P2P Order's ancillary jurisdiction claims.
30 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 7, 38; Wireline Broadband
Order, supra note 24, 108-09; In re United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service
as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281, 9 (Nov.
3, 2006) [hereinafter Broadband Over Power Line Order].
31 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301, 601 (2000). Section 153(10) defines the term "common
carrier" and section 153(33) defines the term "radio communications." Section 602, in con-
trast, contains definitions pertinent to the FCC's statutory mandates over the provision of
"cable services," a term defined in section 602(6) but does not define the term "cable com-
munications." The significance of this omission is discussed infra Part III.B.I.d. The Tele-
communications Act of 1996 added many definitions to Title I, including the definition of
"information service" in section 153(20), "telecommunications" in section 153(43) and
"telecommunications service" in section 153(46). Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, §§ 3(a)(2), (41), (48), (49), 110 Stat. 56, 58-60 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 153(20), (43), (46) (2000)).
32 See BARBARA S. ESBIN, FCC REFORM: SCALPEL OR STEAMROLLER?, PROGRESS &
FREEDOM FOUND., PROGRESS ON POINT No. 15.15, at 5 (2008), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/2008/pop 15.15FCCreform.pdf.
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A. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling
The case against Comcast involved its provision of broadband Internet ac-
cess service.33 The question of the appropriate regulatory treatment of Internet
access provided over cable systems by cable operators came to the FCC's at-
tention shortly after passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act"), yet it was not resolved until 2002."4 In its Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling, the Commission recognized that the 1996 Act did not clearly indicate
how cable modem service should be classified or regulated, and that it had the
authority to address the classification question to "fill gaps where statutes are
silent."35 The Commission assessed and rejected arguments that the cable In-
ternet access services fell within the statutory definition of cable services.36
That left the Commission with two other classifications: information service or
telecommunications service.3" Applying tests developed to help it distinguish
between the predecessor categories of basic and enhanced services, the Com-
mission held that the cable Internet service-which it designates as "cable mo-
dem service"--like the services provided by non-facilities based ISPs, were
33 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 6-11.
34 See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 37, 42 (1999) [hereinafter Esbin, Internet Over Cable]; Barbara
Esbin & Gary Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the Global Information
Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTs 23, 30-32 (2001);
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 7.
35 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 32.
36 See id. TT 60-68.
37 Id. 34 n.139. The 1996 Act defines "telecommunications service" as "the offering
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. §
153(46) (2000). "Telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the
form or content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). "Information
service" is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, trans-
forming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommuni-
cations, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capa-
bility for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). As the Commission
has noted:
The term "information service" follows from a distinction drawn in its [three] Com-
puter Inquiries ... between bottleneck common carrier facilities and services for the
transmission or movement of information on the one hand and, on the other, the use of
computer processing applications to act on the content, code, protocol, or other aspects
of the subscriber's information. The latter are "enhanced" or information services. This
distinction was incorporated into the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), which
governed the Bell Operating Companies after the Bell System Break-Up, and into the
1996 Act. The Commission has confirmed that the two terms-enhanced services and
information services-should be interpreted to extend to the same functions.
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 34 n. 139 (citations omitted).
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more properly treated as an information service under the 1996 Act.3 The
Commission also excluded cable modem service from the category of tele-
communications service on the ground that the cable modem providers were
using telecommunications to provide end users with an integrated transmission
and data processing capability rather than offering them telecommunications
service--that is, a pure transmission path for the transmission of information
of the user's choosing. 9 Finally, the Commission clarified that cable modem
service is an interstate information service on the basis of an "end-to-end anal-
ysis, in this case on an examination of the location of the points among which
the cable modem service communications travel"-often in different states and
countries."°
The Commission justified its classification on the basis of the texts of statu-
tory mandates and definitions, relevant precedents, and its policy of applying a
light touch to new Internet services so that they may exist in a "minimal regu-
latory environment." 1 In considering the issues, the Commission stated that it
was guided by several overarching principles pursuant to sections 706 and
230(b)(2) of the 1996 Act directing the agency to encourage the deployment of
advanced telecommunications capability by "regulatory forbearance, measures
that promote competition . . . or other regulating methods that remove barriers
to infrastructure investment," 2 while seeking "to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Interet and other interac-
tive computer services unfettered by Federal or State regulation." '43
38 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 36-38 ("As currently provi-
sioned, cable modem service supports such functions as e-mail, newsgroups, maintenance of
the user's World Wide Web presence, and the [Domain Name Service]. Accordingly, we
find that cable modem service, an Internet access service, is an information service .... As
currently provisioned, cable modem service is a single, integrated service that enables the
subscriber to utilize Internet access service through a cable provider's facilities and to real-
ize the benefits of a comprehensive service offering.")
39 Id. 39-41 (rejecting commenters urging the Commission "to find a telecommuni-
cations service inherent in the provision of cable modem service."). The Commission also
refused to apply Computer H requirements to cable modem service providers for the pur-
pose of requiring them to create a stand-alone transmission service and offer it to third-party
ISPs and other information service providers under tariff pursuant to the Commission's
Computer II service requirements. See id 42-45. The Commission declined to extend
Computer II for this purpose, noting that it has never applied the Computer II requirements
to any entity besides traditional wireline services. Id. 44. As the majority stated, "Earth-
Link invites us, in essence, to find a telecommunications service inside every information
service, extract it, and make it a stand-alone offering to be regulated under Title II of the
Act. Such radical surgery is not required." Id. 43.
40 Id. 59.
41 Id .4-6.
42 47 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2000); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 4.
43 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 4. Section
230 defines interactive computer service to "mean[] any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access. . . including specifically
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Second, the Commission stated its belief that "broadband services should
exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and inno-
vation in a competitive market. In this regard, we seek to remove regulatory
uncertainty that in itself may discourage investment and innovation. And we
consider how best to limit unnecessary and unduly burdensome regulatory
costs." 44
Third, the Commission sought
to create a rational framework for the regulation of competing services that are pro-
vided ... over multiple electronic platforms, including wireline, cable terrestrial wire-
less and satellite. By promoting development and deployment of multiple platforms,
we promote competition in the provision of broadband capabilities, ensuring that pub-
lic demands and needs can be met.4'
It is noteworthy that the Commission chose to classify cable modem service
as an information service-a then unregulated category of service-in order to
promote the overarching deregulatory principles contained in sections 706 and
230(b)(2). These overarching principles are that broadband infrastructure de-
ployment and innovation should be encouraged by preserving "the competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services," such as the cable modem service, in a manner that is "unfettered by
Federal or State regulation." The Commission also sought comment on
whether it should impose various regulatory obligations on the provision of the
service pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction in the NPRM accompanying the
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling; however, it has never promulgated any
rules pursuant this rulemaking proceeding.47 The Cable Modem Declaratory
a service or system that provides access to the Internet." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Comcast's
high-speed Internet access service falls well within section 230's definition of interactive
computer service. See id; Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 2-8.
44 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 5 (emphasis added).
45 Id. 6 (emphasis added).
46 Id. 4; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
47 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 75-79 (seeking comment on
the extent to which the FCC should exercise Title I authority to regulate the facilities-based
provision of interstate information services and which "explicit statutory provisions, includ-
ing expressions of congressional goals, that would be furthered by the Commission's exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction over cable modem service," including sections 1, 203(b), 706
and any additional bases for asserting ancillary jurisdiction). Nor has the Commission com-
pleted any other rulemaking proceedings initiated for the same purposes with respect to
broadband Internet services provided over other technologies. See, e.g., In re Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service
Obligations of Broadband Providers; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell oper-
ating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-
Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 108-110 (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband
NPRM]; In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863,
38-41 (Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter IP-Enabled Services NPRM]; see also Broadband Indus-
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Ruling was ultimately affirmed in 2005 by the Supreme Court in its decision in
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices."
B. Wireline Broadband Order
Shortly after the Brand X decision, the Commission issued the Wireline
Broadband Order, which established a "new regulatory framework for broad-
band Internet access services offered by wireline facilities-based providers."'9
The FCC defined "wireline broadband Internet access service, for purposes of
this proceeding, [as] a service that uses existing or future wireline facilities of
the telephone network to provide subscribers with Internet access capabili-
ties."' ° The Commission stated that it was acting to further the deregulatory
goals identified in the Wireline Broadband NPRM, which it claimed were rein-
forced by the Supreme Court's action in BrandX.5
The FCC went on to describe its action in the Wireline Broadband Order as
establishing a technology-neutral "minimal regulatory environment" for
broadband Internet access, stating:
First, this Order encourages the ubiquitous availability of broadband to all Americans
by, among other things, removing outdated regulations.... Second, the framework we
adopt in this Order furthers the goal of developing a consistent regulatory framework
across platforms by regulating like services in a similar functional manner .... Fi-
nally, the actions we take in this Order allow facilities-based wireline broadband In-
ternet access service providers to respond to changing marketplace demands effec-
try Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 13, 16; Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13,089-
90 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting) ("[T]he Commission [in the Wireline Broadband Or-
der] clearly contemplated initiating a rulemaking in response to allegations of misconduct,
emphasizing its 'authority to promulgate regulations'-regulations not written at that time,
or today. Such intentions were, I thought, reinforced in 2007 when I voted to adopt the
Broadband Industry Practices Notice, the first step in a rulemaking proceeding designed to
determine whether rules governing network management practices were necessary.... The
additional action I contemplated was the logical move from an NOI to an NPRM-not an
unprecedented, and likely unsustainable, jump to rulemaking by adjudication.") (citations
omitted).
48 545 U.S. 967, 986, 1002-03 (2005).
49 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, I 1. By its terms, the Wireline Broadband
Order applies to "providers of telecommunications for Internet access or IP-enabled ser-
vices." Id. 196.
50 Id. 19.
51 Id. % 1-2 (noting that "[u]nlike the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling ... which
addressed a service and its transmission component that had not previously been classified
under the Act or subjected to any network access requirements," the FCC needed to "con-
sider that legacy regulation in determining the appropriate regulatory framework for wire-
line broadband Internet access service providers."); Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note
47,T5.
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tively and efficiently, spurring them to invest in and deploy innovative broadband ca-
pabilities that can benefit all Americans, consistent with the Communications Act..
52
In the Wireline Broadband Order, the FCC reasoned that wireline broad-
band Internet access service should be treated as an information service be-
cause it offers end users "the capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information
via telecommunications."53 The FCC also determined that neither the 1996 Act
nor Commission precedent required the treatment of broadband transmission as
a telecommunications service when offered to a third-party ISP, though pro-
viders could choose to offer it as such.54 Further, use of the transmission com-
ponent of wireline broadband Internet access service as part of a facilities-
based provider's offering of that service to end users over its own transmission
facilities is telecommunications and not a telecommunications service under
the Act.55 Finally, the Commission eliminated the Computer Inquiry require-
ments applicable to wireline broadband Internet access services offered by fa-
cilities-based providers.56
Thus, wireline broadband Internet access and cable modem services were
classified as Title I information services to place them in a light-touch regula-
tory environment in furtherance of a deregulatory policy focusing on encourag-
ing broadband facilities--or infrastructure--deployment. 7
C. Broadband Consumer Protection NPRM
The Wireline Broadband Order, unlike the FCC's Cable Modem Declara-
tory Ruling, re-classified a service that the FCC had treated as a common car-
rier telecommunications service. 8 Therefore, it was necessary for the Commis-
sion to seek "comment on what effect classifying wireline broadband Internet
access service as an information service would have on other regulatory obli-




56 Id. 4, 80, 82. The FCC's Computer Inquiry requirements obligate "facilities-based
carriers that provide broadband Internet access service directly or through an affiliate [to]
make the telecommunications transmission component available to unaffiliated ISPs as a
common carrier service." Id. 49.
57 Employing similar reasoning, the FCC subsequently classified broadband access to
the Internet over power line and broadband over wireless networks as interstate information
services. Broadband Over Power Line Order, supra note 30, 7-11; see In re Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, De-
claratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 18, 22-26 (Mar. 22, 2007).
58 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 2.
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gations." 9 The Commission noted: "Title II obligations [had] never generally
applied to information services, including Internet access services," and it had
never generally applied Title II obligations to information services-including
Internet access services-but that when it has "deemed it necessary to impose
regulatory requirements on information services, it has done so pursuant to its
Title I ancillary jurisdiction."6 After the Commission noted that it may exer-
cise its ancillary jurisdiction when Title I of the 1996 Act gives it subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the service to be regulated and when the assertion of juris-
diction is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various
responsibilities,"6 the Commission speculated that "both of the predicates for
ancillary jurisdiction are likely satisfied for any consumer protection, network
reliability, or national security obligation that we may subsequently decide to
impose on wireline broadband Internet access service providers."62 Accord-
ingly, in the NPRM adopted with the Wireline Broadband Order, the FCC
specifically sought comment on what obligations it should impose pursuant to
its Title I authority "to further consumer protection in the broadband age."63
With the exception of CPNI obligations, this rulemaking remains pending. 6
The Wireline Broadband Order was-and remains-controversial for its de-
59 Id. 108.
60 Id. Here the FCC is referring to its Computer II Final Decision. See In re Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry),
Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 114, 119, 125, 132 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Com-
puter H Final Decision]. The FCC also cites its action extending section 255 accessibility
obligations-voicemail and interactive menu service--to certain information service pro-
viders. See In re Implementation of Section 255 and 251 (a)(2) of the Communications Act
of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Access to Telecommunica-
tions Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Per-
sons with Disabilities, Report and Order and Further Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417,
93 (July 14, 1999).
61 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 109 (quoting United States v. Sw. Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)).
62 Id.
63 Id. 111. The Broadband Consumer Practices NPRM comprises paragraphs 146 to
159 of the Wireline Broadband Order. Comment was sought on whether the FCC could rely
on market forces or should exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to impose regulations to extend
consumer protection in the traditional telecommunications service areas of customer pro-
prietary network information ("CPNI"), slamming, truth-in-billing, network outage report-
ing, section 214 discontinuance, section 254(g) rate averaging requirements, and federal and
state involvement. Id. 147-58.
64 In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Informa-
tion; IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 55 (Mar. 13, 2007) (concluding that the FCC has ancillary jurisdiction
under Title I to impose CPNI requirements on providers of interconnected VoIP service).
No party sought review of the CPNI Order; thus its conclusion regarding the FCC's ancil-
lary jurisdiction has not been tested in court.
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regulation of traditional wireline carrier broadband transmission services
through an act of regulatory classification. 5 Perhaps because of evident dis-
comfort at this radical transformation of a long-standing regulatory framework
demonstrated by the separate statements of several FCC Commissioners in
response to the Wireline Broadband Order, the FCC simultaneously adopted a
set of four Internet principles, or policies, in a separate Internet Policy State-
ment 66
The separate statements of the Commissioners upon the adoption of the
Wireline Broadband Order and the Internet Policy Statement are instructive.
FCC Chairman Kevin Martin wrote: "The Commission also adopts today a
Policy Statement that reflects each Commissioner's core beliefs about certain
rights all consumers of broadband Internet access should have. Competition
has ensured consumers have had these rights to date, and I remain confident
that it will continue to do so."67 Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy did not
mention the Internet Policy Statement in her statement, but made plain that the
Commission's intent in the Wireline Broadband Order was not the complete
deregulation of wireline broadband providers, but rather to free them from leg-
acy regulation so that a new "minimally regulated framework for the digital
era" could be created pursuant to the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction.6" Commis-
sioner Michael Copps, concurring in the Wireline Broadband Order, stated
that despite his misgivings, digital subscriber line services "will be reclassi-
fied," leaving only Title I available to the FCC in its efforts to protect broad-
band consumers.69 Commissioner Copps characterized the policy statement's
65 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 3; see Net Neutrality Hearing: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. Commerce, Science, and Transp. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp. 109th Cong. 26 (Feb. 7, 2006) (statement of Earl W. Comstock, President and
CEO, COMPTEL) ("The FCC's new approach will prove catastrophic precisely because the
Internet depends on basic common carrier rules to ensure the availability of an essential
ingredient, namely the transmission capacity over which Internet applications reach busi-
nesses and consumers."); J. Steven Rich, Brand X and the Wireline Broadband Report and
Order: The Beginning of the End of the Distinction Between Title I and Title H Services, 58
FED. COMM. L.J. 221, 239 (2006) ("[T]he key conclusion of the Wireline Broadband Report
and Order is as controversial, or more so, than the Declaratory Ruling."). But cf JEFFERY A.
EISENACH, BROADBAND POLICY: DOES THE U.S. HAVE IT RIGHT AFTER ALL?, PROGRESS &
FREEDOM FOUND., PROGRESS ON POINT No. 15-14, at 1-2 (2008), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/2008/popl5.14USbroadbandpolicy.pdf ("The results show that the relatively
deregulatory American approach to broadband policy has produced highly desirable results,
including high levels of investment and innovation, nearly ubiquitous broadband availabil-
ity, high and increasing levels of penetration, falling prices, and high levels of consumer
satisfaction.").
66 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 4.
67 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, at 14,975 (Martin, Chairman, approving)
(emphasis added).
68 Id. at 14,978 (Abernathy, Comm'r, approving).
69 Id. at 14,979 (Copps, Comm'r, concurring).
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principles as critical to "guide [the Commission's] effort to preserve and pro-
mote the openness that makes the Internet so great."7
As Commissioner Copps elaborated:
[The] Statement lays out a path forward under which the Commission will protect
network neutrality so that the Internet remains a vibrant, open place where new tech-
nologies, business innovation and competition can flourish .... While I would have
preferred a rule that we could use to bring enforcement action, this is a critical step.
And, with violations of our policy, I will take the next step and push for Commission
action.7'
Similarly, Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein praised the adoption of the pol-
icy statement for articulating:
a core set of principles for consumers' access to broadband and the Internet. These
principles are designed to ensure that consumers will always enjoy the full benefits of
the Internet. I am also pleased that these principles, which will inform the Commis-
sion's future broadband and Internet-related policymaking, will apply across the
range of broadband technologies.72
Theses statements in response to the adoption of the Wireline Broadband Or-
der and Internet Policy Statement provide context for how the Commissioners
responded to the Comcast P2P Order.
D. Internet Policy Statement
The Internet Policy Statement, adopted contemporaneously with the Wire-
line Broadband Order, cites policies contained in sections 230(b) and 706(a)
of the 1996 Act as its underpinnings, and recites the FCC's view that it "has
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancil-
lary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications. '73 Addi-
tionally, "to ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, af-
fordable, and accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopt[ed] the fol-
lowing principles," each with the purpose "[t]o encourage broadband deploy-
ment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the pub-
lic Internet":
* consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice;
* consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, sub-
ject to the needs of law enforcement;
* consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm
the network;
* consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and
70 Id. at 14,980.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 14,983-84 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring) (emphasis added).
73 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 2, 4 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005)).
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service providers, and content providers.74
The FCC committed itself to incorporating the principles set forth in the In-
ternet Policy Statement "into its ongoing policymaking activities."75 The Inter-
net Policy Statement emphasized that the FCC was "not adopting rules in this
policy statement. The principles . . . adopt[ed] are subject to reasonable net-
work management."76
FCC Chairman Kevin Martin released Comments on the Commission's Pol-
icy Statement upon its adoption, explaining:
The policy statement we adopt today lists four principles that are based on this fun-
damental ability to access any website available to the public. While policy statements
do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents, today's statement does re-
flect core beliefs that each member of this Commission holds regarding how broad-
band Internet access should function.77
In closing, the Chairman stated, "cable and telephone companies' practices
already track well the [I]nternet principles we endorse today. I remain confi-
dent that the marketplace will continue to ensure that these principles are main-
tained. I am also confident, therefore, that regulation is not, nor will be, re-
quired. 78
Thus, the four Internet principles articulate consumer entitlements, but con-
tain no corresponding articulation of ISP obligations. Additionally, the sole
mention of the rights of service providers' is in the phrase subjecting the four
principles to reasonable network management, which is the extent of the
Commission's guidance on the topic.79 Thus, this statement of principles was
intended-as the policy statement plainly says--to provide "guidance and in-
sight into [the Commission's] approach to the Internet and broadband that is
consistent with . . . Congressional directives,"8 rather than to establish norma-
tive and enforceable rules of provider behavior. In an attempt to elucidate ISPs
obligations under the Internet Policy Statement, the Commission later initiated
an inquiry seeking guidance from industry.
E. Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry
Two years after the adoption of the Internet Policy Statement, the FCC initi-
ated an industry-wide inquiry into the broadband network management prac-
tices of facilities-based broadband ISPs.8" The inquiry was initiated:
74 Id. 4 (citations omitted).
75 Id. 5.
76 Id. 5 n. 15 (emphasis added).
77 Martin Statement, supra note 24.
78 Id.
79 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 5 n. 15.
80 Id. 3.
81 See Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 1.
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[T]o enhance [the Commission's] understanding of the nature of the market for
broadband and related services, whether network platform providers and others favor
or disfavor particular content, how consumers are affected by these policies, and
whether consumer choice of broadband providers is sufficient to ensure that all such
policies ultimately benefit consumers. We ask for specific examples of beneficial or
harmful behavior, and we ask whether any regulatory intervention is necessary.
82
It is not evident what precisely prompted the FCC to initiate the Broadband
Industry Practices Inquiry. The Commission noted that its recent reviews of
telecommunications carrier transactions had not adduced evidence of conduct
inconsistent with the Internet Policy Statement.83 Nonetheless, in those pro-
ceedings, it had "specifically recognized the applicants' commitments to act in
a manner consistent with the principles set forth in the Internet Policy State-
ment, and their commitments were incorporated as conditions of their merg-
ers."' Further, the Commission noted that in its review of the transaction in-
volving Adelphia, Time-Warner, and Comcast, it "found that the transaction
was not likely to increase the incentives for the applicants to engage in conduct
harmful to consumers, and found no evidence that the applicants were operat-
ing in a manner inconsistent with the [Internet] Policy Statement."85 Accord-
ingly, unlike license transfer approvals involving telecommunications carriers
that contained voluntary commitments to abide by the Internet Policy State-
ment, the Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order did not contain a voluntary
commitment on the part of the applicants to abide by the Internet Policy State-
ment.86 The FCC nonetheless stated that, "[i]f in the future evidence arises that
any company is willfully blocking or degrading Intemet content, affected par-
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id. 3 nn.6 & 8.
84 Id. (citing In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Ap-
proval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290, 144
(Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Merger Order]; In re Verizon Communications Inc.
and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 143 (Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Merger Order];
In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 152, 153 (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter AT&T-
BellSouth Merger Order].
85 Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 3; In re Applications for
Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Adelphia Communica-
tions Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner
Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and subsidi-
aries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiar-
ies), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc.,
Transferee, Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 217, 223 (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Adel-
phia-Time Warner-Comcast Order].
86 Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 3; Adelphia-Time Warner-
Comcast Order, supra note 85, 223.
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ties may file a complaint with the Commission,""7 noting its view that the In-
ternet Policy Statement "contains principles against which the conduct of
Comcast [and] Time Warner... can be measured."8
The Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry declared that the FCC "has the
ability to adopt and enforce the net neutrality principles it announced in the
Internet Policy Statement" and could do so pursuant to Title I because the two
predicates for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction are met with respect to the
policy statement's four principles. 9 This belief rests upon the Commission's
earlier Wireline Broadband Order, in which the agency reiterated "that both of
the predicates for ancillary jurisdiction are likely satisfied for any consumer
protection, network reliability, or national security obligation that [it] may sub-
sequently decide to impose on wireline broadband Internet access service pro-
viders."9 °
In the Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, the Commission posed a series
of questions concerning the "behavior of broadband market participants," in-
cluding packet prioritization, network management, and pricing practices.9
The Commission also questioned whether it should amend the Internet Policy
Statement to "incorporate a new principle of nondiscrimination," and if so,
how it should be defined and operated.92 The Commission concluded by asking
whether it "ha[d] the legal authority to enforce the Policy Statement in the face
of particular market failures or other specific problems."93
Thus, until release of the Comcast P2P Order, the Commission's long-
standing regulatory goal for cable modem service was to permit the service to
continue to exist in "a minimal regulatory environment. 94 Although the Com-
mission sought comment on whether it should impose regulatory obligations
on the provision of cable modem broadband Internet access pursuant to its an-
cillary jurisdiction in the Cable Modem Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, it has
never promulgated any rules pursuant to that rulemaking proceeding.95 Nor has
87 Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order, supra note 85, 220.
88 Id. 1 223.
89 Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, TT 4, 5 (emphasis added). The
two predicates are subject matter jurisdiction conferred by Title I, and "assertion of jurisdic-
tion is reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's responsibili-
ties." Id 5.
90 Id. 1 5 (quoting Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 109).
91 Id. 18,9.
92 Id. 10.
93 Id. I I (emphasis added). The Commission also asked: "[w]ould regulations further
our mandate to 'encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans'? ... [and] [a]ssuming it is not necessary to
adopt rules at this time, what market characteristics would justify the adoption of rules?" Id.
94 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 1.
95 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 72-112. Nor has the Com-
mission completed any other rulemaking proceedings initiated for the same purposes with
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the Commission completed work on any of the other rulemaking proceedings it
initiated concerning the network management practices of facilities-based
broadband ISPs. Finally, it is quite evident from its repeated inclusion of the
question in rulemaking notices that the FCC understood that it was in fact an
uncertain proposition as to whether the agency could impose additional regula-
tory constraints on providers of broadband Internet access services pursuant to
its ancillary jurisdiction.
F. Free Press Complaint and Related Petitions for Declaratory Ruling or
Rulemaking
In its November 2007, Free Press requested that the Commission declare
"that an Internet service provider violates the [Commission's] Internet Policy
Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted Internet application." '96 Free
Press' Complaint specifically requested that the FCC sanction Comcast for
"secretly degrading peer-to-peer protocols," an action Free Press alleged "vio-
lates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement. 9 7 Comcast was alleged to have de-
graded service to customers utilizing the peer-to-peer file sharing application
BitTorrent.98 On January 11, 2008, the Commission's Enforcement Bureau
transmitted the Free Press Complaint to Comcast and requested a response,
which the company subsequently delivered to the Enforcement Bureau on Jan-
uary 25, 2008.99
respect to broadband Internet services provided over other technologies. See, e.g., Wireline
Broadband Order, supra note 24, 1 146-59; IP-Enabled Services NPRM, supra note 47,
1; see also Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24; Comcast P2P Order, su-
pra note 9, at 13,089-90 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting) ("[T]he Commission [in the
Wireline Broadband Order] clearly contemplated initiating a rulemaking in response to
allegations of misconduct, emphasizing its 'authority to promulgate regulations'-
regulations not written at that time, or today. Such intentions were, I thought, reinforced in
2007 when I voted to adopt the Broadband Industry Practices Notice, the first step in a
rulemaking proceeding designed to determine whether rules governing network manage-
ment practices were necessary .... The additional action I contemplated was the logical
move from an NOI to an NPRM-not an unprecedented, and likely unsustainable, jump to
rulemaking by adjudication." (citations omitted)).
96 Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12, at i.
97 Free Press Complaint, supra note 11, at i.
98 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 2, 4. BitTorrent "employs a decentral-
ized distribution model: Each computer in a BitTorrent 'swarm' is able to download content
from the other computers in the swarm, and in turn each computer also makes available
content for those same peers to download, all via TCP connections. Id. 4.
99 Id. 9 n.28, 10 n.36 (citing Letter from Kris A. Monteith, Chief, Enforcement Bu-
reau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Mary McManus, Senior Director of FCC and Regulatory
Policy, Comcast Corporation, File No. EB-08-IH-1518 (Jan. 11, 2008) and Letter from
Mary McManus, Senior Director of FCC and Regulatory Policy, Comcast Corporation, to
Kris A. Monteith, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, File No. EB-08-
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At the same time it filed its complaint, Free Press filed a Petition for De-
claratory Ruling seeking a declaration "that the practice by broadband service
providers of degrading peer-to-peer traffic violates the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement" and that such practices do not fall within the Commission's excep-
tion for reasonable network management.' ° The FCC released the Free Press
Petition for public comment and requested that interested parties file comments
in WC Docket No. 07-52, the same docket established for the Broadband In-
dustry Practices Inquiry.0 ' The FCC also announced that it would treat the
matter as a permit-but-disclose proceeding in accordance with the Commis-
sion's ex parte rules.0 2 Permit-but-disclose treatment normally is accorded to
non-adjudicatory public notice and comment rulemaking proceedings. 3 The
IH-1518, at 5 (Jan. 25, 2008)). Neither the Enforcement Bureau letter nor Comcast's re-
sponse are available in the public file of the proceeding.
100 Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12, at 3; Free Press Declara-
tory Ruling Public Notice, supra note 12, at 340.
101 Free Press Declaratory Ruling Public Notice, supra note 12, at 340.
102 Id. Permit-but-disclose is a designation used to distinguish restricted adjudications
from public notice-and-comment proceedings for purposes of contact with and between
agency officials and parties to a proceeding or litigation before the FCC. 47 C.F.R. §§
1.1200, 1.1206 (2007). In un-restricted permit-but-disclose proceedings, parties may contact
the FCC outside the presence of other parties to a proceeding, but are required to file an ex
parte notice describing the contact. Id. § 1. 1206. In contrast, in a restricted proceeding, out-
side parties and the parties to the proceeding are not permitted to contact agency officials
outside the hearing of the other parties. Id. § 1.1208. See generally In re Amendment of 47
C.F.R. § 1.1200 et seq. Concerning Ex Parte Presentations in Commission Proceedings,
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 7348 (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Ex Parte Revision Order]
(revising the Commission's ex parte rules).
103 47 C.F.R. S§ 1.1206. The FCC has a "long-standing practice of treating rulemakings
(other than broadcast allotment proceedings) as permit-but-disclose after the issuance of a
notice of proposed rulemaking." Ex Parte Revision Order, supra note 102, 34. In the Ex
Parte Revision Order, the Commission explained:
rulemakings, unlike adjudications, often involve a need for continuing contact between
the Commission and the public to develop policy issues. Further, we are confident that
a permit-but-disclose procedure in rulemakings gives interested persons fair notice of
presentations made to the Commission and ensures the development of a complete re-
cord. In this regard, we find that proceedings involving the issuance of policy state-
ments, interpretive rules, and rules issued without notice and comment are substantially
similar to those involving the notice-and-comment rulemaking, and we shall add an
express provision to the rules treating them as subject to permit-but-disclose proce-
dures once they are issued.
Id. The Commission further explained that "petitions for rulemaking... should continue to
be treated as exempt proceedings," Id. 28 and "in exempt proceedings, ex parte presenta-
tions generally may be made without limitation." Id. 6. Finally, the Commission found
"[1]ike a notice of inquiry, a petition for rulemaking initiates a process that is tentative and
preliminary to the consideration of a proposed rule. Therefore, it is desirable to permit the
maximum degree of free discussion, and there is no danger of prejudicing interested per-
sons." Id. 28 (citation omitted). Most informal non-hearing adjudications are treated as
restricted proceedings. Id. 11; see 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1204(b)(2), 1.1206(a)(2).
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Free Press Petition contains factual allegations and legal arguments that virtu-
ally are identical to the Free Press Complaint, including its request that Com-
cast's action be subject to preliminary and permanent injunction and signifi-
cant forfeitures. 4
Contemporaneous with the filing of the Free Press Complaint and Free
Press Petition, online video service provider Vuze Inc. ("Vuze") °5 filed a "Pe-
tition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broad-
band Network Operators," which the FCC also released for public comment in
WC Docket No. 07-52."°6 Vuze requested that the FCC initiate a rulemaking
proceeding "'to clarify what constitutes 'reasonable network management,' by
broadband network operators and to establish that such network management
does not permit network operators to block, degrade or unreasonably discrimi-
nate against lawful Internet applications, content or technologies as used in the
Commission's Internet Policy Statement."'' 7 The FCC designated the Vuze Pe-
tition as it had the Free Press Petition, as a permit-but-disclose proceeding. °8
The Vuze Petition notes: "Though many Internet companies, consumer groups
and others have urged the Commission to promulgate clearly enforceable rules
to address the parameters of acceptable network management, the Commission
has not done so to date and has instead sought to collect information, including
examples of actual harm."' 9 As the FCC's Broadband Network Management
webpage explains: "To further its review of broadband network management
practices, the Commission... conducted en banc hearings, open to the public,
to hear from expert panelists on the subject to help the Commission evaluate
particular broadband practices and to examine developments in the broadband
marketplace."' 0 These hearings took place over the first seven months of 2008,
and seemed to examine not only network management practices, but also
Comcast's alleged actions.
In February 2008, the FCC held an en banc public hearing at Harvard Law
104 See generally Free Press Complaint, supra note 11, at ii; Free Press Petition for
Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12, at 33.
105 Vuze, Inc. offers Peer-to-Peer networking through BitTorrent technology. Vuze, Our
Technology, http://www.vuze.com/technology.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
106 Comment Sought on Petition for Rulemaking to Establish Rules Governing Network
Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 343
(Jan. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Vuze Petition Public Notice].
107 Id. at 343; see Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, at 5 n. 15.
108 Vuze Petition Public Notice, supra note 106, at 343; see supra note 103.
109 In re Vuze, Inc. Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Prac-
tices by Broadband Network Operators; Broadband Industry Practices, Petition for Rule-
making, WC Docket No. 07-52, at i (Nov. 14, 2007) (available through FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Vuze Petition].
110 FCC, Broadband Network Management,
http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork-management (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
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School as part of its Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry.1 According to the
news release announcing the event, the purpose of the hearing was to permit
the Commission to "hear from expert panelists regarding broadband network
management practices." "2 The hearing was presided over by the FCC Chair-
man and attended by the four other Commissioners. It consisted of two panel
discussions and a technology demonstration; the first panel examined policy
perspectives and the second focused on technological perspectives."3 A Com-
cast representative participated on the first panel."' Shortly thereafter, in
March 2008, Comcast and BitTorrent reached an agreement concerning Com-
cast's handling of its peer-to-peer network traffic; both companies agreed that
there was no need for government involvement."5
The FCC conducted a second en banc public hearing on broadband network
management practices at Stanford University in April 2008--Comcast did not
participate." 6 The news release announcing the agenda and list of witnesses
stated that the purpose of the hearing was to permit the FCC to "hear from ex-
pert panelists regarding broadband network management practices and Inter-
net-related issues.""' 7 Similar to the Harvard hearing, the Stanford hearing was
presided over by the FCC Chairman with the other Commissioners in atten-
dance and consisted of two panel discussions; the first addressed network man-
agement and consumer expectations and the second addressed consumer access
to emerging Internet technologies and applications." 8 The hearing also in-
cluded a public comment period.
A third public en banc hearing was conducted on the topic "Broadband and
the Digital Future" on July 21, 2008 at Carnegie Mellon University."9 Similar
to the other two hearings, the Carnegie Mellon hearing was presided over by
I"' News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Agenda and Witnesses for
Public Hearing En Banc Hearing in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Broadband Network





115 Grant Gross, Comcast, BitTorrent to Work Together on Network Management, IN-
FOWORLD, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/03/27/Comcast-BitTorrent-
to-work-together-on-network-managementI.html.
116 See News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Agenda and Witnesses
for Public En Banc Hearing at Stanford University on Broadband Network Management




119 See News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Additional Panelist for
Public En Banc Hearing at Carnegie Mellon University on Broadband and the Digital Future




the FCC Chairman and attended by the other Commissioners. It consisted of
two panel discussions, "The Future of Digital Media" and "The Broadband of
Tomorrow," together with a public comment period. 2 ' Comcast did not par-
ticipate as a panelist in this hearing.
These en banc hearings were clearly conducted in an informal manner and
as part of the Broadband Industry Practice Inquiry rather than as part of a for-
mal adjudication of the Free Press Complaint, which would have been con-
ducted as a restricted-as opposed to public--proceeding.21 They were typical
of the sorts of quasi-legislative informational fact and opinion gathering exer-
cises conducted by administrative agencies in the performance of their rule-
making functions. 22 No administrative hearing officer or Administrative Law
Judge presided over the hearings, there are no indications that the FCC's En-
forcement Bureau was either present or involved with their preparation, and
the Commission itself selected panel topics and participants and conducted the
hearings.'23 Expert panelists gave informational presentations, not sworn testi-
mony, and unlike expert witness presentations in a judicial proceeding, were
not subjected to cross-examination by Comcast or any other party.
G. The Mystical Union of Statutory Authority and the Internet Policy
Statement
As discussed above, the FCC cites no direct delegation of authority by Con-
gress authorizing the agency either to establish rules governing, or to adjudi-
cate disputes concerning, broadband network management practices in the
Comcast P2P Order.'24 Rather, the FCC's action rests exclusively on the
120 Id.
121 47 C.F.R. § 1.1208 (2007); see 47 C.F.R. § 1.1202(e) (defining a matter designated
for hearing as "[a]ny matter that has been designated for hearing before an administrative
law judge or which is otherwise designated for hearing in accordance with procedures in 5
U.S.C. § 554."); see also infra Part 1V.C (discussing procedural infirmities).
122 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,088 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting)
(noting the FCC has "quasi-executive, -legislative and -judicial powers.").
123 See, e.g., FCC July 21 News Release, supra note 119.
124 This is not surprising. As Commissioner McDowell recognized in his dissenting
statement, Congress has repeatedly tried and failed to enact legislation granting the FCC
such direct regulatory authority over facilities-based providers of broadband Internet access
services. See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,089-90 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissent-
ing); see also Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006,
H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 201; Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 2
(2007); Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006); Internet Free-
dom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. § 2 (20076); Internet Non-Discrimination Act
of 2006, S. 2360, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006); Communications, Consumer's Choice, and
Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 901 (2006); Internet Freedom
Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5353, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008).
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Commission's claimed authority to directly vindicate and enforce federal pol-
icy against providers of broadband Internet access services through an exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction. 5
Former FCC Chairman William Kennard described the jurisdictional basis
for the Comcast P2P Order as "murky."' 26 Murky may be an understatement.
The Comcast P2P Order defies easy analysis, and the Commission's repeated
disclaimers compound the problem that it is doing precisely what the Comcast
P2P Order seems to do-establish new, prospective standards of behavior for
broadband Internet service providers.'"
The confusion originates with the allegations contained in the Free Press
Complaint, which is what the FCC purported to adjudicate. Free Press simply
cited the Internet Policy Statement in describing why Comcast should be sanc-
tioned for its network management practices.'28 Free Press later clarified that
when its Complaint had referred to enforcing the Internet Policy Statement, it
really meant "making policy based on announced principles set fourth in a Pol-
icy Statement by using adjudication to enforce rights guaranteed to consumers,
and which the FCC must ensure because of obligations imposed on the FCC by
the Communications Act."'29
As discussed in the Comcast P2P Order, the FCC purported to "exercise au-
thority over the complaint [as] reasonably ancillary" to its authority, respec-
tively, under sections 1, 201, 230(b), 256, 257, 601(4), and 706 of the Act. 3 °
However, the consumer entitlements that Comcast is alleged to have violated
derive purely from the Internet Policy Statement. The Commission's reasoning
linking behavioral norms articulated in the Internet Policy Statement and the
1996 Act has the sinuosity of a Mobius-strip: It is nearly impossible to tell
where the Internet policy principles leave off and statutory commands begin,
as the following excerpt from the Comcast P2P Order demonstrates:
On its face, Comcast's interference with peer-to-peer protocols appears to contravene
the federal policy of "promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet" because
that interference impedes consumers from "run[ning] applications .. . of their choice,"
125 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13-15; see also id at 13,090 (McDowell,
Comm'r, dissenting).
126 John Eggerton, Kennard: FCC on Shaky Ground in Comcast Decision, BROAD. &
CABLE, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asplayout
=articlePrint&articlelD=CA6589526.
127 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 45-46.
128 Free Press Complaint, supra note 11, at i.
129 See Petition of Free Press, et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet
Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception
for "Reasonable Network Management," Ex Parte Communication of Free Press, CC
Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-337, 95-20, 98-10, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52,
WC Docket No. 07-52, supp. 2 at 2 (June 12, 2008) (accessible via the FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Free Press June 12 Ex Parte].
130 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15-21.
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rather than those favored by Comcast, and that interference limits consumers' ability
"to access the lawful Internet content of their choice," including the video program-
ming made available by vendors like Vuze. Comcast's selective interference also ap-
pears to discourage the "development of technologies"-such as peer-to-peer tech-
nologies-that "maximize user control over what information is received by individu-
als ... who use the Internet" because that interference (again) impedes consumers
from "run[ning] applications ... of their choice," rather than those favored by Com-
cast. 3'
In support of the foregoing propositions, the Commission cites section
230(b)(1) of the Act, paragraph four of the Internet Policy Statement, com-
ments submitted in the record of the Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry,
and a law review article.'32 The Commission found that "Comcast's discrimina-
tory network management practices [that interfere with user applications] also
run afoul of federal policy" in the following ways:
they reduce the rapidity and efficiency of the public Internet, see supra para. 16, cf. 47
U.S.C. § 151, impede competition, see supra para. 16, cf 47 U.S.C. § 151, inhibit the
deployment of advanced technologies, see supra para. 18, cf 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt, im-
properly shift traffic (and hence costs) to providers who offer DSL as a common car-
rier service, see supra para. 17, cf 47 U.S.C. § 201, prevent the seamless and trans-
parent flow of information across public telecommunications networks, see supra
para. 19, cf 47 U.S.C. § 256, erect barriers to entry for entrepreneurs, see supra para.
20 cf 47 U.S.C. § 257, and degrade an individual's ability to access a diverse array of
content over the Internet, see supra paras.20-21, cf 47 U.S.C. §§ 257, 521(4).'
In other words, by using the signal "cf," the FCC signaled its understanding
that these statutory provisions were not directly applicable to the behavior un-
der examination. 3 Nonetheless, the Comcast P2P Order waivers back and
forth between outright declarations that Comcast violated the rights of con-
sumers as described in the Internet Policy Statement, to less-serious declara-
tions that the company has "run afoul of federal policy" as embodied in the
Communications Act.' The Commission purports to be enforcing the rights
guaranteed to consumers in the Internet Policy Statement through case-by-case
adjudication and justifies its action by claiming that in so doing the Commis-
sion is carrying out its statutory responsibilities under the Act, pursuant to its
ancillary jurisdiction. In short, the Comcast P2P Order seems to rest on a mys-
tical union achieved between the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and the pro-
visions of the Communications Act to which the Commission claims its exer-
131 Id. 43 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
132 Id. 43 nn.194-200.
133 Id. 43 n.201.
134 The Bluebook explains the use of"cf." as follows: "Cited authority supports a propo-
sition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support." THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 47 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). The Bluebook is "the best known and most widely used [legal]
citation manual." Carol M. Bast & Susan Harrell, Has the Bluebook Met Its Match? The
ALWD Citation Manual, 92 LAw LIBR. J. 337, 339 (2000).
135 Comeast P2P Order, supra note 9, 43 & n.201.
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cise of regulatory authority is reasonably ancillary.
H. Summary
Whether considered individually or as a group, the Wireline Broadband Or-
der, Internet Policy Statement, and Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry fail
to definitively establish the FCC's ancillary authority either to enforce federal
Internet policy or to adopt rules codifying this policy into legally binding
norms of behavior. 136 Instead, these actions demonstrate only the existence of
relevant federal policies contained in disparate provisions of the Communica-
tions Act and the Commission's untested belief that it has ancillary authority to
take regulatory action against a cable modem service provider to enforce them.
Such faith-based ancillary jurisdiction, unless and until tested in court, remains
in the realm of belief rather than established law.
The FCC's Internet Policy Statement contained four broadband Internet ac-
cess service consumer entitlements, which it made subject to "reasonable net-
work management."'37 The FCC had not, however, adopted any legally binding
rules of behavior incorporating either the principles contained in the Internet
Policy Statement relevant to the allegations contained in the Free Press Com-
plaint.' The FCC had not incorporated a voluntary commitment by Comcast
to abide by the Internet Policy Statement in its Adelphia-Time Warner-
Comcast license transfer approval order.'39 Finally, it is quite evident from its
repeated inclusion of the question in rulemaking notices that the FCC under-
stood that it was in fact an uncertain proposition as to whether the agency
could impose additional regulatory constraints on providers of broadband In-
ternet access services pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction. 4'
According to the Commission's Internet Policy Statement, Congress estab-
lished a national Internet policy by enacting section 230 of the 1996 Act. 4' The
Commission claimed to be clarifying the contours of this policy in its own pol-
icy statement, and it committed to both incorporate this clarified policy in its
on-going policy-making activities and to take undefined action to address vio-
lations of the policy principles in the future. 142 However, this chain of logic
does not support the agency's jurisdictional claims: policy clarifying policy
combined with a pledge to make more policy based on the clarified policy does
not create legally binding rules against which ISP behavior may be adjudi-
136 See supra Part II.B, D-E.
137 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 5 & n. 15.
138 See supra Part I.D.
139 See supra notes 85-88 (discussing the Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast transaction).
140 See supra Part II.A-E.





Moreover, the Internet Policy Statement itself was not an implementation of
specific provisions of the Communications Act, and the FCC's premise that it
may regulate the network management practices of broadband ISPs as rea-
sonably ancillary to sections 230(b) and 706 of the Act, is, to date, untested in
court.1 43 Although the FCC had expressed its opinion that it possessed ancil-
lary jurisdiction to support an assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over the net-
work management practices of broadband ISPs, it had repeatedly also sought
comment on whether in fact such jurisdiction existed.'"
It is thus apparent that the FCC has done precisely what Free Press sug-
gested: "ma[de] policy based on announced principles set fourth in a Policy
Statement by using adjudication to enforce rights guaranteed to consumers, and
which the FCC must ensure because of obligations imposed on the FCC by the
Communications Act."'' 45 Yet the FCC was not interpreting the Communica-
tions Act for the purpose of judging Comcast's conduct. The provisions of the
Act are cited solely in support of the Commission's claim that it has ancillary
jurisdiction that it may exercise to adjudicate the allegations in the Free Press
Complaint. However, for the reasons stated below, these provisions of the Act
do not supply the ancillary jurisdiction the FCC claims, and the Internet Policy
Statement does not contain enforceable rules. Additionally, the Act does not
obligate the FCC to enforce the consumer entitlements contained in the Inter-
net Policy Statement. The FCC therefore lacks both delegated authority over
the matter, lacks rules to enforce, and the Order must be considered ultra vires.
For analytical clarity, we discuss the various sources of authority upon which
the FCC relies, first addressing the core jurisdictional issue before proceeding
to analyze the application of that doctrine to the Free Press Complaint.
Our analysis of the Commission's claims concerning its ancillary jurisdic-
tion in Part III, below, begins with a review of the relevant Supreme Court
cases establishing the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and survey recent deci-
sions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that further illuminate
the contours-and particularly the limits-of the doctrine. These cases, taken
together, establish what we call the "bounded nature of the doctrine." Next, we
demonstrate that none of the provisions of the Communications Act cited by
the Commission, whether considered singly or together, provide a basis for an
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the network management practices of
Comcast, and that the Commission overstepped its statutory authority by adju-
dicating the Free Press Complaint.
W43 See infra Part III.A.
144 See supra Part II.E.
145 Free Press June 12 Ex Parte, supra note 129, supp. 2 at 2.
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III. THE FCC LACKS ANCILLARY JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE
INTERNET POLICY STATEMENT
A. The Doctrine of Ancillary Jurisdiction is Not Unbounded
The FCC's ancillary authority-or jurisdiction-is a judicially-recognized
doctrine that permits the FCC to regulate matters or entities not explicitly cov-
ered by the provisions of the Communications Act in circumstances where: (1)
the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I covers the subject
matter of the regulations; and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibili-
ties.'46 That is, as even the FCC recognizes, "[t]o be 'reasonably ancillary,' the
Commission's rules must be reasonably ancillary to something."'47 Although
the courts have repeatedly stated that the FCC has "broad authority" under this
doctrine to implement statutory purposes, they have also recognized that the
FCC's ancillary authority is limited. 4
The most authoritative cases on ancillary jurisdiction are the original Su-
preme Court decisions establishing and delimiting the doctrine: Southwestern
Cable, Midwest Video I and Midwest Video H."'9 These decisions are discussed
at length, as they are critical to understanding the proper scope of the FCC's
ancillary authority. Taken together, these three Supreme Court cases establish
a limited or "bounded" doctrine that permits the FCC to act where the Act ap-
plies-generally to wire and radio communications-even where the Act con-
tains no express regulatory mandates for the agency to implement over that
subject matter. In other words, the courts have recognized that the FCC's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction must be interpreted broadly, but the FCC's ability to
impose regulatory constraints on the provision of the expansive array of com-
munications falling within its jurisdiction is far more circumscribed. Above all,
Title I ancillary jurisdiction is a derivative, not generative, source of authority
and it must be exercised in the Commission's regulatory responsibilities con-
tained in other titles of the Act. 5°
146 United States v. Sw. Cable Co. (Sw. Cable), 392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968); see Am.
Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
147 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 15 n.63 (emphasis added) (quoting Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
148 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 177-78; FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I1),
440 U.S. 689, 696 (1979).
149 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 178; U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406
U.S. 649, 669-70 (1972); Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 697.
150 See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also W.
KENNETH FERREE, ELEPHANTS Do NOT HIDE IN MOUSE HOLES, PROGRESS & FREEDOM




1. The Scope ofAncillary Jurisdiction Recognized by the Supreme Court is
Limited
a. United States v. Southwestern Cable
The question presented in Southwestern Cable was whether the FCC, prior
to the enactment of Title VI, had authority under the Act to regulate cable tele-
vision systems--then known as "community antenna television"
("CATV")-and if so, whether the FCC had the authority to issue an order
restricting the expansion of a television broadcast station's service via cable
beyond certain broadcast contours. 5' The FCC had justified the distant signal
importation rules under review as necessary-if not imperative--to prevent a
feared destruction or serious degradation of the service offered by television
broadcast stations.1
52
First, the Court found that the FCC had broad subject matter jurisdiction
over "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio," which in-
cludes cable systems as they are comprised within the term "communication by
wire or radio."' 53 The Court also found that there was no doubt that cable pro-
viders were engaged in interstate communications. 4 Additionally, the Court
observed that in 1934 Congress could not foresee every form of wire or radio
communications and therefore built flexibility for the FCC into the Act to al-
low the Commission to effectively perform its express regulatory obliga-
tions.'55 Thus, where an activity is covered by Title I's broad grant of authority
over wire and radio communication, Titles II and III do not otherwise limit the
FCC's subject matter jurisdiction. In other words, the FCC's subject matter
jurisdiction is not limited to common carrier wire or radio communications or
radio and television broadcasting services.
Next, the Court acknowledged that the FCC "ha[d] reasonably concluded
that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform with ef-
fectiveness certain of its other responsibilities."'56 In particular, the FCC
needed to exert jurisdiction over cable to carry out its "core obligation" pursu-
ant to section 307(b) of "providing a widely dispersed radio and television ser-
151 Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 160-61.
152 Id. at 164-66. The challenged rules required that cable systems bringing competing
signals into the service area of a broadcast station whose signal they also carried to avoid
duplication of the local station programming on the same day such programming was
broadcast, and to refrain from importing new distant signals into the 100 largest television
markets unless first demonstrating that the service would comport with the public interest.
Id. at 166-67.
153 Id. at 167-68 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 152(a) (1964)).
154 Id. at 168-69.
155 Id. at 172-73.
156 Id. at 173.
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vice" that is equitably distributed "among states and communities," and its sec-
tion 303(f) and (h) obligation "to prevent interference among . . . stations."'
' 57
Accordingly, the Court found that the FCC had reasonably concluded that the
successful performance of its responsibilities for the orderly development of
local television broadcasting "demands prompt and efficacious regulation of
[CATV] systems," and that it would not "prohibit administrative action im-
perative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes" in the absence
of evidence that Congress intended to so limit the agency.'58 Based on these
findings, the Court determined that the FCC has authority under section 152(a)
that is "restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."'' 9 Additionally, the Court found "[t]he Commission may, for
these purposes, issue 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions
and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as 'public convenience, interest or
necessity requires."'"60 Significantly, the Court refrained from expressing any
view "as to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any
other circumstances or for any other purposes."''
Southwestern Cable established a jurisdictional doctrine of limited scope:
the exercise of ancillary regulatory authority is appropriate when imperative
for the effective performance of the FCC's express statutory mandates such
that its absence would thwart the successful performance of these duties. In the
case of the distant signal importation rules, the statutory authority to which
cable regulation was reasonably ancillary was the FCC's core obligations with
respect to television broadcast stations contained in several provisions of Title
Il.62 Only after an appropriate jurisdictional foundation is recognized may the
Commission resort to its authority pursuant to section 303(r) to issue rules,
regulations, and prescribe restrictions.'63 The Supreme Court went no further in
Southwestern Cable than to find ancillary authority over the subject matter of
cable television, and regulatory authority for the distance signal importation
rule ancillary to Title III. However, in short time the Court would be asked to
determine the applicability of the Commission's regulatory authority of other
aspects of cable television service.
157 Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 173-74.





163 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 177; 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000).
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b. United States v. Midwest Video Corporation (Midewest I)
After its ancillary jurisdiction over cable systems was upheld in Southwest-
ern Cable, the FCC expanded the cable regulatory framework, and industry
challenges quickly followed. Four years after Southwestern Cable, Midwest
Video I provided the Court with the opportunity to further refine the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction in a challenge to the recently crafted program origination
rules."6 A plurality of the Court stated:
[T]he critical question in this case is whether the Commission has reasonably deter-
mined that its origination rule will "further the achievement of long-established regu-
latory goals in the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets
for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and
types of services. ,,65
The plurality found the program origination rule reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the FCC's various responsibilities for the regulation
of television broadcasting, and therefore within the agency's authority. 6  Spe-
cifically, the program origination rules were ancillary to the FCC's obligation
to "facilitate the more effective performance of [its] duty to provide a fair, effi-
cient, and equitable distribution of television service to each of the several
States and communities" in granting station licenses pursuant to section 307(b)
of the Act.
167
The plurality opinion reviewed the limited extent of the Court's action in its
earlier decision in Southwestern Cable:
We ... held that § 2(a) is itself a grant of regulatory power and not merely a prescrip-
tion of the forms of communication to which the Act's other provisions governing
common carriers and broadcasters apply .... This conclusion, however, did not end
the analysis, for § 2(a) does not in and of itselfprescribe any objectives for which the
Commission's regulatory power over [cable] might properly be exercised. We ac-
cordingly went on to evaluate the reasons for which the Commission had asserted ju-
risdiction and found that "the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory
authority over [cable] is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness
certain of its other responsibilities .... In particular, we found that the Commission
had reasonably determined that "the unregulated explosive growth of [cable]," espe-
cially through "its importation of distant signals into the service areas of local sta-
tions" and the resulting division of audiences and revenues, threatened to "deprive the
public of the various benefits of the system of local broadcasting stations" that the
Commission was charged with developing and overseeing under § 307(b) of the Act..
.We therefore concluded, without expressing any view "as to the Commission's au-
thority, if any, to regulate [cable] under any other circumstances or for any other pur-
poses," [to] ... issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and
164 See United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
165 Id. at 667-68. In other words the question is "whether the Commission's program-
origination rule is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of (its) various respon-
sibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."' Id. at 662-63.
166 Id. at 670.
167 Id. at 670 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2000)).
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conditions, not inconsistent with law," as "public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires."'
168
The plurality concluded, "the Commission's legitimate concern in the regu-
lation of [cable] is not limited to controlling the competitive impact [cable]
may have on broadcast services.' ' 69 Rather, the Commission has "various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting," that go beyond
simply "assuring that broadcast stations operating in the public interest do not
go out of business."'70 These other responsibilities include "requiring [cable]
affirmatively to further statutory policies," in recognition of the fact that cable
systems "have arisen in response to public need and demand for improved
television service and perform valuable services in this respect."'' Accord-
ingly, the plurality found the challenged regulation was reasonably ancillary to
several of the Commission's statutory responsibilities with respect to broadcast
regulation, and was supported by substantial record evidence that it would
promote the public interest.'
Midwest Video I reaffirmed three things. First, section 2(a) is not merely a
prescription of the forms of communication to which Title II and III ap-
ply--that is, a source of subject matter jurisdiction.' Second, section 2(a) is a
source of regulatory power-ancillary authority--but the section does not it-
self prescribe the objectives for which the Commission's regulatory power
over cable may properly be exercised.'74 Third, Midwest Video I reaffirmed that
the objectives of the exercise of regulatory power--that to which the chal-
lenged exercise is reasonably ancillary--must derive from the Commission's
other regulatory responsibilities.'75 Chief Justice Burger concurred only in the
result in Midwest Video I on the grounds that cable regulation was within the
Commission's Title III jurisdiction over broadcast stations.'76 Justice Burger
wrote:
Candor requires acknowledgement, for me at least, that the Commission's position
strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has
evolved by decisions of the Commission and the courts. The almost explosive devel-
opment of [cable] suggests the need of a comprehensive re-examination of the statu-
tory scheme as it relates to this new development, so that the basic policies are con-
168 Id. at 660-62 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
169 Id. at 664.
170 Id.
171 Midwest Video 1, 406 U.S. at 664-65.
172 Id. at 670-74.
173 See id. at 662-63.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 670.
176 See id. at 675 (Burger, J., concurring) ("[Cable] is dependent totally on broadcast
signals and is a significant link in the system as a whole and therefore must be seen as with-
in the jurisdiction of the Act.").
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sidered by Congress and not left entirely to the Commission and the courts.
77
The Midwest Video I dissenting opinion found the challenged cable regula-
tion completely beyond the jurisdiction granted to the FCC by Congress."
7
Significantly, the dissenting Justices warned that the upshot of the decision "is
to make the Commission's authority over activities 'ancillary' to its responsi-
bilities greater than its authority over any broadcast licensee," a result only
properly achieved by congressional amendment to the Act. 79 It is apparent that
the view that cable was within the scope of the Commission's delegated au-
thority for the regulation of television broadcasting was grounded, to a signifi-
cant degree, in the view that cable was either "an auxiliary to broadcasting
through the retransmission by wire of intercepted television signals to viewers
otherwise unable to receive them because of distance or local terrain" or was
itself a form of broadcasting, which the FCC already had extensive powers to
regulate under Title 111.18
c. FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation (Midwest II)
The next set of FCC cable regulations promulgated under ancillary jurisdic-
tion presented for Supreme Court review proved to be a bridge too far for a
majority of the Court. In Midwest Video II, the challenged rules: (1) prescribed
a series of interrelated obligations ensuring the set aside of public, educational,
and governmental ("PEG") and leased access channels on cable systems of a
designated size; (2) deprived the cable operators of "all discretion regarding
who may exploit their access channels and what may be transmitted over such
channels"; and (3) instructed the cable operators to "issue rules providing for
first-come, nondiscriminatory access on public and leased channels."''
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Court reviewed its prior ancil-
lary jurisdiction cases. Southwestern Cable upheld the Commission's regula-
tory effort because it was justified as "imperative to prevent interference with
the Commission's work in the broadcasting area. ' ' 82 With respect to Midwest
Video I, the Court stated "[flour Justices, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan,
reaffirmed the view that the Commission has jurisdiction over cable television
and that such authority is delimited by its statutory responsibilities over televi-
sion broadcasting," whereas the "Chief Justice, in a separate opinion concur-
ring in the result, admonished that the Commission's origination rule
177 Midwest Video 1, 406 U.S. at 676.
178 See id. at 679 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 681.
180 Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
181 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 440 U.S. 689, 693-94 (1979).
182 Id. at 706-07.
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'[strained] the outer limits' of its jurisdiction."'83 The Court reiterated that the
FCC's regulations were upheld in Midwest Video I because they promoted
"long-established goals of broadcasting regulation."'"
Against this backdrop, the Midwest Video II Court found the FCC's chal-
lenged access rules to be qualitatively different from those previously ap-
proved and in contravention of statutory limitations designed to safeguard the
journalistic freedom of broadcasters, particularly the command of § 3(h) of the
Act that a "person engaged in ...broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a
common carrier." '85 Unlike the local programming origination rules, which
compelled cable operators to assume a more positive role in the composition of
their programming comparable to that of television broadcasters,'86 the access
rules "transferred control of the content of cable access channels from cable
operators to members of the public who wished to communicate by the cable
medium."'81 Although section 3(h) by its terms precludes the FCC from com-
pelling television broadcasters to act as common carriers,'88 the Court held
"that same constraint applies to the regulation of cable systems," 89 and the
FCC exceeded its jurisdiction by attempting to "relegat[e] cable systems, pro
tanto, to common-carrier status" with its access rules. 9 ° As Justice White indi-
cated:
Of course, § 3(h) does not explicitly limit the regulation of cable systems. But without
reference to the provisions of the Act directly governing broadcasting, the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction under § 2(a) would be unbounded.... Though afforded wide lati-
tude in its supervision over communication by wire, the Commission was not dele-
gated unrestrained authority.'9'
With respect to congressional guidance the Court stated, "Congress has re-
stricted the Commission's ability to advance objectives associated with public
access at the expense of journalistic freedom of persons engaged in broadcast-
ing," and the force of that limitation "is not diminished by the variant technol-
ogy involved in cable transmissions."'92 Unlike the regulations that were found
within the scope of the FCC's ancillary authority in Southwestern and Midwest
Video I, where a lack of congressional guidance led the Court to defer to the
Commission's judgment concerning the scope of its authority, "here there are
183 Id. at 698-99.
184 Id. at 707.
185 Id. at 700; 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000).
186 See id. at 700.
187 Id.
188 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(10); id. at 695.
189 Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. at 705 n.15.
190 Id. at 700.
191 Id. at 706.
192 Id. at 707.
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strong indications that agency flexibility was to be sharply delimited."'93
Thus, in Midwest Video 11, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of Mid-
west Video I by finding that if the basis for jurisdiction over cable is that the
Commission's authority is ancillary to the regulation of broadcasting, the cable
regulation imposed may not be antithetical to a basic regulatory parameter es-
tablished for broadcasting. The Court reiterated that any exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction under section 2(a) of the Act must make "reference to the provi-
sions of the Act directly governing" the activity to which the requirement is
alleged to be ancillary. 94 In other words, a permissible exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction must be reasonably ancillary to provisions authorizing the Com-
mission to regulate the activities of providers of communications by wire or
radio under the operative Titles of the Act, and must not be contrary to any
express provision of the Act. As implied by the phrase "ancillary jurisdiction,"
the authority exercised must be in relation to something else. Otherwise, the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction would extend the Commission's regulatory
jurisdiction beyond the bounds explicitly established by Congress. It is evident
therefore that ancillary jurisdiction is highly fact-specific; each Commission
exercise of this authority must be judged on the facts presented.
d. Ancillary Jurisdiction in Adjudications
It is also noteworthy that all three Supreme Court cases-Southwestern Ca-
ble and Midwest Video I and Midwest Video II-involve the agency's rulemak-
ing and not adjudicatory functions. From that, one may reasonably infer that an
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction should occur only in agency rulemakings.
Ancillary jurisdiction is an amorphous concept, originated by the FCC and
sanctioned by the courts; it is therefore uncertain until the last appeal is ex-
hausted whether any given exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is lawful. Such a
doctrine has a place in the context of rulemaking proceedings imposing general
rules of prospective effect; it is ill suited by its nature to sustain an adjudica-
tion, which predominantly is retrospective in effect.'95 The extension of the
doctrine to adjudications as the Commission sought to do in the Comcast P2P
193 Id. at 708. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, took issue with the
view that section 3(h), one of the definitional sections contained in Title I of the Act, "places
limits on the Commission's exercise of powers otherwise within its statutory authority be-
cause a lawfully imposed requirement might be termed a 'common carrier obligation."' Id.
at 710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the rules at issue as an example of
the FCC's "flexibility to experiment" in choosing to replace the mandatory local origination
rule upheld in Midwest Video I with what the agency viewed as the less onerous local access
rules. Id. at 713.
194 Id. at 706 (majority opinion).
195 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Order would, if recognized, introduce devastating uncertainty for all entities
falling within the FCC's subject matter jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, in the Comeast P2P Order, the Commission rejected argu-
ments advanced by Comcast that its ancillary authority does not extend to ad-
judications, but must first be exercised in a rulemaking proceeding.'96 The FCC
responded, "the D.C. Circuit has affirmed the Commission's exercise of ancil-
lary authority in an adjudicatory proceeding and in the absence of regulations
before."'97 The FCC cited only one precedent supporting the exercise of ancil-
lary authority in any context other than a rulemaking: CBS v. FCC, in which
the court concluded, "the Commission had, in the context of an adjudication,
reasonably construed its ancillary authority to encompass television net-
works."' 98
CBS v. FCC originated with a complaint filed by the Carter-Mondale Presi-
dential Committee alleging that the three broadcast television networks--CBS,
NBC and ABC-violated their statutory obligation to provide reasonable ac-
cess pursuant to section 312(a)(7).'99 By a slim majority the FCC found that the
networks had violated section 312(a)(7) and directed the networks to inform
the Commission how they intended to fulfill their obligation under the Act; the
networks appealed."' The statutory provision at issue empowered the FCC to
revoke a station's license for "willful or repeated failure to allow [legally
qualified candidates] reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for use of [the] broadcast station." '' The FCC interpreted sec-
tion 3 12(a)(7) as including two severable elements, one establishing a reason-
able access obligation and the other a specific remedy, and argued that the ac-
cess obligation was not written in such a way as to expressly "identify the enti-
ties subject to the obligation."2 2 Given the purpose of the provision--to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of broadcast
station use time---the FCC interpreted the provision as imposing an obligation
on the individual stations and the networks "who, by practice and contractual
relationship, control the best practical means of efficiently acquiring national
access."
20 3
196 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 38.
197 Id.
198 Id. 38 n.167 (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980), affd,
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
199 In re Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. against The ABC,
CBS and NBC Television Networks, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d. 631,
1 (1979) [hereinafter Carter-Mondale Order]; 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000).
200 Id.; CBS, 629 F.2d at 8-9. Dissenting Commissioners Lee and Washburn protested
the order's interference with the editorial discretion of broadcasters. Id. n.9.
201 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
202 CBS, 629 F.2d at 25.
203 Id. at 26.
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The court observed that "[t]he access right accorded to presidential candi-
dates by [s]ection 312(a)(7) would have been robbed of much of its intended
significance if the candidate were forced to go from station to station around
the country assembling his own network."' After reviewing the legislative
history, the court concluded: "there is support in the legislative history for the
contention that Congress intended section 312(a)(7) to apply to the[se] net-
works. ' 2°' The court further observed that "[e]ven if section 312(a)(7) by itself
does not afford the Commission power to mandate reasonable network access,
such jurisdiction is 'reasonably ancillary' to the effective enforcement of the
individual licensee's [s]ection 312(a)(7) obligations, and hence, within the
Commission's statutory authority.'20 6 The court pointed to other provisions of
Title III permitting the Commission to exercise jurisdiction over chain broad-
casting and the breadth of the FCC's recognized jurisdiction to regulate broad-
cast activities, concluding that the "Commission's action in applying [s]ection
312(a)(7) to the networks is an exercise of its powers 'reasonably ancillary' to
the effective enforcement of the provision. 2 7
In the underlying order, the FCC had reasoned that:
[T]he legislative intent in enacting Section 312(a)(7) was both to impose a general ob-
ligation of access on the broadcast media and to establish license revocation as one
remedy for violation of that obligation. We will, therefore, interpret Section 312(a)(7)
as applying to the combination of licensees in a network as well as to individual licen-
sees. This interpretation is not only the most reasonable one under the circumstances
but also one that is supported by cases which recognize that the Commission has an-
cillary jurisdiction to regulate matters closely tied to its express statutory obliga-
tions.2 °8
The FCC reasoned further:
Even if Section 312(a)(7) does not directly impose an obligation on the networks,
such an obligation is clearly imposed on network-affiliated licensees under the statute.
Our power to adjudicate complaints involving requests for access to the networks is
surely "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities.
20 9
It is evident, therefore, that although the D.C. Circuit previously affirmed
the Commission's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing, it did not do so in the absence of binding legal requirements. The legal
requirement at issue in CBS v. FCC was quite clearly section 312(a)(7) of the
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. (citing United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)).
207 Id. at 27.
208 Carter-Mondale Order, supra note 199, 25.
209 Id. 25 n.9. In making this determination, the FCC relied on Southwest Cable, and
other cases recognizing the FCC's authority over the broadcast networks under various pro-
visions of the Act. See id.
[Vol. 17
Undue Process at the FCC
Act.2 The Commission could reasonably choose to effectuate Congressional
intent in enacting section 312(a)(7) by relying on case-by-case adjudication
because the nature of the right established in that provision is an individual
right of access to broadcast station facilities and airtime by "legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 211 Both the
underlying Commission order and the opinion of the D.C. Circuit rest on the
dual grounds that the statute as written applied to the broadcast networks and
that the FCC had the power to implement its provisions under its ancillary ju-
risdiction. Thus, the case does not support the FCC's broad view that it may
lawfully exercise its ancillary authority in an adjudicatory proceeding in the
absence of regulations. At most, CBS v. FCC suggests that in an appropriate
case arising under a provision of the Act that establishes a legal requirement,
the FCC has ancillary authority to extend the reach of that obligation where it
is "reasonably ancillary to the effective enforcement of the Commission's
various responsibilities," and therefore, within its statutory authority.2 2 Clearly
there must be a closer nexus between the interpretation enforced in the adjudi-
cation and the underlying statute than is present in the Comcast P2P Order.
2. The Bounded Nature ofAncillary Jurisdiction Has Been Recognized by the
D.C. Circuit
The Supreme Court's bounded view of the scope of the Commission's ancil-
lary jurisdiction has become somewhat obscured by a succession of lower
court rulings, some of which appear to support the view reflected in the Corn-
cast P2P Order that the agency may ground its ancillary jurisdiction solely in
the general grant of regulatory authority contained in Title I of the Act.213 As
demonstrated below in Parts IV.B and IV.B.3, however, Title I was not the
sole source of an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction by the courts in any of the
cases relied upon by the Commission in the Comcast P2P Order. We first dis-
cuss two recent D.C. Circuit Court cases confirming the limited scope of the
FCC's ancillary authority.
210 See CBS, 629 F.2d at 14, 34.
211 Carter-Mondale Order, supra note 199, 17; 47 U.S.C. § 312.
212 Carter-Mondale Order, supra note 199, 25 n.9 (quoting United States v. Sw. Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)).
213 See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
FCC's authority is not absolute and that in order to use its ancillary jurisdiction the regula-
tion must be within the FCC's jurisdiction under Title I and "the subject of the regulation
must be reasonably ancillary to the effective performance" of the FCC's duties); Motion
Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that portions
of the Act did not permit the FCC to adopt rules regulating program content).
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a. MPAA v. FCC
In MPAA, the D.C. Circuit addressed the question whether the FCC had
delegated authority under section 1 of the Act to enact video description
rules.2 4 The 1996 Act added to the Communications Act two rules covering
video programming accessibility: section 613(a)-(d), which dealt with closed
captioning and section 613(f), which addressed video description technolo-
gies."5 The closed captioning provision required the FCC to conduct an in-
quiry, produce a report, and prescribe regulations.26 In contrast, for video de-
scription, section 613(f) required only that the FCC produce a report for Con-
gress. " ' By a 3-2 vote, the FCC concluded that it had statutory authority to
promulgate video description rules.2 8 Although the FCC had relied on a com-
bination of sections 1, 2(a), 4(i), and 303(r) for its authority, at oral argument
counsel for the Commission essentially conceded that "if the agency cannot
find its authority in section 1 then the video description regulations must be
vacated by the court."2 9 A majority of the D.C. Circuit agreed, and the rules
were vacated.2
The MPAA majority found that Chevron deference 22' was inapplicable be-
cause the FCC had exceeded its delegated authority.2 2 The court found that the
FCC lacked delegated authority under section 1 to enact video description rules
because the rules implicated the content of video programming, and as such,
went well beyond the agency's charge to "ensure that all people of the United
States, without discrimination, have access to wire and radio communications
transmissions. ' ' 223 The Court elaborated:
Both the terms of [section] 1 and the case law amplifying it focus on the FCC's power
to promote the accessibility and universality of transmission, not to regulate program
content. Neither the FCC's Order nor its brief to this court cite any authority to sug-
gest otherwise. To regulate in the area of programming, the FCC must find its author-
ity in provisions other than [section] 1.224
214 MPAA, 309 F.3d at 798.
215 47 U.S.C. § 613(a)-(d), (f) (2000).
216 § 613(a)-(b).
217 § 613(f).
218 In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, Report and Order & Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 29-34 (Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Broadcast
Flag Order].
219 Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
220 Id. at 803, 807.
221 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (explaining that on an issue of statutory interpretation where Congress is silent,
courts will defer to the interpretation of the administrative agency charged with implement-
ing the statute so long as the administrative agency's interpretation is reasonable).
222 MPAA, 309 F.3d at 800-01.
223 Id. at 803-04.
224 Id. at 804; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000) (governing designation of cable channels
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The MPAA majority also confirmed that the FCC may avail itself of section
303(r) and 4(i) authority only where Congress has delegated regulatory author-
ity in an area.225 With respect to section 303(r), the provision "simply [could
not] carry the weight of the Commission's argument" that it may regulate
video description because it is a "valid communications policy goal" and the
rules are "in the public interest."226The court observed that simply because the
FCC claims an action is taken in the public interest and to carry out the provi-
sions of the Act does not mean it is necessarily authorized by the Act; "[t]he
FCC must act pursuant to delegated authority before any 'public interest' in-
quiry [is] made under [section] 303(r)." 227 Nor did the MPAA majority find the
FCC's argument that section 4(i), standing alone, gives it authority to promul-
gate the disputed rules, adopting the reasons cited by then-Chairman Powell in
his dissent to the Commission order adopting the rules:
It is important to emphasize that section 4(i) is not a stand-alone basis of authority and
cannot be read in isolation. It is more akin to a "necessary and proper" clause. Section
4(i)'s authority must be "reasonably ancillary" to other express provisions. And, by its
express terms, our exercise of that authority cannot be "inconsistent" with other provi-
sions of the Act. The reason for these limitations is plain: Were an agency afforded
carte blanche under such a broad provision, irrespective of subsequent congressional
acts that did not squarely prohibit such action, it would be able to expand greatly its
regulatory reach.228
The agency's remaining jurisdictional argument--that section 2(a) sup-
ported the challenged regulations-was summarily rejected for similar rea-
sons.229 Finally, the court stated:
[I]f there were any serious question about [the] proper result in this case, all doubt is
resolved by reference to [section] 713. In [section] 713(f), Congress authorized the
Commission to produce a report-nothing more, nothing less .... Once the Commis-
sion completed the task of preparing the report on video description, its delegated au-
thority on the subject ended.23°
It would be a mistake to view the MPAA case-as the Commission does in
the Comcast P2P Order--as simply standing for the proposition that section 1
does not encompass the subject of video programming content.23 ' First, MPAA
stands for the proposition that where the Act authorizes the FCC to produce a
report, but not to undertake other regulatory responsibilities with regard to the
subject matter, the agency's delegated authority on the subject ends with the
for public, educational, or governmental use).
225 MPAA, 309 F.3d at 805-06.
226 Id. at 806.
227 Id.
228 Id. (quoting Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 218, at 15,276 (Powell, Chmn., dis-
senting).
229 Id. at 806.
230 Id. at 807.
231 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76.
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production of the report. Second, the MPAA majority makes clear that FCC
subject matter authority under section 1 may be broad, but its regulatory au-
thority is not unlimited. As the court explained, "[t]o regulate in the area of
programming, [as opposed to merely "promoting" broad statutory goals], the
FCC must find its authority in provisions other than section 1L"232 In other
words, Title I alone cannot satisfy both prongs of the test for ancillary jurisdic-
tion; there must be a hook in one of the titles delegating regulatory responsi-
bilities to the agency upon which to hang an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.
b. American Library Association v. FCC
In American Library Association, the D.C. Circuit found the FCC's broad-
cast flag rules-which sought to regulate consumers' use of television receiver
equipment after the completion of the broadcast transmission-outside the
scope of the FCC's delegated authority.233 The American Library Ass 'n court
reiterated that:
The FCC, like other federal agencies, "literally has no power to act ... unless and un-
til Congress confers power upon it." ... The Commission "has no constitutional or
common law existence or authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by
Congress." .. . Hence, the FCC's power to promulgate legislative regulations is lim-
ited to the scope of the authority Congress has delegated to it.1
3 4
The FCC had relied solely on its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I to justify
its action in the broadcast flag proceeding."5 Sections 1, 2(a) and (3) were cited
to support the view that the Commission had the "authority to promulgate
regulations to effectuate the goals and provisions of the Act even in the ab-
sence of an explicit grant of regulatory authority, if the regulations are rea-
sonably ancillary to the Commission's specific statutory powers and responsi-
bilities." '236 However, because the American Library Association court found
the broadcast flag rules to emanate from an ultra vires action by the FCC, "the
regulations cannot survive judicial review under Chevron/Mead.237 As Judge
Edwards explained:
Our judgment is the same whether we analyze the FCC's action under the first or sec-
ond step of Chevron. "In either situation, the agency's interpretation of the statute is
not entitled to deference absent a delegation of authority from Congress to regulate in
the areas at issue." In this case... the FCC's interpretation of its ancillary jurisdiction
reaches well beyond.., delegated authority under the Communications Act. 238
232 See MPAA, 309 F.3d at 804.
233 See Am. Libr. Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
234 Id. at 698 (citations omitted).
235 Id. at 699-700.
236 Id. at 698.
237 Id. at 699.
238 Id. (citations omitted).
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After reviewing the Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I and Midwest
Video H decisions, the American Library Association court described the Su-
preme Court's approach to ancillary jurisdiction as "cautionary" despite the
fact that the challenged exercises of authority pertained to subjects within the
FCC's general grant of jurisdiction under Title F"239 The broadcast flag rules
floundered because they were outside the scope of the FCC's subject matter
jurisdiction under the first prong of the test for ancillary jurisdiction. 4 In the
case of the broadcast flag rules, the D.C. Circuit found "great caution" to be
warranted because the broadcast flag rested on no apparent statutory founda-
tion other than Title I, "and, thus, appear[s] ... ancillary to nothing."24' As the
D.C. Circuit noted:
We can find nothing in the statute, its legislative history, the applicable case law, or
agency practice indicating that Congress meant to provide the sweeping authority the
FCC now claims over receiver apparatus. And the agency's strained and implausible
interpretations of the definitional provisions ... do not lend credence to its position.
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, Congress "does not ... hide elephants in
mouseholes.
242
The American Library Association court found that the FCC has never pos-
sessed ancillary jurisdiction under the Act to regulate consumer electronics
devices usable for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices
are not engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission. 243 Neither had the
Commission, "in the more than [seventy] years of the Act's existence . . .
claimed such authority nor purported to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction in
such a far-reaching way."2" The court further underscored this point:
The FCC argues that the Commission has "discretion" to exercise "broad authority"
over equipment used in connection with radio and wire transmissions, "when the need
arises, even if it has not previously regulated in a particular area." This is an extraor-
dinary proposition. "The [Commission's] position in this case amounts to the bare
suggestion that it possesses plenary authority to act within a given area simply be-
cause Congress has endowed it with some authority in that area. We categorically re-
ject that suggestion. Agencies owe their capacity to act to the delegation of authority"
from Congress. The FCC, like other federal agencies, "literally has no power to act..
. unless and until Congress confers power upon it."
245
Taken together, MPAA and American Library Association confirm the scope
of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction is far more limited than the Commission
portrays it to be in the Comcast P2P Order. As the D.C. Circuit has affirmed,
239 Id. at 702-03.
240 Id. at 701, 703 (explaining that the first prong of the test requires that the regulation
cover "interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio" and finding that the broadcast
flag rules did not do so).
241 Am. Libr. Ass "n, 406 F.3d at 702 (emphasis added).
242 Id. at 704 (emphasis added).
243 Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
244 Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
245 Id. at 708 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the FCC has no power to act unless and until Congress confers such power.246
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction does not give the FCC liberty to claim
plenary authority to regulate in a given area simply because Congress has en-
dowed the agency with some authority in that area. Further, Title I may pro-
vide the source of the FCC's ancillary authority, but Title I alone cannot pro-
vide the basis for the promulgation of regulations that claim the force of law.
Instead, such regulations must make reference to specific regulatory authority
contained elsewhere in the Act to be considered reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's delegated authority. A rule or action resting upon no apparent
statutory foundation other than Title I would be, in the words of the D.C. Cir-
cuit, ancillary to nothing.247 Further, Supreme Court precedent cited by the
Commission to justify its authority in the Comcast P2P Order does not con-
tribute additional support.
3. Other Supreme Court Cases Cited by the Commission do not Alter the
Bounded Nature of the Doctrine
a. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board
Likely in recognition of the fact that the principal ancillary jurisdiction cases
do not support its action, the FCC first attempts to bolster its position by citing
the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.48 The
Commission quotes a single sentence: "the Commission has 'broad authority'
under its ancillary authority to regulate interstate and foreign communications
'even where the Act does not apply."'249 Reliance on this language to support
the Commission's position that its ancillary jurisdiction is virtually unlimited,
however, is misplaced. Iowa Utilities Board involved an appeal from a deci-
sion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit striking down the
FCC's implementation of the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act; it
was not a review of an exercise of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction, nor does it
provide an expansion of the Supreme Court's prior rulings on the subject. 50
The core question presented in Iowa Utilities Board was whether the FCC
had the jurisdiction to implement certain pricing and non-pricing provisions of
the 1996 Act insofar as some of the FCC rules implicated the provision of in-
246 Id. at 698.
247 See id. at 691-92.
248 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525
U.S. 366, 380 (1999)).
249 Id.
250 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-79, 386 (1999).
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trastate telecommunications services.2' The Court upheld the Commission's
jurisdiction pursuant to the express delegation of regulatory authority under the
Act. 52 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected an argument
that the statement in section 2(b) of the Act that "[n]othing . . . shall be con-
strued to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction" required an explicit
application to intrastate service before Commission jurisdiction could be found
to exist.
253
The respondents had argued that the phrase "or to give the Commission ju-
risdiction" would have "no operative effect ... if every 'application' of the Act
automatically entailed Commission jurisdiction. ' 254 The Supreme Court re-
jected this imaginative argument:
The fallacy in this reasoning is that it ignores the fact that [section] 201(b) explicitly
gives the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act ap-
plies.... For even though "Commission jurisdiction" always follows where the Act
"applies," Commission jurisdiction (so-called "ancillary" jurisdiction) could exist
even where the Act does not "apply." The term "apply" limits the substantive reach of
the statute (and the concomitant scope of primary FCC jurisdiction), and the phrase
"or to give the Commission jurisdiction" limits, in addition, the FCC's ancillary juris-
diction.25
The Court was not passing on a challenge to the FCC's ancillary jurisdic-
tion; it was merely noting the existence of the doctrine together with its limita-
tions and did not address its application in a specific instance. In fact, the Court
specifically noted, "[t]he Commission could not, for example, regulate any
aspect of intrastate communication not governed by the 1996 Act on the theory
that it had an ancillary effect on matters within the Commission's primary ju-
risdiction. '256 Next, the Commission relies on dicta to try to establish its au-
thority.
b. The Language in National Cable and Telecommunications Association v.
Brand X Regarding Ancillary Jurisdiction is Dicta
The Commission's argument for ancillary jurisdiction in the Comcast P2P
Order begins with the claim that "any assertion the Commission lacks the req-
uisite authority over providers of Internet broadband access services, such as
Comcast, has been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court." '257 The Court, the
251 See id. at 370-71.
252 Id. at 377-78 (explaining that the Commission relied on authority granted to it in
section 201(b)).
253 Id. at 379-80.
254 Id. at 380.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 381 n.8.
257 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 14.
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Commission argued, rejected this argument in its decision in National Cable
and Telecommunications Association v. Brand X reviewing the FCC's Cable
Modem Declaratory Ruling.258 According to the Commission, the "Court spe-
cifically stated that 'the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional
regulatory obligations [on information service providers] under its Title I ancil-
lary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications,' and that
'the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-
based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction."'259 The problem with the
FCC's reliance upon Brand X is that the sole question presented to the Su-
preme Court was whether the Commission appropriately classified the cable
modem service as an information service under Title I; the Commission did not
rely upon its ancillary jurisdiction in making that determination, and the Su-
preme Court did not have before it a challenged exercise of ancillary jurisdic-
tion.26 °
The Court first observed that the Commission's initial conclusiorn-4hat ca-
ble Internet service is an information service because it offers consumers "a
comprehensive capability for manipulating information using the Internet via
high-speed telecommunications"--was unchallenged.26' At the same time, the
Commission concluded that the cable Internet service was not a telecommuni-
cations service because although cable companies use telecommunications to
provide consumers with Internet service, they do not offer the telecommunica-
tions element on a stand-alone basis.262 The integrated character of the Intemet
service offering "led the Commission to conclude that cable modem service is
not a 'stand-alone' transparent offering of telecommunications." '263 The Brand
X majority held that this analysis "passe[d] Chevron's first step" because the
word "offer" in the definition of telecommunications service is subject to two
or more linguistic uses and therefore the Commission's choice among them is
entitled to deference by the courts.264
258 Id.
259 Id. (citation omitted).
260 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 968
(2005). In Brand X, the Court wrestled with the question of whether a cable company pro-
vides "telecommunications services" or "information services" under the Communications
Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under the 1996 Act, providers of
"information services" are subject to much less strict regulation than providers of "tele-
communications services." Id.
261 Id. at 987.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 988 (quoting Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 41-43).
264 Id. at 989. As the Brand X Court indicated:
The question, then, is whether the transmission component of cable modem service is
sufficiently integrated with the finished service to make it reasonable to describe the
two as a single, integrated offering. ... We think that they are sufficiently integrated,
because "[a] consumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the infor-
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The Brand X majority found that the FCC's construction of the "information
service" category as comprehending cable modem service was a reasonable
policy choice under Chevron's second step, and rejected several arguments
focused on alleged regulatory consequences that would automatically flow
from the classification decision."' The Court stated, "[t]he Commission's con-
struction ... was more limited than respondents assume."2" The FCC's ruling
was challenged on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the Commission's
treatment of facilities-based Internet service offerings of local telephone carri-
ers who were required to make the telephone lines used to transmit digital sub-
scriber line service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, com-
mon-carrier terms.267 The BrandX majority disagreed, finding that the FCC had
provided a reasoned explanation for this apparent disparity.
2 6
Unquestionably, the sole issue presented to and decided by the Court in
Brand X was "the proper regulatory classification under the Communications
Act of broadband cable Internet service. 269 Specifically, the question was: into
which of the two relevant categories of regulated entities-telecommunications
carriers or information service providers-do cable ISPs fit? 270 After describing
the mandatory obligations that attach to the telecommunications carrier classi-
fication under the Act, the Brand X Court simply observed "[i]nformation-
service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-carrier
regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose
additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regu-
mation-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and because the transmis-
sion is a necessary component of Internet access."
Id. at 990-91 (internal quotation). Furthermore:
Because the term "offer" can sometimes refer to a single, finished product and some-
times to the "individual components in a package being offered" ... the statute fails
unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component of cable modem service
as a distinct offering. This leaves federal telecommunications policy in this technical
and complex area to be set by the Commission, not be warring analogies.
Id. at 991-92.
265 See id. at 997-1000.
266 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 998.
267 Id. at 994-95.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 975.
270 Although another statutory category relevant to the classification of Internet services
provided by cable operators under the Act was "cable services," both the FCC and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had rejected such a classification and consequently the
cable service classification was not presented to the BrandX Court as a possible choice. See
Brand X, 545 U.S. 967, 967; Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 31-33.
See genearlly Esbin, Internet Over Cable, supra note 34 (discussing the appropriate classifi-
cation of cable modem service before the FCC changed the classification).
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late interstate and foreign communications."27'
Thus, the first Brand X quote cited by the FCC concerning its ability to ex-
ercise ancillary jurisdiction over information service providers cannot be con-
sidered decisional and therefore fails to support the FCC's assertion that the
Supreme Court has flatly rejected "any assertion the Commission lacks the
requisite statutory authority over providers of Internet broadband access ser-
vices, such as Comcast." '272 That question was neither presented to nor ruled
upon by the Court. Moreover, the key issue in the Comcast P2P Order is not
whether the FCC has subject matter over providers of Internet broadband ac-
cess service; a proposition not seriously debated. Rather, the question is
whether the FCC can impose specific regulatory obligations upon such provid-
ers pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction273---a question not presented to the Su-
preme Court in BrandX.
Nor does the second Brand X quote cited by the Commission, "that 'the
Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-
based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction,' 274 either standing alone or
in conjunction with the first, provide a basis for the exercise of ancillary juris-
diction over broadband network management practices. Again, the question
whether the FCC can "impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction" '275 was neither presented for decision nor
ruled upon by the Supreme Court in Brand X276 At best, the Brand X major-
ity's observation about ancillary jurisdiction indicates that if presented with the
issue, the Supreme Court likely would find FCC subject matter jurisdiction
over facilities-based broadband Internet providers, a point that Comcast did not
contest.277 More importantly, the critical question of the FCC's authority to act
pursuant to ancillary jurisdiction was expressly recognized by the BrandX ma-
jority to be an open question before the FCC in the Cable Modem Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking which accompanied the Cable Modem Declaratory Rul-
ing278 -no more, and no less.
In short, the Supreme Court could not and did not rule upon the question
whether any given regulation of facilities-based information service providers
271 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 976 (emphasis added). The observation, moreover, is contained
in the opening background portion of the decision. See id. at 976-77.
272 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 14.
273 Id. at 14-15.
274 Id. 14 (quoting BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996).
275 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996.
276 See id. at 1002-03.
277 In re Broadband Industry Practices, Ex Parte Communication of Comcast Corpora-
tion, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 4-5 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast July 10 Ex Parte]
(accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) (addressing several issues, none of
which involved the Supreme Court's possible ancillary jurisdiction over the matter).
278 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996.
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would be reasonably ancillary to the Commission's statutory responsibilities in
a specific instance. All statements in Brand X concerning the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction to impose specific regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs must
be considered dicta insofar as it was relied upon by the Commission its Com-
cast P2P Order.279 Thus, Brand X provides no basis of support for the Com-
mission's authority to enforce federal policy by exercising jurisdiction over the
P2P Complaint to regulate Comcast's broadband network management prac-
tices.
It is instructive, however, that Justice Scalia writing for the dissent in Brand
X, foreshadowed potential limits on the FCC's use of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction to create whole new regulatory or non-regulatory schemes under
the Act. 8° Justice Scalia criticized what he characterized as the FCC's attempt
"to concoct" a "whole new regime of non-regulation ... through an implausi-
ble reading of the statute;" in so doing "exceeded the authority given it by
Congress.""28 The FCC's approach to the cable Internet classification question,
according to Justice Scalia, "mocks the principle that the statute constrains the
agency in any meaningful way." '282 The dissent criticized the FCC for unac-
ceptably turning "statutory constraints into bureaucratic discretions," by play-
ing fast-and-loose with statutory definitions and potentially using its "unde-
fined and sparingly used 'ancillary' powers" to then re-impose the very sorts of
common carrier regulatory obligations it had attempted to avoid through its
decision that cable Internet service was not a telecommunications service.
283
After the dissent noted that although the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling had
contained a "self-congratulatory paean to its deregulatory largesse," the FCC
had simultaneously sought comment on "whether, under its Title I jurisdiction
[it] should require cable companies to offer other ISPs access to their facilities
on common-carrier terms.
'284
279 While dicta may be cited in legal argument, it does not have the full force of legal
precedent, as it was not part of the basis for the judgment. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 134
(2005).
280 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1014.
283 Id. at 1013-14.
284 Id. Justice Scalia went on to speculate that should the FCC use its ancillary powers,
applying its conclusions that the definition of telecommunications carrier did not apply to
cable Internet service to change not the law-its construction of the Title II definitions-but
to change the facts:
Under its undefined and sparingly used "ancillary" powers, the Commission might
conclude that it can order cable companies to "unbundle" the telecommunications
component of cable-modem service. And presto, Title II will then apply to them, be-
cause they will finally be "offering" telecommunications service! Of course, the Com-
mission will still have the statutory power to forbear from regulating them under [sec-
tion] 160 (which it has already tentatively concluded it would do) .... Such Mobius-
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Tellingly, the dissent observed that having concluded that cable ISPs
are not providing "telecommunications services," there is reason to doubt whether it
can use its [ancillary] powers to impose common-carrier-like requirements, since [sec-
tion] 153(44) specifically provides that a "telecommunications carrier shall be treated
as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in provid-
ing telecommunications services," and "this chapter" includes Titles I and 11.285
The dissent's views-albeit in the minority on the classification issue pre-
sented in Brand X-portend significant judicial review problems for any FCC
attempt to impose common carrier-like non-discrimination obligations on fa-
cilities-based ISPs generally, and specifically in the agency's "adjudication" of
the Free Press Complaint against Comcast. Taken as a whole, not only does
BrandX fail to support the Commission's claims about its ancillary jurisdiction
over these matters, the decision calls into question the Commission's analysis
of the its statutory authority in this area.
B. The Provisions of the Communications Act Cited by the FCC Do Not
Support Its Actions
Many commentators have noted the shaky jurisdictional basis for the FCC's
action. 86 The FCC majority, citing various precedents, apparently rests its ac-
tion against Comcast on its subject matter jurisdiction over interstate commu-
nications in wire and radio and its ability to use ancillary jurisdiction under
various provisions of the Act to make policy through adjudication.28
The FCC rejected the view that its authority over the practices of facilities-
based ISPs is "uncertain as a general matter" and specifically rejected Com-
strip reasoning mocks the principle that the statute constrains the agency in any mean-
ingful way.
Id. at 1014. Although the FCC has not acted on the NPRM issues cited by the dissent, one
could argue that its action imposing a non-discrimination carriage requirement on Comcast
in the context of its adjudication of the Free Press Complaint effectively requires Comcast
to offer its Intemet access service on a common carrier basis. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(44),
202(a) (prohibiting unreasonable discrimination in common carrier charges, practices, clas-
sifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication
service).
285 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1014 n.7.
286 See Eggerton, Kennard: FCC on Shaky Ground on Comcast Decision, supra note 126
(quoting former FCC Chairman's description of the jurisdictional basis as "murky"); see
also Posting of David Sohn to Center for Democ. and Tech., PolicyBeta--Digital Policy in
Process, FCC "Enforcement" Against Comcast?, http://blog.cdt.org/2008/07/16/fcc-
enforcement-against-comcast/ (July 16, 2008); Robert Poe, FCC's Comcast Ruling No
Great Victory for Network Neutrality, VOIP-NEWS, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.voip-
news.com/feature/fcc-comcast-ruling-080408/.
287 See supra note 130 and accompanying text; Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at
13,082-83 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring) (citing BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996).
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cast's arguments that it lacked jurisdiction over the company's network man-
agement practices because there was nothing in the Act to which such author-
ity was reasonably ancillary. 288 That is, that the action would fail for lack of a
statutory hook upon which to hang it.289 The Commission disagreed, and cited
several statutory provisions, or hooks, on which to hang its ancillary authority.
First, the Commission found that "[p]eer-to-peer TCP connections provided
through Comcast's broadband Internet access service are undoubtedly a form
of 'communication by wire,' so the subject matter at issue here clearly falls
within the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title 1. ' '29' Here the
FCC is on solid ground. Once Congress included the category of information
services in Title I and the Commission had classified cable Internet service as
an "information service," no one-not even Comcast 29'--challenged the FCC's
subject matter jurisdiction over the service. Nonetheless, the FCC quickly de-
parted the safe shores of its subject matter jurisdiction over communication by
wire when it turned to the thornier question of the something to which its exer-
cise of authority in this case was reasonably ancillary.
Although it places principal reliance upon section 230(b) of the Act, the
Commission relies on no fewer than six additional provisions of the Act as
supporting its ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate the Free Press Complaint,
including sections 1, 201, 256, 257, 601(4), and 706.292 Unfortunately, whether
considered individually or together, they fail to provide the requisite jurisdic-
tional basis for its action. For the reasons discussed below, sections 230(b), 1,
706(a), and 601(4) cannot serve as a means for enforcing behavioral norms
against Comcast because a private party cannot violate Congressional policies
or purposes which, like these, consist of no more than hortatory exclamations
or statements of broad purpose in the Act.293 Nor can sections 201, 256 or 257
288 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15 n.58.
289 John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC's
Ancillary Jurisdiction 19 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/john blevins/2/.
290 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15 (citation omitted).
291 See Comcast July 10 Ex Parte, supra note 277, at 5 n. 15. In the Comcast P2P Order,
the FCC accuses Comcast of "making representations to one tribunal, benefiting from those
representations, and then turning around to assert precisely the opposite claims to a second
tribunal." Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 23. But the FCC elides the critical distinction
between its broad scope of its subject matter jurisdiction and the more narrowly focused
question whether it may impose specific forms of regulation on services within its subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction.
292 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15-21.
293 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 n. 18 (1981) (explain-
ing that findings in a statute were "merely an expression of federal policy" that were "horta-
tory, not mandatory"); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(referring to section 396(g) of the Communications Act as a "guide to Congressional over-
sight policy and as a set of goals... not a substantive standard, legally enforceable by agen-
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provide the necessary jurisdictional reference as they concern solely communi-
cations services provided by common carriers, bear no reasonable relationship
to the network management practices at issue, and otherwise fail to enlarge the
scope of the FCC's existing jurisdiction over providers of broadband informa-
tion services.
1. Statutory Provisions Establishing Only Broad Policies or Purposes Cannot
Support the Exercise ofAncillary Jurisdiction to Regulate Behavior
Sections 230(b), 706(a), and 601(4) set forth only regulatory purposes or
policy goals to be furthered through the exercise of the Commission's ex-
pressly delegated statutory duties contained elsewhere.294 They cannot be con-
strued to establish statutorily mandated responsibilities. In other words, they
establish broad regulatory goals or ends but not the means for achieving them.
No precedent exists for permitting the FCC to exercise its ancillary authority to
impose affirmative regulatory obligations pursuant to the various policy state-
ments contained in the Act as opposed to operative regulatory provisions. Such
quasi-legislative actions, in the absence of a clear delegation of regulatory au-
thority to the FCC from Congress, must be considered ultra vires. Moreover,
even assuming one of these provisions could be read to provide a basis for
some form of ancillary regulatory action, they do not support the action taken
with respect to the Free Press Complaint.
a. Section 230(b)
Section 230(b) was the FCC's first landfall in its odyssey to locate the
source of the authority to which its enforcement action in the Comcast P2P
Order was reasonably ancillary. 295 The FCC refers to "the national Internet
policy enshrined in section 230(b) of the Act 296 and states that it has "recog-
nized its responsibility for overseeing and enforcing" 297 that policy. The Com-
mission claimed that its jurisdiction over the P2P dispute was ancillary to the
effective performance of its responsibility for "the national Internet policy en-
shrined in section 230(b) of the Act. '298 According to the Commission, Con-
cy or courts;" also referred to as "this hortatory language.").
294 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 230(b), 521(4) (2000).
295 See § 230(b); see also Dan G. Barry, The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net
Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP Convergence Mean That It is Time for Net Neutrality
Regulation?, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 421,442 (2008).
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gress--somewhat like Moses and the Ten Commandments-inscribed "the
national Internet policy" onto the Communications Act.299 As the Commission
indicated in its Comcast P2P Order:
When Congress drafted a national Internet policy in 1996, it did not do so on an
empty tablet. Instead, Congress inscribed these policies into section 230 of the Com-
munications Act-the very same Act that established this Commission as the federal
agency entrusted with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire." As Congress was no doubt aware, section 1 of the Act requires the Commis-
sion to "execute and enforce provisions of [the] Act." To carry out this responsibility,
section 4(i) empowers the Commission to "issue such orders ... as may be necessary
in the execution of its functions." Given section 230's placement within the Act, we
think that the Commission's ancillary authority to take appropriate action to further
the policies set forth in section 230(b) is clear.300
In other words, regardless of the purpose of the operative provisions crafted
by Congress and placed in section 230, the FCC believes it may take any ac-
tion pursuant to its section 4(i) authority that it finds appropriate to "further the
policies set forth in section 230(b). '3" This view of the FCC's authority under
section 230(b) is as extraordinary as it is untenable.
First, section 230(b) is more convincingly understood to stand for precisely
the opposite proposition: that the FCC is prohibited from regulating the terms
and conditions of the provision of Internet access services.3 2 Second, the tools
Congress created to implement the policies contained in section 230(b) are
limited to civil immunity from damages for service providers and users that
restrict access to certain objectionable material. 33 There is no gap in these pro-
visions for the Commission to fill by regulating the network management prac-
tices of facilities-based ISPs. Lastly, acceptance of the FCC's view of the stat-
ute would be akin to finding that the agency has plenary authority over the In-
temet and the provision of interactive computer services simply because it pos-
sesses some authority in the area, a proposition roundly rejected by the
courts.3"
To the extent section 230(b) embodies national Internet policy, that policy
expressly directs government to refrain from imposing new Internet regula-
tions.30 5 Although the FCC has cited section 230(b) in previous orders,3 6 it has
299 See id.
300 Id. (citations omitted).
301 See id.
302 As introduced, the legislation that ultimately became the 1996 Act explicitly stated
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to grant any jurisdiction or authority to the
Commission with respect to economic or content regulation of the Internet or other interac-
tive computer services." 141 Cong. Rec. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox).
303 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000) (granting immunity for interactive computer service
providers from suit under libel laws).
304 See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
305 See Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. § 2
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never relied upon the provision to support increased regulation of the Internet
or providers of interactive computer services.
30 7
Section 230's operative provisions---subsections (c) and (d)-create protec-
tion for Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive material by inter-
active computer service users and providers, and imposes content filtering and
notice obligations on providers of interactive computer services.3 8 Section
230(c) states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an-
(1995). The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act was the precursor legislation
to the ultimate language adopted in section 230.
306 For example, when the FCC declined to allow local exchange carriers to assess inter-
state per-minute access charges on ISPs, it cited section 230. In re Access Charge Reform;
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers; Transport Rate Structure and
Pricing End User Common Line Charges, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982,
344 (May 7, 1997). The FCC also declined to regulate peering relationships between Inter-
net backbone providers because it recognized that premature regulation "might impose
structural impediments to the natural evolution and growth process which has made the
Internet so successful." In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecom-
munications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C..R. 2398, 105 (Jan. 28, 1999). In its declaratory ruling clas-
sifying cable modem service as an information service, the FCC quoted section 230 for the
overarching principle of seeking "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Fed-
eral or State regulation." Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 4 (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000)). It further stated that it was "mindful of the need to minimize
both regulation of broadband services and regulatory uncertainty in order to promote in-
vestment and innovation in a competitive market." Id. 73. The FCC also cited section 230
in two orders preempting state regulation of VoIP services. In re Vonage Holdings Corp.
Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 35 (Nov. 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Vonage Order]; In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free
World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 18 (Feb. 12, 2004). As recently as 2004,
the Commission referred to "Congress's clear intention, as expressed in the 1996 Act, that
[information services] remain 'unfettered' by federal or state regulation" and its own
"hands-off' approach to the Internet. IP-Enabled Services NPRM, supra note 47, 39. Ad-
ditionally, the Commission recognized that "courts have recognized the preeminence of
federal authority in the area of information services, particularly in the area [of] the Internet
and other interactive computer services. Id. (citations omitted).
307 The Internet Policy Statement adopted in August 2005 was the first instance in which
the FCC claimed that section 230 gave it authority to impose regulations against ISPs. That
document was not an order, and contemporary statements of FCC Commissioners clearly
indicate that it was not enforceable. See supra Part II.D. In its subsequent Broadband Indus-
try Practices Inquiry, the Commission asked if it had the legal authority to enforce the Pol-
icy Statement and specifically noted that "[t]he Policy Statement did not contain rules."
Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 11 n.20.
308 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)-(d) (2000).
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other information content provider."3" The sole obligation imposed on provid-
ers of interactive computer services is the obligation to provide notice to their
customers of available parental controls so that parents may block objection-
able content."' Section 230's entire policy provision is as follows:
It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive com-
puter services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the In-
ternet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Inter-
net and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filter-
ing technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objection-
able or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish traf-
ficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.11
Nowhere does the policy provision grant any authority to the FCC to impose
regulations on ISPs. Nor does the legislative history support the Commission's
belief that by placing section 230 in the 1996 Act, Congress delegated to the
Commission roving authority to develop rules and regulations to implement
the policies contained in section 230(b).3 2 To the contrary, not only did the
drafters of Section 230 "not wish to have a Federal Computer Commission
with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet,"3"3 they gave the FCC no
express role in implementing its provisions."4 To the extent that section 230
309 § 230(c)
310 § 230 (d).
311 § 230(b).
312 See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). The
Commission's strained attempt to read the provision as supporting its action on the ground
that section 230's emphasis is on "'maximiz[ing] user control' and 'empowering parents'
and its claims that its action against Comcast furthers user control over the content received
by means of Internet connections is unpersuasive. See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9,
15 n.69. The primary object of the statute is to establish civil immunity from damages for
"good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material provided over the Internet
by another information content provider, without the need for additional regulatory in-
volvement in Internet content regulation. Section 230(c) and (d) implement the policies
contained in subsection (b) by means of limiting Internet service provider liability for third
party content and requiring providers to disclose to users the existence of available parental
controls, not by regulating the network management practices of Internet service providers.
The Commission's view that it is unconstrained in its ability to add to Congress' chosen
means of implementing the policies contained in section 230(b) by imposing new regulatory
restraints on Internet service providers is simply wrong.
313 141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
314 The Commission relies on one of its own prior orders claiming that by "codifying its
Internet policy in the Commission's organic statute, Congress charged the Commission with
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speaks to any regulatory mandate for the FCC, it is solely to preclude the
agency-or anyone else-from treating "the provider or user of an interactive
computer service as the publisher or speaker of any information provide by
another information content provider."35 Even assuming arguendo the Com-
mission is correct that by placing the radically deregulatory section 230 in the
1996 Act, Congress was somehow charging the agency "with ongoing respon-
sibility to advance that policy consistent with [its] other statutory obliga-
tions,"3 '6 there remains a significant distinction between advancing overarching
policy goals and promulgating a ruling concerning broadband network man-
agement practices that has the force of law. And it is evident that Congress did
not contemplate the latter role for the Commission in enacting section 230.
i. Legislative History of Section 230
On February 1, 1995, Senators Exon (D-NE) and Gorton (R-WA) intro-
duced S. 314, the Communications Decency Act ("CDA").317 This bill would
have made it a crime to send any material objectionable to minors between any
two computers connected to the Internet.1 8 When the House version of the
1996 Act was introduced in May 2005, several prominent House members in-
cluding Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, publicly announced their opposi-
tion to the CDA.39
On June 30, 1995, Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wy-
den (D-OR) introduced H.R. 1978, the Internet Freedom and Family Empow-
erment Act 320 in response to the CDA, which Wyden believed was "doomed to
ongoing responsibility to advance that policy consistent with our other statutory obligations"
in support of its ancillary jurisdiction to "enforce federal policy" and regulate broadband
network management practices. Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 12 n.45, 15 n.69
(quoting Vonage Order, supra note 306, 35). In the Vonage Order, the Commission estab-
lished that "[w]hile [it] acknowledge that the title of section 230 refers to 'offensive mate-
rial' the general policy statements regarding the Internet and interactive computer services
contained in the section are not similarly confined to offensive material."). Notwithstanding
the statements contained in the Vonage Order, the Commission may not enlarge its statutory
authority at will by finding that the provision of some authority in an area gives it plenary
authority over that subject matter. See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C.
Cir. 2005); see also Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 804-06
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
315 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
316 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 15 n.69.
317 See Communications Decency Act of 1995, S. 314, 104th Cong.
318 See id. § 2.
319 Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon 's Communications Decency
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 66-
67, 74 (1996).
320 See Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995).
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fail because their idea of a Federal Internet Police will make the Keystone
Cops look like Cracker Jack crime fighters."32' In August, the Cox-Wyden bill
was amended to the House's version of the 1996 Act.322 When introducing the
amendment, Rep. Cox explained it as follows:
Mr. Chairman, our amendment will do two basic things: First, it will protect computer
Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who provides a front end to the In-
ternet, let us say, who takes steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers .... Second, it will establish as the policy of the United States that we do
not wish to have content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the In-
ternet, that we do not wish to have a Federal Computer Commission with an army of
bureaucrats regulating the Internet because frankly the Internet has grown up to be
what it is without that kind of help from the Government.... We want to help [the In-
ternet] along this time by saying Government is going to get out of the way and let
parents and individuals control it rather than Government doing that job for us.323
The Cox-Wyden amendment was approved by a 420-to-4 vote, and the
House passed its version of the 1996 Act by a 305-to- 117 vote. 324 When the
House and Senate met to reconcile the different versions of the Act, the Senate
version contained the CDA and the House version contained the Internet Free-
dom and Family Empowerment Act.325 It was believed that only one of the two
plans would survive in the final version of the 1996 Act.3 26 Surprisingly, both
plans were included, but the explicit limitation on FCC regulation proposed by
the Cox-Wyden amendment was eliminated. On February 8, 1996, President
Clinton signed the 1996 Act.328 That same day, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") and Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") filed a
lawsuit arguing that the CDA was unconstitutional.329 On June 26, 1997, on
appeal from a lower court ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that the CDA was
overly broad and vague in its definitions of the types of Internet communica-
tions it criminalized, but section 230 survived.3
In view of this legislative history, it is apparent that section 230 was in-
321 141 CONG. REc. H8287 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
322 141 CONG. REc. H8450 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
323 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
324 H.R. 1555, A0004, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REc. 21,999, 22,054, 22,083-84 (1995).
325 See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 569, 595-96 (2001).
326 See Congressman Cox and Wyden Demonstrate New Internet Blocking Technologies,
CNET, July, 17, 1995, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0E1N/is /ai_17278694; Centr.
for Democ. and Tech., The Communications Decency Act: Legislative History,
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/cda.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
327 See Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wiki-
pedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 164, 174 (2006).
328 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (enacted Feb. 8,
1996); see Guy Lamolinara, Wired for the Future: President Clinton Signs Telecom Act at
LC, http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9603/telecom.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
329 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 861 (1997).
330 See id. at 885.
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tended to set forth a policy of non-regulation or un-regulation of the Internet
and Internet services generally, and to create a shield against publisher or
speaker liability on the part of ISPs for third-party content?3' The goal of sec-
tion 230 was to empower parents and individuals--and not the govern-
ment--to set controls to deal with material they found objectionable on the
Internet.32 The key finding in section 230 with respect to Internet service regu-
lation, subsection (a)(4), states "The Internet and other interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.333 It follows then, as expressed in section 230(b)(2),
that Congress declared it to be the policy of the United States "to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion. 334 The Commission, however, disregards this policy in its Comcast P2P
Order.
ii. The FCC's Flawed Interpretation of Section 230
As clear as the legislative history is, the FCC nonetheless rejected arguments
advanced by Comcast that section 230(b)(2) embodies the "clear intent of
Congress that the Internet not be regulated" and that it deprives the Commis-
sion of legal authority to adjudicate the dispute over Comcast's network man-
agement practices.335 According to the Commission, "Comcast places too much
weight on the last few words of this federal policy, and we reject Comcast's
construction of this language. '3 6 The Commission advanced three reasons for
its position. First, the policy embodied in section 230 "cannot reasonably be
read to prevent any governmental oversight of providers of broadband Internet
access services. 333 Second, the Commission has previously rejected an inter-
pretation of section 230(b)(2) that would "place a flat-out ban on any govern-
ment action that might affect the Internet and the market for broadband Inter-
net access services. '"338 Third, "Comcast ... waived the argument" by failing to
petition the Commission to reconsider its prior statement in the Adelphia-Time
331 See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 24 (FCC Office of
Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999),
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp31.doc (describing 30 years of FCC
policy decisions concerning computer applications that created the deregulatory environ-
ment in which the Internet could flourish).
332 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(a), (c) (2000).
333 § 230(a)(4) (emphasis added).
334 § 230(b)(2).
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Warner-Comcast Order to the effect that it had the ability to adjudicate com-
plaints alleging violations of its Internet Policy Statement.339
Under the first justification, the Commission argued that section 230(b)(2)
discusses preservation of the "market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive services," a market that substantially consisted at the time of
passage of the 1996 Act of dial-up Internet access services provided over regu-
lated telephone networks.3" The Commission stated, "It is inconceivable that
Congress was unaware of or intended to eliminate this regulatory framework
given its stated purpose of 'preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free mar-
ket." 34' There are several problems with this analysis.
The fact that the FCC regulated the common carrier provision of basic tele-
communications services utilized for dial-up access to the Internet in 1996 is
irrelevant to the Congressional statement of policy that the free market that
then existed for "the Internet and other interactive computer services" be pre-
served. The Commission itself has long classified the types of data processing
services provided by ISPs as enhanced or information services for the express
purpose of keeping them free from Title 1I regulation.342 As the Commission
has found, the provision of telecommunications services and information ser-
339 Id. 27. The FCC claims that Comcast has waived the argument that the agency
lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate actions under the four policy principles by not "petition[ing]
the Commission to reconsider its ability to adjudicate such complaints." Id. Specifically, the
Commission notes Comcast had the opportunity to seek reconsideration after the FCC stated
in the Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order that "[i]f in the future evidence arises that any
company is willfully blocking or degrading Internet content, affected parties may file a
complaint with the Commission." Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order, supra note 85,
220 (approving the acquisition of Adelphia cable systems by Comcast and Time Warner).
The FCC also stated in that proceeding that the Commission's Internet Policy Statement
"contains principles against which the conduct of Comcast ... can be measured." Id. 223.
The FCC cites no statutory provisions supporting its claim to have jurisdiction to rule upon
such a complaint, nor is it self-evident what it meant by its vow in the Adelphia-Time War-
ner-Comcast Order to measure Comcast's behavior against unenforceable policy principles.
No court would have considered as ripe a petition challenging such vague prognostications
about undefined future events. See Tex. v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) ("A
claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 'contingent future events that may not occur
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."'),(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri-
cultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (explaining that ripeness prevents courts from "entangling them-
selves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies"); infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing
notice). In summary, Comcast cannot be considered to have waived its ability to challenge
the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate the Free Press Complaint).
340 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 25.
341 Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000)).
342 See Computer H Final Decision, supra note 60, 5, 7; Computer and Commc'ns




vices under the Act are mutually exclusive. 43 Cable modem services were just
being developed in 1996 and since wide spread adoption, have never success-
fully been subjected to common carrier regulation at either the federal, state, or
local level.3" Through its choice of language in section 230(b)(2), Congress
sought to preserve the free market for the provision of such enhanced or infor-
mation services as those provided by Comcast. Once the Commission itself
classified facilities-based Internet access service provided by cable operators as
information services, they too fell under the ambit of this congressional policy.
Accordingly, the Commission's attempt to exercise ancillary jurisdiction to
impose regulatory constraints on a facilities-based provider of broadband In-
ternet access service cannot stand because it contravenes this express Congres-
sional policy, as well as long-established FCC policy.
Second, the Commission relies on its own prior orders finding that section
230(b)(2) did not preclude its imposition of local number portability, telephone
consumer privacy protections, and 911 service obligations on providers of in-
terconnected VolP service.345 With respect to local number portability, the
Commission stated that section 230(b)(2) "was not meant to displace the policy
of 'preserv[ing] an efficient numbering administration system that fosters
competition among all communications services in a competitively neutral and
fair manner."'346 Similar arguments were advanced in the Comcast P2P Order
concerning the FCC's imposition of consumer privacy protections and 911
343 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13
F.C.C.R. 11,501, 13 (Apr. 10, 1998).
344 Attempts by local franchising authorities to subject cable modem services to various
"open access" requirements were ultimately overturned by the courts. See Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 75, 96, 98; Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand
X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03 (2005); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d
871, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 34, at 28-29 (discussing
attempts by local franchising authorities to impose cable open access on cable operators as
franchising requirements).
345 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 26 (citing In re Telephone Number Require-
ments for IP-Enabled Services Providers; Local Number Portability Porting Interval and
Validation Requirements; IP-Enabled Services; Telephone Number Portability; CTIA Peti-
tions for Declaratory Ruling on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues; Final Regulatory Flexibil-
ity Analysis; Numbering Resource Optimization, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling,
Order on Remand, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 19,531, 29 n.101
(Oct. 31, 2007)); In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecom-
munications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Cus-
tomer Information; IP-Enable Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 59 n.188 (Mar. 13, 2007); In re IP-Enabled Services; E911
Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, 29 n.95 (May 19, 2005) [hereinafter VoIP E911
Order]. For a criticism of this exercise of ancillary jurisdiction see Susan Crawford, The
Ambulance, The Squad Car, & The Internet, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873, 928-29 (2006).
346 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 26.
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service obligations.347
VolP utilizes Internet Protocol to provide services that are functionally
equivalent to traditional circuit-switched voice services. 48 The services may or
may not be provided over the Internet 49 The VoIP E911 Order was justified in
part as an exercise of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction." '
Moreover, the Commission's view that the statement of policy in section
230(b)(2) should not be read to bar its regulation of the provision of intercon-
nected VolP services under express statutory mandates concerning the provi-
sion of similar voice telephony services is not dispositive. The fact that section
230(b)(2) does not, as the FCC has stated, impose a "flat-out ban on any gov-
ernment action"35' in this area fails to demonstrate that the provision thereby
permits any particular action.
Pursuant to Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I and Midwest Video I, an-
cillary jurisdiction may be exercised where it is imperative to the effective per-
formance of the Commission's regulatory responsibilities and is not contrary to
any provision of the Act.352 The Commission itself has recognized that Midwest
Video H restricted the scope of ancillary jurisdiction by adding that the regula-
tion imposed pursuant to this doctrine "cannot be antithetical to a basic regula-
tory parameter established" for the service or provider to which the challenged
rule is reasonably ancillary. "3 Regulating the network management practices of
information service providers like Comcast is unrelated to the provisions of
section 230 concerning offensive material, parental controls, and intermediary
liability for third party content.3 The Commission's action cannot even be
considered relevant, let alone imperative, to the effective implementation of
section 230(b). Moreover, it is plainly antithetical to the policy expressed in
section 230(b)(2) that the Internet and interactive computer services such as the
services provided by Comcast remain unfettered by Federal regulation. Regu-
347 See id.
348 VoIP "is a technology that allows you to make voice calls using a broadband Internet
connection instead of a regular (or analog) phone line." Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, IP-Enable
Services, http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
349 As defined by the Commission, "[t]he term 'interconnected' refers to the ability of
the user generally to receive calls from and terminate calls to the public switched telephone
network... including commercial mobile radio services... networks." VoIP E911 Order,
supra 345, 1 n.1.
350 VoIP E911 Order, supra 345, 29 (finding that the Commission could exert ancillary
jurisdiction over interconnected VoIP service providers solely by reference to its Title I
responsibilities).
351 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 26.
352 United States v. Sw. Cable Co. (Sw. Cable), 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC (Midwest Video 1), 571 F.2d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 1978); FCC v. Mid-
west Video Corp. (Midwest Video 11), 440 U.S. 689, 697 (1979).
353 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 109 n.340.
354 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000).
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lating the network management practices of ISPs, therefore, cannot be consid-
ered reasonably ancillary to section 230(b). The Commission may not rely
upon section 230(b) to support its action in its Comcast P2P Order.
b. Section 1
The next stop on the FCC's journey to locate its regulatory authority is sec-
tion 1 of the Act.355 Section 1 provides the reasons for the Communications
Act: "For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com-
munication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible ... a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges," '356 and the creation of
the Commission "for the purpose of . . .centralizing authority heretofore
granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with
respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication..
. .,1.. The Commission opined that acting on the Free Press Complaint "is rea-
sonably ancillary to this delegation of authority in several ways": (1) "prohibit-
ing unreasonable network discrimination directly furthers the goal of making
broadband Internet access service both 'rapid' and 'efficient"'; and (2) "exer-
cising jurisdiction over the complaint ...promote[s] the goal of achieving
'reasonable charges. '358
The Commission's argument, citing Midwest Video II, that the Supreme
Court "has never rejected section 1 as a basis for [its] ancillary jurisdiction" is
an untenably slender reed upon which to support such an exercise. 359 The Su-
355 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16. In support of the first goal, the Commission
reasoned that Comcast's practice of inhibiting consumer access to certain content had the
effect of making the service slower even when doing so would not necessarily ease network
congestion, and that such practices could also make "Internet communications as a whole,
less efficient." Id. In support of the second goal, the Commission reasoned that by interven-
ing to stop Comcast's practice of inhibiting the ability of consumers with cable modem ser-
vice to access high-definition video over the Internet, the resulting competition to cable
"should result in downward pressure on cable television prices, which have increased rap-
idly in recent years." Id. Setting the obvious frailty of these arguments aside for the moment,
rates for the many cable service tiers have been de-regulated since 1999. See 47 U.S.C. §
543(c)(4). The only rates still subject to regulation at the local franchising authority
level-those for basic cable service---have been de-regulated in many communities by vir-
tue of the presence of "effective competition" by other multichannel video programming
distributors. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 533(a)(3), 543(b)(1), 543(d), 543(I)(1). Thus, the FCC cannot
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over Comcast's network management practices as "rea-
sonably ancillary" to its responsibilities over cable rate levels.
359 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76. (citing FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. (Midwest Video I), 440 U.S. 689 (1979)).
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preme Court has never rejected section 1 standing alone as a basis for the exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction because it has never been presented with such a
case posing the question. In the two instances in which challenged cable regu-
lations grounded in ancillary jurisdiction were upheld, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly held that the action was ancillary to the Commission's Title III respon-
sibilities to regulate television broadcasting.36 In the third Supreme Court case
on the subject, Midwest Video 11, as discussed above, the Court established
firm limits on the scope of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction by explicitly reaf-
firming that any exercise of such authority under Title I must not only make
"reference to the provisions of the Act directly governing" the activity to
which the requirement is alleged to be ancillary,"' but must also not be con-
trary to the express provisions of the Act concerning that activity.362 Section 1
does not directly govern any specific activity; it is one of ten general provi-
sions of Title I that articulate the broad purposes of the Act---that the Commis-
sion was created to carry out-and establishes its overarching goals.363
To support its argument, the Commission cites the Supreme Court," two
D.C. Circuit cases,365 two cases from other circuits,3 " and even on of its own
prior orders.367 The Commission's claim that the D.C. Circuit and other Cir-
cuits have accepted section 1 standing alone as a basis for the exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction is contradicted by the courts' rulings themselves.368 None of
these cases were decided solely under Title I, and none of these cases demon-
strate judicial acceptance of this sweepingly broad interpretation of the doc-
trine of virtually unlimited ancillary jurisdiction.
Turning to the D.C. Circuit cases, the FCC notes369 that in CCIA v. FCC, the
360 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); United States v. Mid-
west Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649, 663 (1972).
361 Midwest Video If, 440 U.S. at 706; see supra Part III.A.l.c.
362 See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 706.
363 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
364 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never re-
jected section 1 as a basis for our ancillary jurisdiction-at issue in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. [Midwest Video I1], 440 U.S. 689 (1979), was a regulation that the Commission had
promulgated as ancillary to its broadcasting responsibilities (Title III), and the Court struck
down that regulation because it effectively imposed a common carrier regime on cable sys-
tems, which Congress had 'outright reject[ed]' in other statutory provisions .... ").
365 Id. (citing Computer & Comm'cns Indus. Ass'n v. FCC (CCIA), 693 F.2d 198, 212-
13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
366 Id. (citing GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730-31 (2d Cir. 1973) and Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1971)).
367 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76 (citing VolP E911 Order, supra note
345). Needless to say--as interesting as they are--the Commission's own views of its ancil-
lary jurisdiction cannot be relied upon by the Commission as authoritative precedent unless
and until they have been accepted by a reviewing court.
368 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76.
369 The fact that the Comcast P2P Order states that "the court in this case noted' instead
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court stated that "[o]ne of [the Commission's] responsibilities is to assure a
nationwide system of wire communications services at reasonable prices." 7 °
From this the FCC concludes that the D.C. Circuit "and others have conse-
quently upheld actions premised on our section 1 ancillary authority."37' CCIA
involved review of an FCC rulemaking known as the Second Computer Inquiry
("Computer 11"), in which the Commission found that enhanced data process-
ing services and customer premises equipment ("CPE") were not within the
scope of its Title II jurisdiction, but were within its ancillary jurisdiction under
sections 152 and 153 of the Communications Act.72 As such, the FCC imposed
a structural separation requirement on AT&T under which it could offer en-
hanced services and CPE to consumers only through separate subsidiaries.373
The CCIA court first observed that when the FCC decided to move away
from its previous framework governing enhanced services, it was "compelled
to choose a new regulatory approach to fulfill its statutory duty 'to make avail-
able ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service."'374 The Commission could
either regulate all data communications service and consumer premises equip-
ment under Title II, or none, and it chose the latter route. 75
The parties in CCIA challenged these rules on the grounds that the FCC
"overreached its ancillary jurisdiction." '376 The CCIA court's analysis proceeded
from the view that "the Commission's decision in Computer 11 [is] a demarca-
tion of the scope of Title II jurisdiction in a volatile and highly specialized
field and a concomitant substitution of alternative regulatory tools for tradi-
tional Title II regulation in this field." '377 The court found the FCC's justifica-
tions for not "subject[ing] enhanced services or CPE to Title II regulation...
sustainable on either grounds asserted by the Commission. '"378 That is, that they
are not common carrier communications activities, and that even if some could
be so classified, "the Commission is not required to subject them to Title II
of stating that the court held tacitly admits that this statement was mere dicta. Comcast P2P
Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76 (emphasis added). See also supra note 279 (discussing dicta).
370 Computer Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n v. FCC (CCIA), 693 F.2d 198, 213 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (emphasis added).
371 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76.
372 CCIA, 693 F.2d at 205, 207 ("Section 152 gives the Commission jurisdiction over 'all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio,' and section 153 defines 'communi-
cation by wire' as 'the transmission of writing, signs, signals pictures and sounds of all
kinds ... incidental to such transmission."').
373 Id. at 205-208.
374 Id. at 207.
375 Id.
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regulation where, as here, it finds that it cannot feasibly separate regulable
from nonregulable services."37 9 As an alternative to Title II regulation, "the
Commission used its ancillary jurisdiction to impose ... a structural regulation
scheme only through a separate subsidiary;"380 an appropriate use of its re-
sources under circumstances where the difficulty of isolating activities subject
to Title II outweighs the benefits to be gained by that regulation."' Therefore,
the court was "faced only with the issue whether the Commission's discretion
extends to deciding what regulatory tools to use in regulating common carrier
service. '
Thus, the CPE unbundling and structural separation requirements were up-
held as necessary to accomplish the Commission's responsibilities for regulat-
ing common carrier services pursuant to Title II. That is, when the CCIA court
stated that "[regulation of] both enhanced services and CPE was necessary to
assure wire communications at reasonable rates,"3"3 the reference must have
been to the FCC's specific statutory mandate to ensure reasonable rates for
basic transmission services pursuant to sections 201 through 203, rather than
the more general purposes stated in section 1 of the Act.
It is section 201(b), not sections 2 or 3, which declares unjust or unreason-
able rates for common carrier communication services unlawful.8 While the
court found that enhanced services and CPE easily fell within the FCC's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under sections 2 and 3 of the Act, it upheld the Com-
puter H regulations on carrier-provided enhanced services and CPE as "rea-
sonably ancillary" to the FCC's specific regulatory responsibilities to ensure
that rates charged by common carriers are just and reasonable, pursuant to Title
II of the Act.
385
The Commission also relies on the D.C. Circuit's decision in Rural Tele-
phone Coalition v. FCC,36 but this case does not support the Commission's
379 Id. at 210.
380 Id. at 211.
381 Id. at 211. The rule imposed pursuant to ancillary jurisdiction is referred to in the
quoted passage as an "alternative" to Title II regulation, yet it is evident from the CCIA
decision as whole that the structural separation rule was imposed ancillary to the FCC's
Title II regulatory responsibilities for the provision of basis transmission services by com-
munications common carriers. The CCIA decision is not a model of clarity on this point. Id.
at 207.
382 Id. at 212. In the passage quoted, the CCIA court acknowledges that the relevant ju-
risdictional question is the FCC's ability to choose among the regulatory tools at its disposal
"in regulating common carrier services." Id. In other words, the action was ancillary to its
responsibilities for Title II common carrier services.
383 Id. at 213.
384 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
385 CCIA, 693 F.2d at 213.
386 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, T 16 fn. 76 (citing Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838
F.2d 1307, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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ability to impose regulations solely pursuant to section 1 of the Act. The chal-
lenged actions before the court in Rural Telephone were certain interim meas-
ures the FCC had taken as the communications industry "adjust[ed] to the dis-
solution" of the Bell System and its system of implicit subsidies for universal
service.387 Specifically, the case involved the FCC's creation of interstate ac-
cess charges and an included mechanism for explicit funding of support for
universal telephone service.388 The access charges were created pursuant to the
Commission's authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of common
carrier services pursuant to sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Act." 9 This is
evident from the underlying Commission order establishing high cost appor-
tionment of universal service reviewed by the D.C. Circuit.39
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's creation of a universal service funding
mechanism as within its statutory authority under sections 1 and 4(i) "in order
to further the objective of making communication service available to all
Americans at reasonable charges."' 91 It found that "the Commission's action..
. [fell] within the 'expansive powers' delegated to it by the Communications
Act. 3 92 The court in Rural Telephone further observed that "[h]ad the Com-
mission proposed the Universal Service Fund for the purpose of subsidizing
the incomes of impoverished telephone users, it would have exceeded its au-
thority under section 154(i), as the provision of public welfare is not among its
functions."'3 93 The most sensible reading of this decision is that the FCC's ex-
tensive Title II responsibilities for common carrier services provided the hook
upon which the Commission's jurisdiction to create the universal service sup-
port mechanism rested.
In other cases not cited by the FCC, the D.C. Circuit explicitly stated that
ancillary jurisdiction must find a source outside Title I to which the challenged
387 Rural Tel., 838 F.2d at 1310.
388 Id. at 1314-15.
389 See In re MTS & WATS Market Structure, Third Report and Report, 93 F.C.C.2d.
241, 37-38, 41, 45-46 (Dec. 22, 1982), aff'd in principal part sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
390 As the Commission held:
The basic provisions for the protection of universal service recommended by the Joint
Board represent a sound balancing of concern for the promotion of universally avail-
able telephone service at reasonable rates and the need to prevent uneconomic bypass
of the local exchange .... We also agree with the Joint Board's plan to direct assis-
tance to high cost areas. This approach will promote universal service by enabling tele-
phone companies and state regulators to establish local exchange service rates in high
cost areas that do not greatly exceed nationwide average levels.
In re Amendment of Part 67 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board,
Decision and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 781, 29-30 (Dec. 1, 1983).
391 Rural Tel., 838 F.2d at 1315; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i) (2000).
392 Rural Tel., 838 F.2d at 1315 (citing NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)).
393 Id.
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regulations may be said to be reasonably. In National Association of Regula-
tory Utilities Commissioners v. FCC-a 1976 case involving a challenge to an
FCC rule preempting state common carrier regulation over the use of cable
system leased access channels for two-way point-to-point non-video commu-
nications--the D.C. Circuit explained that "each and every assertion of juris-
diction" to regulate in a particular manner "must be independently justified as
reasonably ancillary to" a specific statutorily mandated responsibility.94 The
court found that "pre-emption of regulatory power of two-way, non-video ca-
ble communications is not within the 'ancillary to broadcasting' standard as
developed in Midwest [Video I], even absent the apparent applicability of the
[section] 152(b) jurisdictional bar.
3 95
In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed in detail the three Supreme
Court cases addressing the scope of the FCC's ancillary authority over cable
communications and determined that the cases failed to support "the Commis-
sion's argument that it has blanket jurisdiction over all activities which cable
systems may carry on." '396 To the contrary, the D.C. Circuit found that the Su-
preme Court's plurality decision in Midwest Video I "devoted substantial atten-
tion to establishing the requisite 'ancillariness' between the Commission's au-
thority over broadcasting and the particular regulation before the Court," and
that the Chief Justice's concurring opinion suggested "some attempted regula-
tions of cable operations would fall outside the delegated power." '397 Addition-
ally, the D.C. Circuit held that "the Court's reasoning in both Southwestern and
Midwest [Video I] compels the conclusion that the cable jurisdiction, which
they have located primarily in § 152(a), is really incidental to, and contingent
upon, specifically delegated powers under the Act."'3 98
The NARUC II court rejected the Commission's argument that blanket juris-
diction over cable was "essential, if the 'goal of a nationwide broadband com-
munications grid' is to be achieved." '399 The court was "not convinced that this
goal of [a] nationwide communications network must, in all cases, take prece-
dence, especially where the Commission jurisdiction is explicitly denied under
other provisions of the Act.."40 ° As the court elaborated:
This long term goal which the Commission sets out for itself apparently has its roots
in the general purpose section of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). While that section
does set forth worthy aims toward which the Commission should strive, it has not he-
retofore been read as a general grant of power to take any action necessary and proper
394 Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC fl), 533 F.2d 601, 612
(D.C. Cir. 1976). In this case, the mandated responsibility was over broadcasting. Id.
395 Id. at 617.
396 Id. at 612-13.
397 Id. at 613.
398 Id. at 612.




to those ends. Especially in view of our conclusion that [section] 152(b) seems to bar
Commission jurisdiction in this case, we are extremely dubious about the legal sub-




Yet another D.C. Circuit decision, Southwestern Bell Telephone v. FCC,
also undermines the Commission's expansive view of its section 1 authority." 2
Southwestern Bell Telephone involved the FCC's attempt to regulate the provi-
sion of dark fiber by requiring phone companies to provide dark fiber under
tariff.43 Although the case did not involve an ancillary jurisdiction challenge,
its language is instructive on the D.C. Circuit's understanding of the doctrine:
The Act gives the Commission specific regulatory responsibilities regarding common
carriers under [T]itle II of the Act, and broadcasting under [T]itle Ill. In addition, the
Commission has general regulatory jurisdiction over "all interstate and foreign com-
munications by wire or radio .... The Commission's general jurisdiction over inter-
state communication and persons engaged in such communication, however, "is re-
stricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various re-
sponsibilities" under [T]itles II and III of the Act.
4 4
These cases, together with the more recent D.C. Circuit decisions in MPAA
and American Library Ass "n are consistent with this limited view of the FCC's
ancillary authority. They therefore fail to support the FCC's expansive view of
its section 1 powers as advanced in the Comcast P2P Order.
Other circuit courts also share the D.C. Circuit's view that the Commis-
sion's ancillary jurisdiction is incidental to, and contingent upon, its authority
under Titles II or III, contrary to the Commission's suggestion in its Comcast
P2P Order.4"5 The Commission relies on two other circuit court cases to estab-
lish its authority to exercise ancillary jurisdiction solely pursuant to section 1
of the Act.40 6
First, GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, was cited in the Comcast P2P Order as
"upholding the Commission's section 1 authority."4 7 GTE, however, was cited
by the Ninth Circuit in California v. FCC for precisely the opposite conclu-
sion: "upholding the FCC's regulation of enhanced services as ancillary to
Commission's authority over interstate basic telephone services.""4 The GTE
401 Id. at 614 n.77 (citation omitted).
402 See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
403 Id. at 1477-78. Dark fiber is deployed fiber optic cable without "electronic and other
equipment necessary to power ... the glass fiber." Id. at 1478.
404 Id. at 1479 (citations omitted); see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II),
440 U.S. 689, 694 (1979); United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406
U.S. 649, 656 (1972).
405 The question whether the Commission may exercise jurisdiction ancillary to its Title
VI responsibilities for cable communications, discussed infra Part III.C.1.f, has yet to be
presented to the appellate courts.
406 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 16 n.76.
407 Id.; GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730-31 (1973).
408 California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240 n.35 (9th Cir. 1990).
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decision upheld the Commission's rules governing the provision of non-
regulated computer data processing services by communications common car-
riers within the scope of the FCC's authority over common carriers."° The
Second Circuit's references in GTE to the Commission's "broad and compre-
hensive rule-making authority in the new and dynamic field of electronic
communication"4 0 are not the sole basis for the decision."'
The Ninth Circuit, in California v. FCC, squarely rejected the FCC's at-
tempt to justify rules preempting intrastate structural separation requirements
on its Title I authority alone." 2 After noting that the "FCC attaches great sig-
nificance to its decision to regulate enhanced services pursuant to Title I, rather
than Title II," the court rejected the Commission's argument that it was not
bound by the restriction of its jurisdiction contained in section 2(b)(1) because
that pertained only to cases in which the Commission had chosen to exercise
its Title II authority to regulate common carriers." 3 The Ninth Circuit found
that the Commission's argument misconceived the nature of its ancillary au-
thority:
Title I is not an independent source of regulatory authority; rather, it confers on the
FCC only such power as is ancillary to the Commission's specific statutory responsi-
bilities .... In the case of enhanced services, the specific responsibility to which the
Commission's Title I authority is ancillary [is] to its Title II authority over common
carrier services.4 4
The FCC also cited General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. United
States, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit involving
review of a Commission rule prohibiting telephone companies from providing
cable services through affiliates unless they allowed cable operators to attach
to phone company utility poles. 5 The court declined to decide the full scope of
the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction in the area of cable regulation under
section 2(a) of the Act, "since [it was] of the opinion that that section together
with [s]ection 1 and [s]ection 214 provide ample jurisdiction for the Commis-
sion's orders. 41 6 The General Telephone court stated:
409 GTE, 474 F.2d at 729-31.
410 Id. at 731.
411 Id. at 729-32 (upholding the Commission's "maximum separation" rules governing
the entry of communications common carriers into the non-regulated field of data process-
ing services as supported by the Commission's concern that its "carriers provide efficient
and economic [telephone] service to the public").
412 California, 905 F.2d at 1240 & n35.
413 Id. at 1240 n.35 (citation omitted).
414 Id. (citations omitted).
415 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 116 n.76; Gen. Tele. Co. of the Sw. v. United
States (General Telephone), 449 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1971).
416 General Telephone, 449 F.2d at 854. Section 214 requires carriers to obtain from the
Commission a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" prior to constructing new
lines or acquiring or operating any line; the FCC is permitted to "'attach to the issuance of
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While the Commission is specifically charged with the regulation of common carriers
under Title II and broadcasters under Title III, it nonetheless has the additional and
overriding responsibility, as enunciated in Section 1 (47 U.S.C. § 151), to "make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate fa-
cilities at reasonable charges." The development of [cable] services is a part of this
broader purpose. The Commission is obliged to discharge its responsibilities in this
area as best it can and it has chosen in this instance to implement the national policy
by limiting the involvement of common carriers, over which the Commission has un-
questioned jurisdiction, in [cable] operations.
417
The Fifth Circuit thus recognized that section l's broad purposes may be ef-
fectuated through the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction only when the exercise is
reasonably ancillary to its much more narrowly-tailored regulatory authority
under Titles II and III of the Act.
In conclusion, in virtually every instance in which the courts have upheld
the FCC's reliance upon its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, the agency's action
was also supported by its express statutory responsibilities to regulate the ac-
tivities of television broadcast stations and other radio licensees under Title III
or the provision of telecommunications services by common carriers under
Title II."' The Commission's argument boils down to little more than an asser-
tion that it may exercise its ancillary jurisdiction in any case where its action
may be said to further the general goals of section 1. This is an unsupportable
view of the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction, as it "mocks the principle that
the statute constrains the agency in any meaningful way."4 If accepted, it
would obviate the need for any other provision of the Act. In other words, if
the FCC's view that section 1, standing alone, supports the exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction over Comcast's broadband network management practices,
then the rest of the Act is rendered no more than surplus usage. Unfortunately
for the Commission, the courts have already rejected this sweeping view of its
powers and have instead consistently held that "Title I is not an independent
the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and ne-
cessity may require."' 47 U.S.C. § 214(a); see General Telephone, 449 F.2d at 854. The
court noted that this specific authorization is "supplemented by Section 4(i) of the Act (47
U.S.C. § 154(i)) which permits the agency to 'make such orders, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."' Id.; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
154(i), 214 (2000).
417 General Telephone, 449 F.2d at 854-55 (emphasis added)..
418 In addition to the cases discussed above, see Mobile Commc'ns Corp. of Am. v. FCC,
77 F.3d 1399, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (approving exercise of ancillary authority pursuant to
the FCC's statutory responsibility under section 309(a) to grant licenses in the public inter-
est); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ap-
proving ancillary authority to impose prospective rate reductions "absolutely necessary"
given the mandates of sections 204 and 205 of the Act);
419 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1014
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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source of regulatory authority; rather, it confers on the FCC only such power
as is ancillary to the Commission's specific statutory responsibilities." 20
The Commission's position that Title I may satisfy both prongs of the test
for ancillary jurisdiction is untenable because Title I is considered the source
of ancillary jurisdiction;42" ' the position, thus, is akin to saying that the FCC can
regulate if its actions are ancillary to its ancillary jurisdiction, and that is one
ancillary too many. 2
420 California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240 n.35 (9th Cir. 1990) In California v. FCC,
the court rejected the FCC's attempt to preempt state regulation of structural separation
requirements and inconsistent nonstructural safeguards than what the Commission imposed
in the Computer Inquiries on the grounds that they would negate its Computer III policy of
permitting the integration of basic and enhanced services offered on an interstate basis. The
FCC's cannot rely on its claimed justification that section 2(b)(l), which limits its authority
over intrastate common carrier services was inapplicable because it has chosen to regulate
enhanced services pursuant to Title I rather than Title II because "[iun the case of enhanced
services, the specific responsibility to which the Commission's Title I authority is ancillary
to its Title II authority is over common carrier services." Id. n.35; see U.S. v. Sw. Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (finding the FCC's Title I authority "restricted to that reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities"); Mo-
tion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the
"FCC must look beyond [section] 1 to find authority for regulations that significantly impli-
cate program content"); Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(vacating broadcast flag rules imposed solely under FCC's Title I authority because, lacking
a "statutory foundation," they were therefore "ancillary to nothing"); see also Illinois Citi-
zens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397, 1399 (7th Cir. 1972) The Seventh Circuit
agreed with an FCC determination that it has no power to regulate the construction of an
office tower claimed to interfere with the reception of broadcasting television reception,
under either its direct statutory authorization or its ancillary authority. Id. at 1401. The court
observed that Sw. Cable recognized a very limited extension of the FCC's authority over
activities clearly falling within its subject matter jurisdiction under Title I, but even there the
Supreme Court "appeared to be treading lightly." Id. at 1400. In view of this, the petitioners'
argument that "if the 'communications' are within the FCC's power to regulate, so are all
activities which 'substantially affect communications,' was rejected on the grounds that the
argument was "too broad" as it "would result in expanding the FCC's already substantial
responsibilities to include a wide range of activities, whether or not actually involving the
transmission of radio or television signals much less being remotely electronic in nature."
Id. at 1399-1400.
421 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); United States v. Mid-
west Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649, 653-58 (1972); see also Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005) ("Information-
service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-carier regulation un-
der Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obliga-
tions under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communica-
tions.").
422 As the D.C. Circuit put it, an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction cannot rest solely on
Title I because it would "thus appear ancillary to nothing." Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406




Section 706 is titled Advanced Telecommunications Incentives.423 As the
Commission recognizes, section 706(a) provides that the "Commission shall
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced tele-
communications capability to all Americans."424 Section 706(a) further pro-
vides that the Commission is to pursue this policy by "utilizing, in a manner
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regu-
lation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers
to infrastructure investment.""42 Congress defined advanced telecommunica-
tions capability as "high-speed, switched broadband telecommunications capa-
bility that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data,
graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology" and "without
regard to any transmission media or technology." '426
Apart from its responsibility to encourage the deployment of advanced tele-
communications capability by utilizing various deregulatory or regulating
methods that "remove barriers to infrastructure investment," the Commission's
sole statutory mandate pursuant to section 706(b) is to conduct a regular in-
quiry concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.427 Only upon a negative find-
ing is the Commission empowered to "take immediate action to accelerate de-
ployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment
and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.""4 8
The Commission found that exercising jurisdiction over the Free Press
Complaint would reasonably be ancillary to this provision in several ways.
First, it found that the practice of degrading consumer ability to share or access
video content effectively "results in the limiting of 'deployment' of an 'ad-
vanced telecommunications capability,' i.e., the ability to 'originate and re-
423 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 153 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (2000)).
424 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 18; 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000). Section 706 was
added as a footnote to section 157, contained in Title I of the Act, by the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996. § 157. Section 157, entitled "New Technologies and Services," states that
it "shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies
and services to the public." § 157(a). The Commission is directed to determine "whether any
new technology or service proposed in a petition or application is in the public interest
within one year" of filing, and to conclude any proceeding for a new technology or service
that the Commission itself initiates within one year. § 157(b). Section 706 of the Act was
moved to its own section of the code in December 2008. 47 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2008).
425 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706(a).
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ceive high-quality . . . video telecommunications using any technology.
''4 29
Second, the Commission "predict[ed] that prohibiting network operators from
blocking or degrading consumer access to desirable content and applications
on-line will result in increased consumer demand for high-speed Intemet ac-
cess, and therefore, increased deployment to meet that demand.""43 Finally, the
Commission found that "the expenditure of both creative and financial capital
on such content and applications is much less likely if large numbers of Inter-
net users will be unable to access them in an unfettered manner. 43" '
Setting aside the highly speculative nature of the Commission's predictions
in this case, even Free Press recognized that section 706(a) provides a "general
instruction to the FCC" to promote broadband deployment.432 However, this
congressional policy-as the Supreme Court has described it-is not an inde-
pendent grant of substantive regulatory power.433 The Commission has con-
firmed this reading of the plain language of the statute: Section 706 confers no
substantive authority on the Commission but rather sets forth policy guidance
to be used in exercising authority conferred elsewhere in the Act.434 Accord-
429 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 18.
430 Id.
431 Id. The Commission cites exactly one source of record evidence supporting these
predictive judgments. Id. 18 n.85 ("[W]e agree with Free Press that the unimpeded avail-
ability of high-definition content on-line will lead to increased adoption of broadband Inter-
net access, as well as consumer demand for network upgrades that would result in higher
speeds that would allow such content to be accessed more quickly."); see Free Press June
12 Ex Parte, supra note 129, supp. 1 at 22.
432 Free Press June 12 Ex Parte, supra note 129, at 20-24.
433 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002).
434 See Comeast P2P Order, supra note 9, 18; see also In re Deployment of Wireline
Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability; Petition of Bell Atlantic Cor-
poration for Relief from Barriers to Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Ser-
vices; Petition of US West Communications, Inc. for Relief from Barriers to Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Services; Petition of Ameritech Corporation to Remove
Barriers to Investment in Advanced Telecommunications Technology; Petition of the Alli-
ance for Public Technology Requesting Issuance of Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking to Implement Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act; Petition
of the Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS) for a Declaratory Ruling
Establishing Conditions Necessary to Promote Deployment of Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Services Under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Bell Company, and Nevada Bell Petition for Relief from
Regulation Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 47 U.S.C. §
160 for ADSL Infrastructure and Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 77 (Aug. 6, 1998) [hereinafter First Advanced
Services Order]; In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommuni-
cations Capability; Petition of Bell Atlantic Corporation for Relief from Barriers to De-
ployment of Advanced Telecommunications Services; Petition of US West Communica-
tions, Inc. for Relief from Barriers to Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Ser-
vices; Petition of Ameritech Corporation to Remove Barriers to Investment in Advanced
Telecommunications Technology; Petition of the Alliance for Public Technology Request-
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ingly, the FCC cannot assert ancillary jurisdiction solely to promote the goals
of section 706(a) because that provision does not grant any authority or impose
any specific mandatory obligation on the Commission, as the agency itself has
previously recognized:
[S]ection 706(a) does not constitute an independent grant of forbearance authority or
of authority to employ other regulating methods. Rather, we conclude that section
706(a) directs the Commission to use the authority granted in other provisions, includ-
ing forbearance authority granted under section 10(a), to encourage the deployment of
advanced services. 35
As discussed above, the Commission may not rely on its ancillary jurisdic-
tion simply because an action may be said to further a "'valid communications
policy goal and [is] in the public interest. '436 Rather, the Commission must
support its actions as necessary, if not imperative, to effectuate a specific dele-
gated regulatory responsibility, and the action must support long established
regulatory goals in the area of regulation relied upon.437 Also, as noted above,
the D.C. Circuit has recognized that statutory provisions that "order[] the
Commission to produce a report" do "nothing more, nothing less" and that
"[o]nce the Commission complete[s] the task of preparing the report ...its
delegated authority on the subject end[s]. ''438 Thus, consistent with the D.C.
Circuit's decision in MPAA, once the FCC discharges its obligation to conduct
its periodic inquiries and produce the required reports to Congress pursuant to
section 706(b), "its delegated authority on the subject end[s]."'39 Section 706
may continue to serve as a guidepost for FCC regulatory actions, but standing
alone, it may not provide the hook for its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over
the Free Press Complaint.
Moreover, an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction must not be contrary to statu-
ing Issuance of Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Implement Section
706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act; Petition of the Association for Local Telecom-
munications Services (ALTS) for a Declaratory Ruling Establishing Conditions Necessary
to Promote Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Services Under Section 706 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Bell
Company, and Nevada Bell Petition for Relief from Regulation Pursuant to Section 706 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 47 U.S.C. § 160 for ADSL Infrastructure and
Service, Order on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 17,044, 5 (Aug. 3, 2000); In re Imple-
mentation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as
amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Re-
port and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101, 62-64
(Dec. 20, 2006).
435 First Advanced Services Order, supra note 434, 69.
436 Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
437 United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649, 663-65
(1972); see supra Part III.A. L.b.
438 MPAA, 309 F.3d at 807.
439 Id.
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tory limits on the scope of agency authority, nor may it be contrary to long-
established policy in the area of advanced telecommunications deployment.'
In the case of section 706, the FCC has long pursued a deregulatory policy for
the express purpose of "encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans" fo-
cused on spurring infrastructure investment." By exercising regulatory author-
ity to dictate the network management policies of a facilities-based broadband
ISP-a move that will likely deter rather than encourage infrastructure invest-
ment-the FCC both contravenes the statutory purpose and reverses its own
long-standing policy objectives." 2 The Commission's action, therefore, cannot
be deemed reasonably ancillary to the accomplishment of the purposes of sec-
tion 706; to the contrary, it is more likely to contravene statutory goals. Again,
even assuming that section 706 could be read to support an exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction for the purposes cited by the Commission-which is doubt-
ful-such an action would only be appropriate in an agency rulemaking pro-
ceeding.
d Section 601
Section 601 sets forth the purposes of Title VI of the Act, much as section 1
sets forth the purposes of the Communications Act, and, like sections 1 and
230, imposes no statutorily mandated responsibilities on the Commission."4
Rather, section 601 establishes only the broad ends to which the Commission's
delegated regulatory authority under Title VI-the means-may be applied.
Among the six statutory purposes contained in section 601, the Commission
selected subsection four as supporting its ancillary jurisdiction.'" That provi-
sion identifies as a purpose of Title VI: to "assure that cable communications
provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of infor-
mation sources and services to the public."" 5 The five other statutory purposes
taken together reflect congressional goals for the establishment of "a national
policy concerning cable communications" that "establish[es] guidelines for the
exercise of Federal, State, and local authority" to regulate cable systems; "en-
440 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I1), 440 U.S. 689, 706-07 (1979).
441 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) note (2000); see Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21,
4, 47, 73; Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 77.
442 Presumably, by imposing additional obligations on broadband providers based on
weak legal grounds, the Commission increases the uncertainty in the market, thereby dis-
couraging additional investment.
443 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (listing the purposes of section 601) with 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151,230.
444 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, % 21-22.
445 47 U.S.C. § 521(4); see ComcastP2P Order, supra note 9, 21.
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courage[s] the growth and development of cable systems"; protects cable op-
erators from "unfair denials of [franchise] renewal"; and "promote[s] competi-
tion in cable communications and minimize[s] unnecessary regulation that
would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems."" 6
It bears noting that although Title VI has yet to be recognized as a source of
regulatory responsibilities supporting an exercise of the Commission's ancil-
lary jurisdiction, there is no jurisprudential impediment to its use for such pur-
poses. However, consistent with Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I, and
Midwest Video 11, such actions must be imperative for the successful perform-
ance of the Commission's statutory responsibilities under Title VI, and must
not contravene the regulatory framework Congress established in that title-
tests that the Comcast P2P Order cannot pass.
Section 601 was added to the Communications Act by the Cable Communi-
cations Act of 1984, 44' which was intended as a deregulatory act, eliminating
unnecessary state and local cable regulation and delineating the appropriate
role of federal and state and local franchising authorities vis-.-vis cable com-
munications . 48 Title VI was established to govern cable communications, but
the term itself is not defined in the statute. The section 602 definitions appear
to confine the scope of the Commission's Title VI mandatory statutory respon-
sibilities to the provision of cable services and multichannel video program-
ming distributor ("MVPD") services by cable operators and other MVPDs,
including telephone companies providing video programming services and
operators of open video systems.44 With limited exceptions, the operative pro-
446 47 U.S.C. § 521(1), (3), (5)-(6). Even assuming that section 601 may support the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to, for example, "promote competition in cable communi-
cations," arguably a goal identified by the Commission in the Comcast P2P Order, supra
note 9, 16, it would only support the Commission's ability to engage in a rulemaking. See
discussion infra Part IV.C. 1, on the impropriety of the Commission's "adjudi-making."
447 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (codi-
fied as 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-73); see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, History of Cable Tele-
vision, http://www.ncta.com/About/AboutHistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (last visited Feb.
10, 2009) (providing a history of cable television).
448 See J. Michael Shepherd et al., Panel Discussion on Self-Regulation, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 809, 817 (1989).
449 "Cable communications" is not a defined term in the Act. Section 552(6) defines the
key term "cable service" as "(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video pro-
gramming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is
required for the selection or use of such video programming or other programming service."
47 U.S.C. § 522(6). "Video programming" means "programming provided by, or generally
considered comparable to programming provided by a television broadcast station." §
522(20). "Other programming service" is defined as "information that a cable operator
makes available to all subscribers generally." § 522(14). "MVPD" is defined as "a person
such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distributor service, a
direct satellite broadcast service ... who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or
customers, multiple channels of video programming." § 522(13). The provision of video
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visions of Title VI are addressed to the provision of one-way multichannel
video programming services by cable operators and other entities.45°
In the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the Commission expressly rejected
classifying cable modem service as a Title VI cable service because Internet
access services are highly interactive two-way services affording subscribers
the ability to access and interact with all the content available on the Interet in
a manner wholly inconsistent with the notion of "one-way transmission to sub-
scribers ... of video programming, or other programming service."45' Accord-
ing to the Commission, the amount of subscriber interaction needed "to use"
the cable modem service placed it outside the scope of Title VI.
452
In the Comcast P2P Order, the Commission reasoned that, unlike Title VI
generally, section 601(4) by its terms is not limited to "cable services" but ap-
plies more broadly to "cable communications. '453 Accordingly, in the Comcast
P2P Order, the Commission stated that it "interpret[s] 'cable communications'
in this instance to include those communications, such as peer-to-peer trans-
fers, facilitated by broadband Internet access service provided by cable opera-
tors such as Comcast. ' '454 Continuing, the Commission stated:
To the extent that our adjudicatory action promotes a diversity of information sources
for Comcast's end users by enabling them to access more easily a wider variety of
content than Comcast previously allowed, this core purpose of Title VI of the Act is
satisfied by our assertion of authority in this area.455
Thus, in the Commission's view, it is free to exercise its ancillary jurisdic-
tion to promote any and all of the purposes contained in section 601 over the
array of communications services provided by cable operators simply because
the services are provided by cable operators. This truly is a breathtaking ex-
pansion of the Commission's regulatory powers, and it is highly unlikely that
Congress ever contemplated such an open-ended delegation of regulatory au-
thority under section 601. Acceptance of the Commission's interpretation of its
powers under section 601 would render superfluous the remaining provisions
of Title VI.
The Commission attempts to address this problem in the Comcast P2P Or-
der by referencing statements by the Supreme Court in Midwest Video I in
which the Court rejected an argument that sections 1 and 303(g)-relied upon
by the Commission in support of its cable local origination rules--"merely
programming services by telephone companies is governed by section 651. § 571.
450 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 522, 571(a)(3), 573(a).
451 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(A); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 67.
452 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 65-67.





state objectives without granting power for their implementation. '' "O According
to the Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the local origination rules as
"'founded on those provisions for the policies they state, and not for any regu-
latory power they might confer.' Rather, the Court explained that '[t]he regula-
tory power itself may be found . . . in 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 303(r).' 457 The
quoted passage omits the citation to Southwestern Cable, which makes plain
that this simply is a reference to the statutory sources of the Commission's an-
cillary jurisdiction previously recognized by the Court. 458 The Commission
relies on the quoted material to support its claim that it may base an exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction solely on policy or purpose statements contained in the
Act. The quote is contained in a footnote; the Midwest Video I text preceding
and following the footnote demonstrates, however, that the local origination
rules were upheld on other grounds.459 Consistent with this analysis, the Court
in Midwest Video I found the FCC's action reasonably ancillary, not solely-if
at all-to a general statutory policy or goal, but to a specific mandated statu-
tory responsibility contained in Title III:
But in both cases the rules serve the policies of [sections] 1 and 303(g) of the Com-
munications Act on which the cablecasting regulation is specifically premised, and al-
so, in the Commission's words, 'facilitate the more effective performance of [its] duty
to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of television service to each of
the several States and communities " under § 307(b). In sum, the regulation preserves
and enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and therefore is "reasonably ancillary
to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regu-
lation of television broadcasting. 46 °
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Commission's novel interpretation of sec-
tion 601 has effectively reversed its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling to the
extent the Comcast P2P Order finds that at least a portion of the cable modem
service to constitutes cable communications governed by Title VI. 6 Under the
FCC's new approach, section 601 can only serve as a basis for the Commis-
sion's ancillary jurisdiction over cable modem service providers. By this ac-
tion, the FCC has created just the sort of regulatory disparity it sought to avoid
in each of its earlier broadband Internet access classification rulings. In each
case, the Commission intentionally classified all facilities-based broadband
456 Id., 22 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S.
649, 669 n.28 (1972)).
457 Id. 22 (quoting Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 669 n.28).
458 See Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 669 n.28.
459 See id. at 669-70.
460 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
461 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 7 ("[C]able modem service,
as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a
cable service."); Id. 68 ("Our determination that cable modem service is not a cable ser-
vice does not mean that the cable operator cannot provide the service, just that the service is
not subject to Title VI.").
[Vol. 17
Undue Process at the FCC
Internet access services as Title I information services so that all providers
would be able to compete on a level playing field in a minimally regulated en-
vironment.462
The Commission's attempt to pick and choose among these statutory pur-
poses to find one that can arguably support its action in its Comcast P2P Order
highlights a key problem with basing an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction on
the many policy and statutory purpose statements contained with the Commu-
nications Act: in any given specific instance, the purpose statement will fall
into unacceptable contradiction of one another. While that is a tolerable state of
affairs for statements of policy goals, it is intolerable when it comes to the
Commission's actions in its quasi-legislative rulemaking or quasi-judicial ad-
judicatory function, where the Commission simply has no authority to take
action unless it has been delegated that authority by Congress. Ancillary juris-
diction to accomplish statutory policies-as opposed to specific statutory man-
dates-would give the agency virtually unlimited authority to regulate when-
ever and wherever it chose, a result not countenanced by any court.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Commission may not exer-
cise its ancillary jurisdiction simply because it declares that its action furthers a
valid policy objective such as that contained in sections 1, 601(4) or section
706. A proper exercise of ancillary jurisdiction must not only comprehend a
subject matter within the Commission's express charge from Congress, it must
be imperative to the successful accomplishment of a statutory mandate, as op-
posed to policy statement, contained in one of the operative titles of the Act,
and cannot conflict with the regulatory regime to which it is said to be rea-
sonably ancillary. In addition to improperly relying provisions of the Act re-
garding only broad policies to support its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, the
Commission also relies on Title II of the Act.
2. The Commission May Not Rely Upon the Provisions of Title II Cited in its
Decision to Support its Exercise ofAncillary Jurisdiction
The FCC relies upon three provisions contained in Title II-in addition to
section 230-to support its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the Free
Press Complaint: sections 201, 256 and 257.463 Given the FCC's decision in the
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that cable modem service does not consti-
tute a telecommunications service under section 153(46), reliance upon any
provision of the Act explicitly governing common carriers to support its action
462 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 1, 4, 5; Broadband Over Power
Line Order, supra 30, 1-2.
463 ComeastP2P Order, supra note 9, T 17, 19-20; 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 256, 257 (2000).
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
against Comcast is highly questionable."4 The specific justifications supplied
by the Commission do not strengthen its position.
a. Section 201
Pursuant to section 201, "[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regula-
tions for and in connection with [common carrier] service, shall be just and
reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is
unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful."465 The Commission rea-
soned that its action was reasonably ancillary to its section 201 authority be-
cause Comcast's interference "with its users' ability to upload content" would
cause the computer attempting to download that content "to look for another
source," which in some cases will be a computer connected to a common car-
rier's network.466 The Commission further speculates that depending on the
amount of traffic shifted, the DSL provider may need to purchase or build ad-
ditional capacity, and depending on the terms of its traffic exchange agree-
ments, might owe increased payments, thus increasing its costs.467 The Com-
mission argues that this "would have implications for the DSL provider's
charges and the arrangements it must make pursuant to section 201."'468 Thus,
according to the FCC, Comcast's conduct "shift[ed] the costs and burdens of
carrying traffic away from Comcast and onto Title II carriers" with whom it
interconnects.469 The Commission believes such behavior "directly impacts
Title 1I carriers and thus implicates [its] section 201 authority.""47
At the outset, it must be noted that the cost-shifting scenario spun out by the
Commission is completely speculative and unsupported by any record evi-
dence. The FCC cites no traffic studies, complaints by DSL providers, or any
indication of the number of wireline broadband ISPs-using DSL or some oth-
er technology-actually experiencing increased traffic flows and costs due to
Comcast's conduct. Nor does the Commission support its decision by citing
record evidence of carrier rate increases due to carrier cost increases that could
464 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1006-20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissecting the Commission's argument that cable
modem service is not a telecommunications service but contains a telecommunications
component..
465 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).




470 Id. The FCC notes that it has permitted some facilities-based carriers to choose
whether to offer the transmission portion of wireline broadband Internet access service as
non-common carriage or common carriage, without attempting to quantify the number of
providers who have elected to provide DSL on a common carrier basis. Id. T 17 n.80.
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arguably be considered unreasonable, and hence a basis for FCC action under
section 201. In other words, even if section 201 could theoretically provide the
basis for an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate or regulate the rea-
sonableness of the network management practices of a cable modem service
provider, the Commission has failed to make the case in this instance. Regard-
less, it is highly doubtful that section 201 can provide such a basis.
By its terms, section 201 requires common carriers to charge just and rea-
sonable rates.47" ' The question whether the a common carrier's costs have been
unduly raised by the action of a non-common carrier is wholly distinct from
the question under section 201 whether the rates charged by the affected com-
mon carrier to its end users are just and reasonable. Accordingly, section 201
can provide no basis for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over Comcast's
network management practices.
b. Section 256
The next Title II provision cited by the Commission-section
256--similarly is incapable of supporting the claimed ancillary jurisdiction.472
Section 256, entitled "Coordination for interconnectivity," states that its pur-
poses are "to promote nondiscriminatory accessibility by the broadest number
of users and vendors of communications products and services to public tele-
communications networks used to provide telecommunications services" and
"to ensure the ability of users and information providers to seamlessly and
transparently transmit and receive information between and across telecommu-
nications networks." '473 Congress explicitly limited the Commission to two core
functions under section 256.
First, the Commission "establish[es] procedures for [its] oversight of coor-
dinated network planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers
of telecommunications service for the effective and efficient interconnection of
public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications ser-
vice." '474 Second, it participates "in a manner consistent with its authority and
practice prior [to the date of enactment of this section], in the development by
appropriate industry standard-setting organizations of public telecommunica-
tions network interconnectivity standards." '475 Significantly, section 256(c),
471 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
472 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 19; 47 U.S.C. § 256 (2000).
473 47 U.S.C. § 256(a). As used in section 256, the term "public telecommunications
network interconnectivity" means "the ability of two or more public telecommunications
networks used to provide telecommunications service to communicate and exchange infor-





which addresses the Commission's Authority, states that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as expanding or limiting any authority that the Com-
mission may have under law in effect before" the date of enactment of the
1996 Act. 476
In other words, pursuant to section 256, the Commission's added statutory
responsibilities are limited strictly to establishing procedures for its oversight
of coordinated public telecommunications network planning. Additionally, it
may participate with industry standards-setting bodies in the development of
public telecommunications network interconnectivity standards, consistent
with its authority over such matters prior to enactment of the 1996 Act.47 The
provision otherwise does not expand upon the Commission's statutory author-
ity. Moreover, section 256 contains the word telecommunications in connec-
tion with carrier, network, or service no fewer than eighteen times;47 it cannot
reasonably be read to support the FCC regulatory authority over the network
management practices of a cable modem service provider.
The Commission attempts to skirt these obvious problems with relying on
section 256 to provide the hook for its ancillary jurisdiction by arguing that
even if Comcast's "cable plant-based Internet access network is not, when
viewed in isolation, a 'public telecommunications network,' it clearly inter-
connects with such networks. 4 79 To explain the significance of this assumed
fact, the Commission again hypothesizes actions by a Comcast customer-in
this case a VolP customer-who "may utilize [the] service to call a customer
using a traditional land-line telephone connected to the public switched tele-
phone network. '480 Similarly, Comcast's customers may also "share content
with customers of local exchange carriers, whose networks are used to provide
telecommunications services ... and are thus 'public telecommunications net-
works."'48 Finally-channeling its section 201 hypothetical-the Commission
notes that Comcast's practices may "have the effect of shifting traffic to other
carriers' telecommunications networks."4 2 The Commission concludes:
It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the Commission's ancillary authority to section
256 to promote the ability of Comcast customers and customers of other networks, in-
cluding public telecommunications networks, to share content and applications with
each other, without facing operator-erected barriers, i.e., to "seamlessly and transpar-
ently transmit and receive information," and without allowing Comcast to shift costs
and burdens to those networks. 83
476 § 256(c).
477 See id.
478 See § 256.
479 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 19.
480 Id. (emphasis added).
481 Id.
482 Id.
483 Id. (citation omitted).
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Unfortunately, the obvious impediments to basing an exercise of regulatory
authority on section 256 are the provision's express statement that it does not
expand the Commission's authority in any manner. Additionally, it is impeded
by the section's express terms authorizing the Commission to do nothing more
than establish telecommunications network interconnectivity oversight proce-
dures and participate in industry standards-setting body efforts aimed at pro-
moting the statutory purposes.4" No matter how many theoretical linkages the
Commission may hypothecate to connect Comcast's cable modem network
with a public telecommunications network, the Commission's action cannot be
considered reasonably ancillary to a provision directing that it do nothing other
than establish procedures and participate in industry standards-setting activi-
ties. Again, the grant of some authority over a subject does not give the FCC
plenary authority in the area.485
c. Section 257
Similarly, section 257 does not support the Commission's exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction in this instance. Section 257, entitled "Market entry barriers
proceeding," directs the Commission, within fifteen months after enactment of
the 1996 Act, to:
complete a proceeding for the purpose of identifying and eliminating, by regulations
pursuant to its authority under this Act (other than this section), market entry barriers
for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership of tele-
communications services and information services, or in the provision of parts or ser-
vices to providers of telecommunications services and information services.4 86
Further, every three years following the completion of the aforementioned pro-
ceeding, the Commission is "to review and report to Congress" on "any regula-
tions prescribed to eliminate barriers within its jurisdiction" and any "statutory
barriers identified under subsection (a) ... that the Commission recommends
be eliminated consistent with the public interest. 4 87 Congress expressly di-
rected the Commission, "[i]n carrying out subsection (a) . . . [to] seek to pro-
mote the policies and purposes of [the Act] favoring diversity of media voices,
vigorous economic competition, technological advancement, and promotion of
the public interest, convenience, and necessity.""4 '
Thus, as with section 256, in adding section 257 to the Act, Congress ex-
pressly refrained from expanding the scope of the Commission's regulatory
jurisdiction. The provision created new obligations for the Commission con-
484 47 U.S.C. § 256(b) (2000).
485 Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005).





sisting of a single rulemaking proceeding and a continuing reporting obliga-
tion, without expanding the scope of its regulatory authority over providers of
either telecommunications or information services.489 It is therefore highly
doubtful that section 257, standing alone, may be relied on to support an exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction not necessary for the accomplishment of an ex-
press statutory mandate contained elsewhere in the Act. Consistent with the
principle established by the D.C. Circuit in American Library Association,49 °
once the FCC has discharged its rulemaking and reporting obligations under
section 257, its delegated authority over the matter ends.49'
Even if section 257 could be read theoretically to support the FCC's ancil-
lary authority in an appropriate case, the Commission's action on the Free
Press Complaint fails to pass muster. In the Comcast P2P Order, the FCC
made several determinations regarding the success of the Internet.
The Commission reasoned that the success of the Internet has been "directly
linked to its particular architectural design"; that variances from its standard
protocols and practices or contravention of these protocols and practices "dam-
ages the Intemet as a whole"; and that entrepreneurs would have to "spend
considerable time and resources in an effort to accommodate Comcast's par-
ticular network management practices. 49 2 From this predicate, the FCC con-
cludes that by
exercising authority over this complaint, [it is] able to ensure that Comcast's actions
do not inappropriately hinder entry by "entrepreneurs and other small businesses in
the provision and ownership of telecommunications services and information ser-
vices." In addition by facilitating such entry, [it] also promote[s] the Act's policies fa-
voring "a diversity of media voices" and "technological advancement.
' 493
The record evidence cited in support of this conclusion, however, indicates
that rather than acting as a barrier to market entry, Comcast's network man-
agement and disclosure practices might have constituted merely a hindrance to
the easy uploading and distribution of content by subscribers to multichannel
online video distributors such as Vuze.49" Even Vuze acknowledged that it had
been "able to minimize any serious impact on its service" by "implement[ing]
a number of counter-measures."'4 95 Thus, the FCC is lacking a factual basis on
which to build its ancillary authority, even assuming such authority could rea-
sonably be exercised pursuant to section 257. In short, the FCC had no basis to
489 § 257(a)-(c).
490 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.b.
491 See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 807 (2002) (Provid-
ing that in the case of section 713(f) where Congress solely authorized the Commission to
produce a report, its delegated authority on the matter was limited to producing the report).
492 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 20.
493 Id.
494 See id. 20 n.96; see also Vuze Petition, supra note 109, at 11.
495 Vuze Petition, supra note 109, at 11.
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take any action pursuant to section 257 concerning Comcast's network man-
agement practices.
C. Summary of Ancillary Jurisdiction Analysis
Contrary to the Commission's beliefs, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
is bounded and the Commission cannot expand its regulatory authority at will.
Although the courts have repeatedly stated that the FCC has "broad authority"
under this doctrine to implement statutory purposes, they have also recognized
that the FCC's ancillary authority is not unlimited.496 Southwestern Cable,
Midwest Video I and Midwest Video I,"' taken together circumscribe the FCC's
ability to impose regulatory constraints on the array of communications falling
under the FCC's subject matter jurisdiction.498
Further, the seven provisions of the Act on which the Commission re-
lies--sections 1, 201, 230(b), 256, 257, 601(4), and 706-fail to provide the
requisite jurisdictional basis for its action. Sections 1, 230(b), 706(a), and
601(4) cannot serve as a means for enforcing behavioral norms against Com-
cast because a private party cannot violate Congressional policies or purposes
that, like these, consist of no more than hortatory exclamations or statements of
broad purpose.499 Further, sections 201, 256, and 257 cannot provide the neces-
sary jurisdictional reference as they concern solely communications services
provided by common carriers, bear no reasonable relationship to the network
management practices at issue, or otherwise fail to enlarge the scope of the
FCC's existing jurisdiction over providers of broadband information services.
The Commission's attempts to bolster its ancillary jurisdiction analysis
through reliance on Iowa Utilities Board and BrandX flounder by virtue of the
fact that neither decision involved challenges to an exercise of ancillary juris-
diction by the Commission. All statements concerning the doctrine in these
decisions, therefore, must be considered dicta. Moreover, taken as a whole, not
only does BrandX fail to support the Commission's claims about its ancillary
jurisdiction over these matters, the decision calls into question the Commis-
sion's analysis of its statutory authority in this area.
496 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968); FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. (Midwest Video 11), 440 U.S. 689, 698 (1979).
497 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 178; U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406
U.S. 649 (1972); Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
498 See supra Part III.A.I.
499 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 n.18 (1981) (stating
that findings in a statute were "merely an expression of federal policy" that were "hortatory,
not mandatory"); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (re-
ferring to section 396(g) of the Communications Act, as a "guide to Congressional oversight
policy and as a set of goals to which the Directors of CPB should aspire ... not a substan-
tive standard, legally enforceable by agency or courts.").
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In summary, ancillary jurisdiction is an amorphous but bounded doctrine
and each Commission exercise of this authority must be judged on the facts
presented. It is properly limited to rulemaking proceedings imposing general
rules of prospective effect. Because of the high level of uncertainty surround-
ing the doctrine, it is ill-suited by its nature to sustain adjudications, which are
predominantly retrospective in effect. A proper exercise of ancillary jurisdic-
tion must not only comprehend a subject matter within the Commission's ex-
press charge from Congress, it must be imperative to the successful accom-
plishment of a mandate contained in one of the operative titles of the Act, and
cannot conflict with the regulatory mandates to which it is said to be reasona-
bly ancillary. The Commission is not free to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction
simply because it declares that an action furthers a valid policy objective; it
must remain within the bounds of the authority delegated to it by Congress.
IV. UNDUE PROCESS
At the outset, what we know of the "undue process" used to resolve the Free
Press Complaint concerning Comcast's network management practices is not
reassuring. At the time the FCC decided to exercise jurisdiction over Com-
cast's alleged throttling of BitTorrent traffic, the actual dispute between Bit-
Torrent and Comcast had been resolved."° Moreover, the Commission had no
enforceable rules governing broadband network management practices, and its
action rests solely upon hortatory policy statements."' Even more disturbing is
the manner in which the Commission conducted its resolution of the Free
Press Complaint. Surely, the Commission broke new ground from a legal and
procedural perspective when it decided to combine the forms of rulemaking
and adjudication and find that one industry participant violated a set of policy
principles that the FCC itself had heretofore declared 'unenforceable.
The FCC acknowledges in the Comcast P2P Order "the question of whether
[it] has jurisdiction to decide an issue is entirely separate from the question of
how the Commission chooses to address [the] issue.""5 2 As demonstrated in the
previous Part of this article, the FCC's claim that it may adjudicate the dispute
concerning Comcast's network management practices pursuant to its ancillary
jurisdiction cannot withstand scrutiny, and it is doubtful it possesses ancillary
jurisdiction to regulate broadband network management practices for the rea-
500 See, e.g., John Eggerton, Comcast: Challenged Network Management Techniques
Have Ended, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article
/161687ComcastChallenged NetworkManagementTechniquesHave Ended.php.
501 See supra Part III (arguing that the FCC improperly relied on the Internet Policy
Statement in crafting the Comcast P2P Order).
502 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 38.
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sons it advanced in the Comcast P2P Order. This Part examines how the
Commission chose to exercise its purported jurisdiction. The FCC alternately
claims that the Internet Policy Statement is enforceable and that it can simulta-
neously announce new rules and imposes them in an adjudicatory proceeding.
Each of these claims is examined in turn.
A. An Agency Cannot Vindicate Policy Not Codified in a Statutory Mandate
or Rule
Federal agencies can carry out their responsibilities by either rulemaking or
through adjudication."3 The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines
rulemaking as the "process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule."5"
A rule is "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ."" In
contrast, adjudication is the process through which an order is formulated, and
an "order" is a "final disposition" in "a matter other than rule making.""0 6 In
other words, under the APA, any final agency action that is not labeled rule-
making is considered an adjudication. In terms of rulemaking:
When an agency wishes to promulgate a rule, the default position under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ... requires public notice, an opportunity for comment, and the
issuance of a "concise and general statement of basis and purpose." The resulting
documents are called "legislative rules" because they are capable of binding with the
force of statutes.507
Agencies can also issue interpretive rules and policy statements, which are
collectively referred to as non-legislative rules.0 Non-legislative rules are ex-
empt from notice-and-comment requirements and can be made effective im-
mediately upon publication in the Federal Register 0 9 The Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act defines interpretive rules as
"rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers."5 0
503 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 895
(2004).
504 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006).
505 § 551(4) (emphasis added).
506 § 551(6)-(7).
507 Manning, supra note 503, at 893.
508 This Article uses the simpler term "interpretive" instead of the APA's "interpreta-
tive." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
'o9 § 553(b).
510 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 15 (1947),
reprinted in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SOURCEBOOK 33, 30 n.3 (William F. Funk et al, eds.,
2000), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/I947cover.html. The Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act was intended "as a guide to the
agencies in adjusting their procedures to the requirements of the Act" and was originally
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In contrast, policy statements are defined as "statements issued by an agency
to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes
to exercise a discretionary power.""' Note that "legislative rules, interpretive
rules, and policy statements all may involve interpretation of a statute. There-
fore, sometimes an agency pronouncement can properly be characterized both
as an interpretation and a policy statement." ' However, there is an important
difference between a general statement of policy containing an interpretation
and an interpretive rule. As Professor John Manning explains:
The central inquiry in all nonlegislative rule cases is this: Is the agency document,
properly conceived, a legislative rule that is invalid because it did not undergo notice-
and-comment procedures, or a proper interpretative rule or general statement of policy
exempt from such procedures? ... [I]f an agency seeks to specify its regulatory inten-
tions in a legally operative way (without notice-and-comment rulemaking), it must be
able to defend the resultant document as an "interpretive rule"--something defensible
as an interpretation rather than as an exercise of delegated lawmaking authority. In
practice, this framework requires the agency to show that the document in question
merely implements policies already established by more formal means in statutes or
legislative regulations. An agency cannot rely on (binding) interpretative rules to
break new policymaking ground.
51 3
The distinction between a valid policy statement and an invalid legislative
rule "turns on an agency's intention to bind itself to a particular legal posi-
tion." 4 Although general statements of policy are generally classified as non-
legislative rules, they are not binding; only interpretive non-legislative rules
are binding. The D.C. Circuit has held that a general statement of policy cannot
"create[] a new regime" in which the agency "bases enforcement actions on the
policies or interpretations formulated in the document."5"5 The D.C. Circuit has
produced by George T. Washington, the Assistant Solicitor General, who had assisted with
the drafting of the Act. Id. at 38; see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d
33, 38 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The Attorney General's Manual is entitled to considerable
weight because of the very active role that the Attorney General played in the formulation
and enactment of the APA.").
511 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 510 at 30 n.3.
512 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 75-76 (2006); see
Presbyterian Med. Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa. v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146, 1147, 1150-51 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (holding that a Department of Health and Human Services rule that required par-
ties seeking Medicare reimbursement to provide contemporaneous documentation was a
permissible interpretative rule); Nat'l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788-89
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a decision by the FCC to award telecommunications by a
lottery in case of a tie among the applicants was a permissible interpretative rule).
513 Manning, supra note 503, at 917, 923-24.
514 U.S. Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
515 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("If an
agency acts as if a [general statement of policy] issued at headquarters is controlling in the
field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a legislative rule, if it bases
enforcement actions on the policies or interpretations formulated in the document . . . [then]
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also found that "[t]he real dividing point between regulations and general
statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, which
the [APA] authorizes to contain only documents 'having general applicability
and legal effect."'5 6
To understand the FCC's actions in the Comcast P2P Order one must un-
derstanding the role of the Internet Policy Statement. The FCC's action rests
exclusively on the its claimed authority to directly vindicate and enforce fed-
eral policy against providers of broadband Internet access services."7 The
Comcast P2P Order locates the source of federal policy being vindicated
squarely in section 230 of the Act:
Unlike newspapers or radio or broadcast television or even on-demand television, the
Internet gives Americans "a great degree of control over the information that they re-
ceive." Consequently, the Internet "offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development and myriad avenues for in-
tellectual activity." Recognizing the Internet's dynamic potential, Congress set forth
the federal policies of "promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet" and of
encourag[ing] the development of technologies [that] maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals ... who use the Internet" as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996."'
The Commission claims that its charge under this federal policy is to "en-
courage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and inter-
connected nature of the public Internet,"5 9 and states that it has recognized in
its Internet Policy Statement "its responsibility for overseeing and enforcing
the 'national Internet policy' Congress had established in section 230(b). 52 °
Through the Internet Policy Statement, the FCC claims it simply "clarified the
contours of this policy. 5 2' Specifically and most relevantly:
The Commission instructed providers of broadband Internet access services that "con-
sumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice" and "to access
lawful Internet content of their choice," subject to reasonable network management
[practices] .
Additionally, the Commission claims that the Internet Policy Statement re-
flected the its understanding of its "'duty to preserve and promote the vibrant
and open character of the Internet as the telecommunications marketplace en-
it should have been, but was not, promulgated in compliance with notice and comment
rulemaking procedures.").
516 Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting
44 U.S.C. § 1510 (1982) (emphasis added)); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2006).
517 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13-15.
518 Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C §§ 230(a)(2), (4); (b)(1), (3)) (alteration in original).
519 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 4.
520 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13.
521 Id.
522 Id. 13 (quoting Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 4).
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ters the broadband age."'" 3 In the Internet Policy Statement, Wireline Broad-
band Order, and Broadband Practices Inquiry, the FCC signaled that it would
need to adopt the principles as enforceable rules before adjudicating disputes
arising under the principles. 24 Furthermore, it is evident that the Commission
initiated the Broadband Practices Inquiry for the purpose of gathering legisla-
tive facts to determine the need for regulatory intervention in the specific area
of broadband industry practices, and that no further rulemaking activities have
followed the initiation of this docket.
As explained in more detail in Part 1II, Congress has not delegated legisla-
tive power to the FCC to enforce its Internet Policy Statement.25 Further, even
if the FCC did have the power, it did not intend to exercise it in issuing the
Internet Policy Statement.26 As recently as April 2007, the FCC reiterated that
"[t]he Policy Statement did not contain rules." '527 Although the FCC, in the
Comcast P2P Order, "agree[d] with Free Press that its Complaint is reasonably
interpreted to rest on the statutory provisions interpreted in and cited by the
Internet Policy Statement,''52 the FCC cannot recant its earlier position that the
Internet Policy Statement did not establish enforceable rules. 29 The Internet
Policy Statement has not been published in the Code of Federal Regulations-
it has not even been published in the Federal Register. The Internet Policy
Statement is thus clearly not a legislative rule. Even if the FCC's repeated
statements that the Internet Policy Statement did not establish rules were ig-
nored, the Internet Policy Statement can not be properly classified as an inter-
pretive rule either.
Agencies can issue interpretive rules to "resolve ... ambiguities" or to trans-
form a "vague ... duty or right into a sharply delineated duty or right.""53 In-
terpretive rules cannot be used to make new laws, rights, and duties. 3' Accord-
523 Id. Additionally, the Comcast P2P Order reflected the FCC's commitment to incor-
porate the principles set forth in the Internet Policy Statement "'into its on-going policymak-
ing activities."' Id. (quoting Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 5).
524 See supra Part II.B, D-E.
525 See supra Part III.A.
526 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 2-3.
527 Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 11 n.20.
528 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 41 n. 177.
529 See discussion supra Part II.G.
530 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
531 See, e.g., Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Ultimately,
an interpretative statement simply indicates an agency's reading of a statute or a rule.");
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("[I1f by
its action the agency intends to create new law, rights or duties, the rule is properly consid-
ered to be a legislative rule."); Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1952) ("Generally speaking, . . . 'regulations', 'substantive rules' or 'legislative rules' are
those which create law, usually implementary to an existing law; whereas interpretative
rules are statements as to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation
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ingly, courts have developed various tests to determine if an agency's classifi-
cation of a document as an interpretive rule is proper. If the rule invokes "spe-
cific statutory provisions, and its validity stands or falls on the correctness of
the agency's interpretation of those provisions," it may be deemed a proper
interpretive rule.532 Similarly, if the justification for the rule consists of "rea-
soned statutory interpretation, with reference to the language, purpose and leg-
islative history" of the relevant provision, the court is likely to view it as an
interpretive rule.533 Finally, if a rule "clarifies a statutory term" or "reminds
parties of existing statutory duties," the court will consider it to be an interpre-
tive rule.534
There is, however, no ambiguity needing interpretation in the statutory pro-
visions cited by the Commission with respect to either network management
practices or consumer entitlements regarding broadband Internet access ser-
vice.535 The FCC previously stated, "Congress's clear intention, as expressed in
the 1996 Act, [was] that [information services] remain 'unfettered' by federal
or state regulation.5 36
The Comcast P2P Order also cites section 706(a), in which Congress
charged the Commission with "encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Ameri-
cans."5 37 There is no ambiguity in this charge with respect to broadband net-
work management practices or consumer entitlements regarding broadband
Internet access services to be resolved by the Commission's Internet Policy
Statement. The Commission cannot reasonably claim that the Internet Policy
Statement simply is reminding facilities-based broadband Internet access pro-
viders of an existing statutory duty or right. 38 The FCC has required several
parties to commit to abiding by the Internet Policy Statement as a condition to
obtaining merger approval, which would not be necessary if there was a statu-
tory duty already imposed on all such ISPs." As the D.C. Circuit notes:
means.").
532 See United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
533 Gen. Motors Corp., 742 F.2d at 1565; see United Techs. Corp., 821 F.2d. at 720 (not-
ing that an agency rule qualified as an interpretive rule because its validity "depended on
whether or not the Agency had correctly interpreted congressional intent").
534 Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
535 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13-15, 13,088 (McDowell, Comm'r, dis-
senting).
536 IP-Enabled Services NPRM, supra note 47, 39 (emphasis added).
537 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-104, § 706(a), 110 Stat. 153
(1996).
538 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Internet
Policy Statement, supra note 20, 4-5.
539 See, e.g., AT&T-BellSouth Merger Order, supra note 84, at 5807 app. F; SBC-AT&T
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A general statement of policy.., does not establish a "binding norm." It is not finally
determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The agency cannot apply
or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a general statement of pol-
icy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy. A policy statement
announces the agency's tentative intentions for the future. When the agency applies
the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if
the policy statement had never been issued. An agency cannot escape its responsibility
to present evidence and reasoning supporting its substantive rules by announcing
binding precedent in the form of a general statement of policy.
5 4 °
As the title of the Internet Policy Statement makes clear, the document
should be classified as a general statement of policy under the APA. The Inter-
net Policy Statement was just that; a statement of broad policy principles that
the Commission said it would incorporate in future policymaking activities. As
such, the FCC's adjudicatory action against Comcast must be evaluated as if
the Internet Policy Statement had never been issued. The FCC can only apply
the Internet Policy Statement against Comcast if the FCC can support it "just
as if the policy statement had never been issued. 54' As we have demonstrated
in Part III, above, it cannot. The question of whether the FCC can introduce
and apply a new rule as part of an adjudication is explored below.
B. Rulemaking by Adjudication
The FCC majority justified its decision to enforce the Internet Policy State-
ment through adjudication by pointing out that courts have recognized that
agencies have discretion to choose between proceeding by adjudication or
rulemaking in carrying out their statutory responsibilities. 42 As a general mat-
Merger Order, supra note 84, at 18,911 app. F; Verizon-MCl Merger Order, supra note 84,
at 18,512. Significantly, the FCC did not impose such conditions on the Adelphia/Time
Wamer/Comcast license transfer. See Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order, supra note
85, 223.
540 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(citations omitted).
541 Id.
542 As the Supreme Court had previously indicated, "[n]ot every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a
general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be ad-
justed to meet particular, unforeseeable situations." SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I1), 332
U.S. 194, 202 (1947). However, "there may be situations where the [agency's] reliance on
adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. (Bell
Aerospace Co.), 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974). The 9th Circuit contemplated that "[s]uch a
situation may present itself where the new standard, adopted by adjudication, departs radi-
cally from the agency's previous interpretation of the law, where the public has relied sub-
stantially and in good faith on the previous interpretation, where fines or damages are in-
volved, and where the new standard is very broad and general in scope and prospective ap-
plication." Pfaffv. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 (1996) (citing Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 295); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir.
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ter, that is indisputably true, but only in a much more limited sense than is re-
lied upon by the Commission. Although administrative agencies may choose to
regulate through adjudication as well as rulemaking, the Supreme Court has
shown a clear preference for rulemaking: "The function of filling in the inter-
stices of [a statute] should be performed, as much as possible, through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future." '543 Proceed-
ing via adjudication to "enunciate and enforce new federal policy " is most
appropriate for cases where "the administrative agency could not reasonably
foresee" yet "must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. 545
Comcast's network management practices were not an instance where the FCC
had to proceed by adjudication to address a problem that could not have been
foreseen.546
1981); Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1203-05 (9th Cir. 1980); Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d
39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978).
543 Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202.
544 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 28.
545 Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03.
546 In March of 2005, the FCC took action against Madison River Communications, a
local exchange carrier, for intentionally blocking a specific application. See In re Madison
River Communications, LLC and affiliated companies, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (Mar. 3,
2005) [hereinafter Madison River Order]. Although Madison River was clearly subject to
Title II, the basis on which the Commission premised its decree was not clear. The Internet
Policy Statement was adopted in August 2005, more than two years before Free Press filed
its complaint and four days shy of three years before the FCC adopted the Comcast P2P
Order. Furthermore, by the time the FCC issued the Comcast P2P Order, Comcast had
announced that it would migrate to protocol-agnostic network management techniques by
the end of 2008. Press Release, Comcast Corp., Comcast and BitTorrent Form Collaboration
to Address Network Management, Network Architecture and Content Distribution, (Mar.
27, 2008), available at
http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=740. If the
FCC wanted to ensure that Comcast would honor its announcement, the agency could have
sought a consent decree with Comcast as it did with Madison River Communications. In re
Madison River Communications, LLC and affiliated companies, Consent Decree, 20
F.C.C.R. 4296, I (Mar. 3, 2005). Seeking a consent decree rather than issuing an order
would also likely have led to a quicker resolution. The Madison River consent decree was
resolved less than a month after the letter of inquiry ("LOI") was issued. The LOI was is-
sued on February 11, 2005. Id., 3. The decree was signed on March 3, 2005. Madison
River Order, supra, at 4295. The Comcast P2P Order, by comparison, was issued nine
months after the filing of the Free Press Complaint. Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at
13,028. And considering that in March of 2008 Comcast had already announced it would
take the actions that the FCC eventually required of it, a consent decree would likely have
been easy to secure.
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1. The Comcast P2P Order Effectively Imposes Improper, Purely Prospective
General Rules
As the Supreme Court has found, "[i]n order for an agency interpretation to
be granted deference, it must be consistent with the congressional purpose."5 '7
Although an agency is free to "announce new principals in an adjudicative
proceeding," it is improper to do so when the adverse consequences of reliance
on past agency decisions are substantial, when liability is imposed for past ac-
tions taken in good faith reliance on prior agency pronouncements, when the
affected party has not had a full opportunity to be heard before the agency
makes its determination, or when fines or damages are involved."4 In Pfaffv.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Ninth Circuit held:
[R]eliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion.., where the new
standard ... departs radically from the agency's previous interpretation of the law,
where the public has relied substantially and in good faith on the previous interpreta-
tion, where fines or damages are involved, and where the new standard is very broad
and general in scope and prospective application. 49
As Part III explains, the Commission cited seven statutory provisions as
well as the Internet Policy Statement, as the basis for its actions. Although the
Comcast P2P Order is "murky""55 about which provisions are cited to establish
jurisdiction and which are provisions that Comcast violated, the clearest state-
ment on this is that "Comcast's interference with peer-to-peer protocols ap-
pears to contravene the federal policy of 'promoting the continued develop-
ment of the Intemet."' 5" As the history of section 230 discussed in Part
III.B. L.a illustrates, this quote is taken completely out of context. The only ac-
tive rule contained in section 230 that accompanies this hortatory language is
"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of ... any action voluntarily taken ... to restrict access to or availabil-
ity of material that the provider... considers to be ... otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.5 52 It is not at all
clear how adjudication of unpublished rules that force broadband providers to
change their business plans553 serves the congressional purpose of section
230(b), which unequivocally declares the policy of the United States to be that
547 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974).
548 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295-96 (1974).
549 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
BellAerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294-95).
550 See Eggerton, Kennard: FCC on Shaky Ground on Comeast Decision, supra note 126
(quoting former FCC Chairman William Kennard).
551 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 43 (citing 47 U.S.C § 230(b)(1) (2000)).
552 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).
553 CRAIG MOFFETT, WEEKEND MEDIA BLAST: BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR 1-2
(2008); Jonathan Make, FCC Comcast Order May Prompt Broadband Usage Caps, COMM.
DAILY, Aug. 5, 2008, at 3.
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the Intemet remain "unfettered by Federal or state regulation.""
The FCC's determination that it is a violation of this provision for an ISP to
"determine[] how it will route some connections based not on their destinations
but on their contents" lies beyond reason.55 This statute was enacted specifi-
cally to allow ISPs to filter the content traversing their networks without fear
of liability; yet the FCC is now holding Comcast liable for doing exactly that.
The Comcast P2P Order departs radically from the agency's prior interpreta-
tions of section 230 and its repeated prior statements that the Internet Policy
Statement would not be enforced. 56
2. Comcast Appears to Have Relied Substantially and in Good Faith on the
FCC's Prior Interpretations of the Law
Comcast presumably instituted the disputed network management practices
based either on the FCC's prior interpretations of section 230 and the enforce-
ability of the Internet Policy Statement, or its belief that its network manage-
ment practices complied with the Internet Policy Statement's exception for
reasonable network management. 57 Comcast's reliance was substantial in that
it would not have incurred the likely large cost of purchasing and installing the
network management equipment58 were it not for that interpretation.
There is no evidence cited in the record that Comcast's reliance was in bad
faith. Although the Comcast P2P Order mentions that "Vuze found that the
peer-to-peer TCP connections of Comcast customers were interrupted more
consistently and more persistently than those of any other provider's custom-
ers," '559 Vuze itself admitted that its process measured "all network interrup-
tions, and cannot differentiate between reset activity occurring in the ordinary
course and reset activity that is artificially interposed by a network operator."5"
Therefore, Vuze did not "draw[] ... firm conclusions from its network moni-
554 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(2). As discussed supra Part III, it is directly contrary to this policy,
and for this reason, among others, the FCC lacks ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate the Free
Press Complaint.
555 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 41.
556 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 6 n. 15; see also In re Broadband in-
dustry Practices, Comments of Comcast Corporation, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 24 (Feb. 12,
2008) (accessible via the FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Comments
of Comcast Corporation].
557 See Comments of Comcast Corporation, supra note 556, at 33, 45 (asserting that
Comcast's network management practices were fully "consistent with the principles articu-
lated in the Commission's Internet Policy Statement," and that the Internet Policy Statement
did not create "legally binding rules.").
558 See id. at 18-20.
559 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 42.
560 Letter from Henry Goldberg, Counsel, Vuze, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC 1 (Apr. 22, 2008) (accessible via the FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
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toring study."56 ' On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence in the Comcast
P2P Order that Comcast's chosen method of network management was rea-
sonable.
In the Order, the FCC accepts that easing network congestion is a "critically
important interest." '62 The agency also accepts that "all network providers must
manage bandwidth in some manner" '563 and that providers need "flexibility to
engage in the reasonable network management practices."" The FCC even
suggests that giving certain packets higher priority would be acceptable. 65 But
as Free Press' Residual Issues Memorandum states, "network operators cannot
speed up certain bits. Instead, the operator would be forced to degrade or slow
other bits." '66 Comcast's old network management practices, the practices
complained of by Free Press, apparently were designed-even if not properly
executed-to manage with a light touch, prioritizing time sensitive data by
slowing down peer-to-peer file transfers which are not time sensitive. It would
therefore seem reasonable for Comcast to choose that method, compared to its
new compliant management practices, which by design are more likely to af-
fect average users because they slow down all of a user's traffic when that user
has exceeded the traffic threshold. 67 Comcast appears, therefore, to have relied
substantially and in good faith on the FCC's prior interpretations of section
230 and the Internet Policy Statement.
561 Id.
562 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 47. As the FCC stated, "Comcast justifies its
practice as a means of easing network congestion, and we will assume without deciding that
this is a critically important interest." Id.
563 Id. 50.
564 Id.
565 As the majority noted in the Comcast P2P Order, "[w]e specifically do not decide
today whether other actual or potential conduct, such as giving real-time communications
packets (e.g., VoIP) higher priority than other packets or giving higher priority to packets of
a particular, unaffiliated content provider pursuant to an arms-length agreement, would vio-
late federal policy." Id. 43 n.202; see The Future of the Internet: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman of the FCC), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/-files/KevinMartinFutureoftheintemetTestimony.pdf
("There are some good techniques for example when they favor voice packets over data
packets to make sure that the voice communications can occur on a real-time basis.") [here-
inafter Martin Commerce Committee Testimony].
566 Free Press June 12 Ex Parte, supra note 129, at 2.
567 See ATrACHMENT B: COMCAST CORP., DESCRIPTION OF PLANNED NETWORK MAN-
AGEMENT PRACTICES TO BE DEPLOYED FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF CURRENT PRAC-
TICES 2 (2008), available at
http://downloads.comcast.net/docs/AttachmentB FuturePractices.pdf.
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3. The Comcast P2P Order Improperly Imposes Purely Prospective General
Rules
As Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Bowen v. George-
town University Hospital, "just as Chenery suggested that rulemaking was pro-
spective, the opinions in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon ... suggested the obverse:
that adjudication could not be purely prospective, since otherwise it would
constitute rulemaking.
5 68
The Comeast P2P Order states, "we tailor our analysis here to the particu-
lars of the dispute at issue and do not attempt broad, prophylactic rules. 5 69 Yet
the FCC admits that "[a]lthough our remedy may have some retroactive effect,
its primary purpose is prospective .... ,"5" The remedy and the newly-enacted
rules at issue were both prospective. By the time the FCC issued the Comcast
P2P Order, Comcast had announced that it would migrate to protocol-agnostic
network management technique by year-end 2008."7' As such, the remedy sim-
ply required5 . Comcast to "live[] up to its promise" '573 by disclosing the details
of its new network management plans and its schedule for migrating to the new
network management technique that it had already publicly stated it was im-
plementing. 74 The sections below discuss three new rules established in the
Comcast P2P Order, the first of which is the reasonable network management
standard.
a. The Reasonable Network Management Standard
In law, the exception can sometimes swallow the rule. That appears to be
what has happened in this case. The reasonable network management standard
was originally articulated as an exception to the four principles espoused in the
568 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 216, 221 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
569 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 36.
570 Id. 35 n.157 (emphasis added).
571 See id. 54.
572 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 54. But see 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (2006) (stating
that the "requirement of a report... may not be issued, made, or enforced except as author-
ized by law"). This rule has been applied to informal adjudications by the Supreme Court in
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV Corp. See 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990).
573 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 54. This reference to Comcast's promise to mi-
grate to a protocol agnostic approach to traffic management highlights the fact that there
was no longer an underlying dispute between Comcast and BitTorrent for the FCC to adju-
dicate. This strongly suggests that the FCC's action on the Free Press Complaint was an
abuse of discretion, chosen instead of more properly issuing a declaratory ruling or rulemak-
ing petitions or completing its Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry in an effort to address
Internet traffic congestion issues.
574 Martin Commerce Committee Testimony, supra note 565, at 9.
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Internet Policy Statement.75 That is, the consumer entitlements were made ex-
pressly subject to reasonable network management. 76 That phrasing implied a
right on behalf of the provider to engage in reasonable network management
even if that affected the consumer rights. In the Comcast P2P Order, reason-
able network management was transmuted into an across-the-board limitation
on provider behavior that can be enforced virtually without reference to the
four principles. Although restated many times in slightly different ways, it is a
general rule in the same way that Ford v. FTC-the FTC's decision that deal-
erships are not allowed to credit a debtor for the wholesale value of the car yet
sell the repossessed vehicle at retail-was determined to be a general rule that
should have been implemented by a rulemaking. 77 In the FCC's own language:
* "This Order addresses whether it is a reasonable network management practice
for Comcast to interfere with its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking applica-
tions, including those that use the BitTorrent protocol." 578
* It is "unreasonable network management" for an ISP to "discriminate among
applications and protocols rather than treating all equally.
'579
* It is "unreasonable network management" for an ISP to "determine] how it will
,,580route some connections based not on their destinations but on their contents....
* "To the extent, however, that providers choose to utilize practices that are not
application or content neutral, the risk to the open nature of the Internet is particularly
acute and the danger of network management practices being used to further anticom-
petitive ends is strong.,
58
1
The Commission also imposed a disclosure rule on Comcast in its Comeast
P2P Order.
b. Disclosure
In addition to probing whether a broadband ISP's network management
practices focus on applications, protocols, destinations, and the contents of
connections, the Comcast P2P Order introduces an entirely new requirement:
whether the ISP has disclosed its network practices to its customers: "A hall-
mark of whether something is reasonable is whether a provider is willing to
disclose to its customers what it is doing." '582 Although the FCC argues, "[it
has] not adopted ... general disclosure requirements for the network manage-
575 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, T 5 n. 15. The last sentence of the last foot-
note placed at the end of the Internet Policy Statement stated, "The principles we adopt are
subject to reasonable network management." Id.
576 See id.
577 Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1981).
578 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 2 (emphasis added).
579 Id. 41 (emphasis added).
580 Id. (emphasis added).
581 Id. 50 (emphasis added).
582 Id. 53 (emphasis added).
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ment practices of providers of broadband Internet access services. 83 This is
precisely the practical effect of its declaration that disclosure is a hallmark of
the reasonableness of a network management practice."8 It also explicitly states
a rule for future behavior: "To the extent that Comcast wishes to employ ca-
pacity limits in the future, it should disclose those to customers in clear
terms." '85 Further, the Commission adopted a new standard of review for chal-
lenges to network management techniques.
c. The "Strict Scrutiny" Standard of Review
The third new rule the FCC announced in the Comcast P2P Order is the
standard of review the agency will use for evaluating reasonable network man-
agement. The Comcast P2P Order states that an ISP's "[network management]
practice should further a critically important interest and be narrowly or care-
fully tailored to serve that interest." '586 This rule is restated a number of times in
slightly different language:
* "there must be a tight fit between its chosen practices and a significant goal";
5 87
* the ISP's means must be "carefully tailored" to its stated goal;5 88
* "[tihe company's justification for its practice must clear a high threshold";5 89
* "[i]t is incumbent on the Commission to be vigilant and subject such practices to
a searching inquiry .... 590
This language evokes the strict scrutiny standard, which normally is appro-
priate only in cases involving a fundamental constitutional right or a suspect
classification, and only when reviewing government actions. 9' But here, the
583 Id. 52.
584 This new requirement introduces a new layer of uncertainty: does disclosure trump an
otherwise unreasonable network management practice? See Barbara Esbin, Does Disclosure
Trump Net Blocking?, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/09/doesdisclosure.html (Sept. 15,
2008, 12:29 EST).






591 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Kore-
matsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AII legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.");
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) ("[L]aws
that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment ... are always
subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny." (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added)); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S.
180, 185 (1997) ("[W]hether the provisions were narrowly tailored to further important
governmental interests" (emphasis added)); see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
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FCC is attempting to impose this burden on Comcast to defend its network
management practices. 92 The Commission cited two examples to support its
decision that strict scrutiny was appropriate, neither of which is relevant to the
present situation. "' In the first, Filing and Review of Open Network Architec-
ture Plans, the Commission didn't impose strict scrutiny as a standard of re-
view, it simply stated that "[b]ecause Ameritech, NYNEX, SWBT, and US
West have not thus far demonstrated substantial progress in providing ESP
access to OSS services, we will be examining their reports with a heightened
level of scrutiny. 594 The fact that this level of scrutiny was not applied to re-
ports from other Bell Operating Companies indicates that the use of the term
"heightened level of scrutiny" was not meant in a legal sense. The other exam-
ple is Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, but the cited language is applicable
only to rate-setting activities. 95 As Commissioner McDowell observed in his
dissent:
Perhaps most puzzling of all is the Commission's use of a "strict scrutiny" type stan-
dard to strike down the actions of a private party engaged in management of its net-
work. The majority is too clever to call its standard of review "strict scrutiny," and
with good reason. It is unprecedented, and inappropriate, for the Commission to judge
the actions of a private actor by a standard that has generally been reserved for deter-
mining whether the government has trampled on the fundamental constitutional rights
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 793, 800-01 (2006); The Supreme Court Historical Society, Interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/05_learning/subs/05_e.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2009).
592 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 7 47-50. The Commission found Comcast's
practices over inclusive for three reasons: "First, [the practices] can affect customers who
are using little bandwidth simply because they are using a disfavored application. Second, it
is not employed only during times of the day when congestion is prevalent.... And third,
its equipment does not appear to target only those neighborhoods that have congested
nodes." Id. 48 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Commission found Comcast's prac-
tices under inclusive because "[a] customer may use an extraordinary amount of bandwidth
during periods of network congestion and will be totally unaffected so long as he does not
utilize a disfavored application." Id. It also found that Comcast's solution was not "carefully
tailored": "Comcast's practice falls well short of being carefully tailored to further the inter-
est offered by the company." Id. 50. Finally, the other solutions "all appear far better tai-
lored to Comcast's basic complaint that a 'disproportionately large amount of the traffic
currently on broadband networks originates from a relatively small number of users."' Id.
49 (quoting Comments of Comcast Corporation, supra note 556, at 25).
593 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 47 n.22 1.
594 In re Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7646, 47 (Nov. 21, 1991).
595 Sw. Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) ("The Constitution
does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of
formulas. Agencies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are free, within the
ambit of their statutory authority to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called
for by particular circumstances.").
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of individuals. The Commission certainly has never used it to restrain private parties
in their interactions with other private parties. Using a strict scrutiny standard in this
context, especially one wearing a transparent disguise, is sure to doom this order on
appeal.596
Accordingly, the upshot of the Comcast P2P Order is the establishment of
several very broad new rules that are prospective in application.
4. The Cases Cited By the FCC Do Not Support It's Position That It Was
Proper to Announce New Policy In an Adjudication
In the Comcast P2P Order, the FCC argues, "the Commission has often re-
lied on adjudications rather than rulemakings to enunciate and enforce new
federal policy." '597 Three examples are cited: the FCC's 1965 comparative
broadcast licensing policy statement,598 the Carterfone decision,599 and the
FCC's 1974 policy on children's programming.
60
The Comparative Broadcast Licensing Policy Statement was necessary to
cope with the rapid increase in the number of radio stations.6 ' In contrast, the
596 ComcastP2P Order, supra note 9, atl3,091-92 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
597 Id. 28 (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (emphasis added).
598 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393
(1965) [hereinafter Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings]; see Allied
Broad., Inc., v. FCC, 435 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
599 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service; Thomas F.
Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. Am. Telephone and
Telegraph Co., Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., and
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest (Defendants), Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (June 26,
1968) [hereinafter Carterfone Order].
600 See In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking
Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Program-
ming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs,
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (Oct. 24, 1974), reh's
denied, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement].
601 A number of events in the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in a large increase in
the number of radio and TV stations licensed. Battery-powered, pocket-sized transistor ra-
dios, first available in 1954, achieved mass popularity in the early 1960s. Transistor Radio:
History, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor radio (last accessed March 31, 2009). The
FCC approved stereo FM broadcasting in 1961. In re Amendment of Part 3 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations to Permit FM Broadcast Stations to Transmit Stereophonic
Programs on a Multiplex Basis, Report and Order, FCC 61-524, April 20, 1961, available
at http://louise.hallikainen.org/BroadcastHistory/uploads/FM-StereoFinalRandO.pdf.
Color television was first commercially transmitted in 1963. History of Radio: Later 20th
Century Developments,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historyof_radio#Color television and digital (last accessed
March 31, 2009). The result was that the number of radio stations increased from 4,142 in
1961 to 5,316 in 1965. American RadioWorks, Hearing America: A Century of Music on
the Radio, Radio Station Growth,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/radio/dl.html (last accessed March 31,
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FCC's regulation of broadband ISPs up to this point has been minimal, 2 in
keeping with its deregulatory stance towards broadband services specifically
and the Internet generally. 3 In addition, the adjudication of Comcast's net-
work management techniques did not involve an issue that the Internet Policy
Statement could clarify. In contrast to the comparative licensing policy state-
ment, which explained how the process would be handled, the Internet Policy
Statement defines what entitlements consumers have regarding their broadband
Internet access service.' Furthermore, the licensing process used in 1965 in-
volved a formal review process,"°5 whereas in the present controversy, there
was almost no recognizable process and no statutory mandate for the FCC to
discharge.
The Comparative Broadcast Licensing Policy Statement was issued for the
purpose of "prevent[ing] undue delay" and achieving "a high degree of consis-
tency of decision and of clarity" in a process that "commonly require[d] ex-
tended hearings into a number of areas of comparison. 6 6 The Commission felt
it especially important to alert license applicants to the factors that would be
focused on during the hearings because applicants were prohibited from modi-
fying their applications once submitted. 7 The Comparative Broadcast Licens-
2009).
602 The only case of the FCC taking action against an ISP is its consent agreement with
Madison River Communications after the latter blocked VoIP on its network. See Madison
River Order, supra note 546.
603 See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24 (classifying wireline broadband
Internet access and cable modem services as Title I "information services" to place them in
a "minimal regulatory environment" in furtherance of a deregulatory policy placing primacy
on encouraging infrastructure deployment).
604 The Internet Policy Statement contains no direction concerning the rights of ISPs to
manage their broadband networks other than to specify that such management must be "rea-
sonable." Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, 5 n.15; compare Internet Policy
Statement, supra note 20 (discussing certain principles adopted by the Commission such as
encouraging broadband deployment and preserving and promoting the open and intercon-
nected nature of the public Internet) with Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ings, Public Notice, I F.C.C. 2d 393, 393-94, 405 (July 28, 2005), applied in In re Applica-
tions of Lorain Community Broadcasting Co., Lorain, Ohio; Allied Broadcasting, Inc., Lo-
rain, Ohio; Midwest Broadcasting Co., Lorain, Ohio for Construction Permits, Docket No.
16877 File No. BP-16940; Docket No. 16877 File No. BP-17297; Docket No. 16878 File
No. BP-17302, Order, 18 F.C.C. 2d 686 (1969), aff'd Allied Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 435
F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (explaining that the process is inherently complex and requires
consistency and clarity of key decisions and policies).
605 See KPMG, LLP, HISTORY OF BROADCAST LICENSE APPLICATION PROCESS 5 (2000),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb study/broadcast licstudy_ptl .pdf.
606 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, supra note 598, at 393.
607 See Allied Broad, Inc., 435 F.2d at 70 n.9, 71 (noting that the FCC required "good
cause" in order to amend an application); see also Policy Statement on Comparative Broad-
cast Hearings, supra note 598, at 394-400 (discussing the factors that applicants should
consider).
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ing Policy Statement would "also be of value to the examiners who initially
decide the cases and to the Review Board to which the basic review of exam-
iners' decisions in this area has been delegated.""6 8 As the Comparative Broad-
cast Licensing Policy Statement explained, "[s]ince we are not adopting new
criteria which would call for the introduction of new evidence, but rather re-
stricting the scope somewhat of existing factors and explaining their impor-
tance more clearly, there will be no element of surprise which might affect the
fairness of a hearing."6 9 The adjudication of Comcast's network management
techniques is just the opposite, imposing new criteria calling for new evidence.
Although the 1965 Comparative Broadcast Licensing Policy Statement was
applied in subsequent adjudications, it was limited to situations where the FCC
was acting pursuant to its express statutory mandate to allocate broadcast li-
censes-it needed to decide to whom to allocate the licenses.610 There was no
such statutory requirement for the FCC to act on in the Free Press Complaint.
The FCC could have instead acted on Free Press's request for a declaratory
ruling,"' Vuze's request for a rulemaking,1 2 or the open docket on the broader
issues."'
The FCC's Carterfone decision was an appeal from an investigation of an
AT&T tariff614 that the carrier had interpreted to prevent the use of the Carter-
fone device by its customers. 5 The inventor of the device, Thomas Carter,
brought a private antitrust action against AT&T, which was stayed while the
matter was referred to the FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.6
The Commission determined that it needed to hold a public hearing to "resolve
'the question of justness, reasonableness, validity, and effect of the tariff regu-
lations and practices complained of,"' and designated five issues for hearing.
17
The FCC agreed with the hearing examiner's recommendation of the resolu-
tion of the issue and held that to the extent the tariff prevented use of the Car-
608 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, supra note 598, at 393-94.
609 Id. at 400.
610 See id at 393 (applying only when there were multiple applicants for a new station
license).
611 See generally Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12.
612 See generally Vuze Petition, supra note 109.
613 See generally WC Docket 07-52 (accessible through FCC Electronic Document Man-
agement System).
614 A tariff can be defined as "a document that carriers file with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission or a state public utility commission detailing the services, equipment,
prices and terms it offers. Making the information public helps ensure that carriers offer the
same rates and conditions to all customers." Brett Machtig, Secrets of the Tariff Game,
NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 13, 1999, available at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/1999/1213feat.html.
615 Carterfone Order, supra note 599, at 420-21.
616 Id. at 420.
617 Id. at 421-22.
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
terfone device by telephone subscribers that did not harm the network, the tar-
iff was unlawful and unreasonably discriminatory under sections 201(b) and
202(a) of the Act.68 The tariff was ordered stricken and the carrier permitted to
file new tariff provisions consistent with the decision.6 9 In reaching this deci-
sion, the FCC relied upon its earlier decision in the Hush-a-Phone case, in
which it held "that a tariff prohibition of a customer supplied 'foreign attach-
ment' was 'in [sic] unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's
right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial
without being publicly detrimental.' 62° Thus, Carterfone can hardly be said to
be a case in which the FCC applied new policy in the context of an adjudica-
tory proceeding. Furthermore, the decision did not impose new obligations on
the regulated entity. Instead, as the FCC recognized, the Carterfone principles
were subsequently codified as part 68 of the Commission rules in a rulemaking
proceeding.62'
It is not evident why the FCC cited its 1974 policy on children's program-
ming as an example of announcing new policy through an adjudication, as the
children's programming policy does not appear to support the FCC's present
position that it may refine policy through adjudication.622 After receiving a re-
quest from Action for Children's Television, the FCC initiated an inquiry into
whether it should institute new rules for children's television programming.
6 23
In the resulting Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, the FCC
ultimately decided that because of the television industry's self-regulatory
measures, per se rules were not necessary regarding the number of hours de-
voted to children's programming, the amount of instructional children's pro-
gramming, the provision of children's programming for specific age groups, or
specific scheduling requirements.624 The Commission believed that "with re-
spect to programming and advertising designed for the child audience ...
[E]very opportunity should be accorded to the broadcast industry to reform
itself because self-regulation preserves flexibility and an opportunity for ad-
justment which is not possible with per se rules." '625 The only new ground bro-
ken in the report, if any, was the FCC's recognition that "broadcasters have a
duty to serve all substantial and important groups in their communities, and
618 Id. at 423,426.
619 Id. at 425.
620 Id. at 423 (quoting Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C.
Cir. 1956)).
621 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 40 & n. 176.
622 See id. 128.
623 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 600, 1 1-2.
624 See id. 11 19-27, 57.
625 Id. 157.
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children obviously represent such a group." 6 As with the comparative broad-
cast licenses example above, the FCC simply clarified the factors it would con-
sider when renewing broadcasting licenses pursuant to established Title III
statutory mandates. Thus, the FCC lacks support for its assertion it may rely on
an adjudication to enunciate and enforce new federal policy in this case. None
of the authorities relied upon by the Commission support its decision to an-
nounce and enforce new federal policy in an adjudication.
5. Internet Policy Should Not be Established in a Case-by-Case Fashion
The Comcast P2P Order expresses the FCC's preference "to adjudicate dis-
putes regarding federal Internet policy on a case-by-case basis" and cites three
reasons:
627
* "[T]he Internet is a new medium, and traffic management questions like the one
presented here are relatively novel. 628
* "Internet access networks are complex and variegated. We thus think it possible
that the network management practices of the various providers of broadband Internet
access services are 'so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible to capture
within the boundaries of a general rule.' . . . [G]iven the present record, we are not
certain that a one-size-fits-all approach is good policy.,
629
* "Deciding to establish policy through adjudicating particular disputes rather than
imposing broad, prophylactic rules comports with our policy of proceeding with re-
straint in this area at this time. 63°
Given the dynamic nature of Internet communications and networks, these
arguments seem logical, but case-by-case adjudication is improper especially
for Internet service disputes. If "traffic management questions like the one pre-
sented here are relatively novel" and "Internet access networks are complex
and variegated,' 6 3' how are ISPs to know how they can and cannot manage
their networks? The rate of change of technology makes compliance with gen-
erally applicable standards of administrative procedure even more important in
the Internet context. The obvious solution is to refrain from imposing broad-
band network management rules-and not attempt to enforce policy state-
ments-until the environment reaches a level of maturity for which rulemaking
proceedings are appropriate. This is not to suggest that the FCC should impose
new rules on the Internet. Instead, if there were a demonstrated need for such
regulatory intervention-and assuming the FCC had delegated authority under
which to act-a well-defined rule is preferable to case-by-case adjudication of
626 Id. 16.
627 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 1 29.
628 Id. 30.
629 Id. 31 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).
630 Id. 32.
631 Id. 30, 31.
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an unenforceable policy statement. Broadband ISPs need a clear understanding
of what network management practices will be acceptable before they spend
large sums of money to purchase and deploy network management solutions.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Comcast P2P Order consti-
tutes a radical departure from the FCC's previous interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions and the intent of its Internet Policy Statement. There is
evidence that Comcast had relied substantially and in good faith on the previ-
ous interpretations and the Commission has announced a new standard of be-
havior for broadband ISPs that is very broad and general in scope. Conse-
quently, reliance on adjudication in this case amounts to an abuse of discretion
under Bowen and Pfaff632
The Commission's attempt to exercise ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the
Internet Policy Statement through case-by-case adjudication produces a par-
ticularly lethal level of risk for service providers. This combination effects a
"doubling down" of uncertainty for private entities who find themselves on the
receiving end of allegations that they are violating vaguely defined policy prin-
ciples while admitting of no meaningful jurisdictional or procedural constraints
on agency power.
C. Procedural Infirmities
The Comcast P2P Order resulted in factual findings that a single-industry
participant violated rules of behavior articulated for the first time in the very
proceeding in which the accused was found guilty as charged. More troubling
still, the adjudi-making was wholly lacking the protections afforded the sub-
jects of more traditional administrative adjudications, such as the need for
sworn testimony, adherence to the rules of evidence, and the other procedural
safeguards of a restricted formal adjudication.633 Instead, the FCC apparently
tried Comcast in an open docket through a series of en banc public hearings,
found it guilty, and subjected it to various "compliance" obligations with the
threat of additional regulatory punishments if it fails to adhere to those obliga-
tions.6"4
632 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 211-13 (1988); Pfaff v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1996).
633 See 47 U.S.C. § 409(i) (2006); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.351, .1208 (2007). In a "restricted"
proceeding, decision-makers cannot be lobbied outside the presence of other parties. 47
C.F.R. § 1.1208; see 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006).
634 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 11, 51, 54, 55.
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1. Established Procedures for Handling Complaints Were Not Followed
The FCC's enforcement powers are set forth in Titles I, II, and IV of the
Act.635 Typically, investigations, whether initiated by a complaint or by the
Commission on its own motion, proceed in set stages.636 None of these interim
steps on the path of enforcement appear to have been taken in the case of the
Free Press Formal Complaint, leaving its precise path through the Commis-
sion uncertain.
It bears noting that Free Press filed a document in the form of a complaint
and entitled it "Formal Complaint."6" The FCC's section 208 formal complaint
rule provides a strict set of procedural protections to ensure that due process is
afforded to both the complainant and respondent.638 A formal complaint must
contain a "[c]itation to the section of the Communications Act and/or order
and/or regulation of the Commission alleged to have been violated." '639 The
Free Press Complaint did not cite any statutory provision that Comcast had
violated.o The Commission's rules state that "[a]ny document purporting to be
a formal complaint which does not state a cause of action under the Communi-
cations Act will be dismissed."'" Thus, as Commissioner McDowell observed,
the FCC should have dismissed the complaint. 2 Instead, the FCC felt it was
"not bound by allegations contained within the four comers of the Free Press
Complaint" and that "(w]hen information comes to [the] Commission's atten-
tion suggesting that there has been a violation of the agency's rules or policies,
the Commission can take action, regardless of the title the submitting party
puts on its submission." '643 This is a troubling proposition.
Additionally, as noted by Commissioner McDowell, "[o]ur rules mandate
that formal complaints apply only to common carriers."' Comcast, however,
635 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, 218, 403 (2000).
636 The stages are: a staff investigation; issuance of a "Letter of Inquiry" requesting the
respondent to answer questions concerning its activities; and evaluation of the responses.
Subpoenas may also be issued in appropriate cases. See, e.g., FCC, Complaint Process,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (explaining the stages of
the complaint process for broadcast indecency); see also 47 C.F.R. § 1.331 (2007). If viola-
tions of the Act, the Commission's rules, or a Commission order are found, the Commission
has a range of enforcement options, from monetary forfeitures to license revocation. 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.80(a), 1.85.
637 Free Press Complaint, supra note 11.
638 See 47 U.S.C. § 208.
639 47 C.F.R. § 1.72 1(a)(4).
640 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,088, 13,090, 13,092 (McDowell,
Comm'r, dissenting).
641 47 C.F.R. § 1.728(a).
642 See Comeast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,088-89 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissent-
ing).
643 Id., $ 41 n. 177 (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
644 Id., at 13,088 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
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is not acting as a common carrier in its provision of Internet access service. 5
Although the formal complaint rules were inapplicable to Comcast, 6 they are
instructive as to how the Free Press Complaint should have been treated by
agency staff. 7
Not only did the FCC lack rules to govern its adjudication of the Free Press
Complaint, it lacked established procedures for adjudicating formal complaints
against non-common carriers like Comcast.648 Even assuming the Commis-
645 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 21, 36, 38, 42, 43; see also
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005);
discussion supra note 373.
646 Under section 208 of the Act, the Enforcement Bureau adjudicates formal complaints
against common carriers. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.111 (2007). Formal Complaints filed pursuant to
section 208 are governed by a strict set of procedures. See 47 U.S.C. § 208(b) (2000); 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.720-35. In non-technical terms, proceedings initiated under these rules are "ad-
judications" in which facts are found and conclusions of law are reached by agency staff
and/or the full Commission. Where disputes cannot be resolved upon a paper record, they
may be referred for hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") pursuant to a
"Hearing Designation Order." Consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, among the
many protections afforded litigants before an ALJ is the separation of agency "trial" and
"decisional" staff. See 5 U.S.C. 554(d) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1202(c). Once a matter is sent
for hearing before an ALJ, the Enforcement Bureau must designate "trial staff' and keep
them from communicating with the ultimate agency decision-makers who will receive the
recommendations of the AL. The Commission has also adopted rules that allow the section
208 complaint rules to be used to settle disability complaints under section 255 of the Act.
See In re Implementation of Section 255 and 25 1(a)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Access to Telecommunications Ser-
vices, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment By Persons with
Disabilities, Report and Order and Further Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417, 110 (July
14, 1999). Those complaints, which are very rare, could involve equipment manufacturers.
That is the only exception to the requirement that complaints pursuant to Title II of the Act
involve only common carriers. See Id.
647 Consumers and companies from time to time may send the FCC what they term to be
a "Formal Complaint" against non-common carriers. It is standard practice to advise such
entities that formal complaints may only be filed against common carriers and that the doc-
ument that they have filed--often in the form of a letter-will not be treated as a formal
complaint. They may also be told that the Commission might investigate the matter raised in
their "complaint", but that they will not be a "party" to that investigation, will not be in-
formed if such an investigation has been undertaken, and will not be advised as to status
and/or disposition of any investigation. The Investigations & Hearings Division ("IHD")
within the Enforcement Bureau handles informal complaints filed against common carriers,
broadcast licensees and other entities within the jurisdiction of the FCC, as well as initiates
its own investigations. Informal complaints against common carriers are generally governed
by sections 1.716-1.719 of the Commission's rules. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.716-19 (2007).
648 In 2002 the FCC initiated a rulemaking seeking comments "on proposals to establish
a unified, streamlined process for the intake and resolution of informal complaints filed by
consumers" against non-common carrier entities regulated by the Commission. In re Estab-
lishment of Rules Governing Procedures to Be Followed When Informal Complaints are
Filed by Consumers Against Entities Regulated by the Commission; Amendment of Subpart
E of Chapter 1 of the Commission's Rules Governing Procedures to Be Followed When
Informal Complaints are Filed Against Common Carriers; 2000 Biennial Regulatory Re-
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sion's rules for formal or informal complaints currently applicable to common
carriers governed the Free Press Complaint, a party answering either type of
complaint has a right to be apprised of the behavior that is alleged to have been
violated. 6"9 Comcast was denied this right. Nor was the Free Press Complaint
handled according to FCC policies that encourage parties to a dispute to avail
themselves of staff-assisted mediation either prior to or after the filing of a
complaint.65 While the Commission is well within its rights to investigate al-
leged transgressions of its rules, it is not similarly free to take action against a
violation of a Commission policy statement that has not been enacted into a
rule, such as the Internet Policy Statement. The FCC should not be free to
make up new rules of procedure and apply them as they are making them--or
make them retroactive.
Ordinarily, when the agency is considering adoption of a rule that is pro-
spective in nature and applicable to an entire industry--either by rulemaking or
a declaratory ruling--the matter is handled by one of its policy bureaus, such
as the Wireline Competition Bureau.65" ' In such cases, WC docket numbers are
assigned. When the FCC's Enforcement Bureau is resolving a formal com-
plaint filed against a common carrier, its Market Disputes Resolution Division
handles the matter and a MD file number is assigned.652 In some cases, the En-
view, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R.
3919, 1, 17 (Feb. 14, 2002) ("Currently, the rules contain no procedures for filing a
formal' complaint in the non-common carrier context. We propose to establish a formal
complaint process that is similar to that which applies to common carriers." (emphasis add-
ed)). This rulemaking is still pending before the FCC; no rules concerning procedures for
adjudicating formal complaints against non-common carriers have been adopted or pub-
lished.
649 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.716(c), 1.721(a)(4)(5) (discussing the requirement that formal and
informal complaints state what the carrier did in violation of the Act).
650 See FCC, Market Disputes Resolution Division, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/mdrd (last
visited Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Market Dispute Resolution Division].
651 See, e.g., FCC, Wireline Competition Bureau, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009).
652 See Market Dispute Resolution Division, supra note 650. According to the Commis-
sion's website:
The Market Disputes Resolution Division ("MDRD") is responsible for resolving com-
plaints by market participants, entities or organizations against common carriers (wire-
line, wireless or international) for alleged violations of the Communications Act that
are filed pursuant to Section 208 of the Act. The division also resolves complaints filed
by cable operators, telecommunications carriers, utilities and other parties pursuant to
Section 224 of the Communications Act relating to the reasonableness of rates, terms,
and conditions for pole attachments.
Id.
Another division within the Enforcement Bureau, the Telecommunications Consumers Divi-
sion ("TCD") is charged with "protecting consumers from fraudulent, misleading and other
harmful practices involving telecommunications." FCC, Telecommunications Consumers
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forcement Bureau's Investigations and Hearings Division ("IHD") investigates
complaints that are filed against non-common carriers and assigned an IH file
number.653
The title of the item in the July 25, 2008 notice announcing the items for
consideration at the August 1, 2008 Commission meeting was "Formal Com-
plaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
(WC Docket No. 07-52)." 654 The summary stated: "The Commission will con-
sider a Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing a complaint and other fil-
ings concerning Comcast's network management practices." 655 Although the
meeting notice referenced only a WC Docket number,656 it later appeared from
the captions of the separate and dissenting statements released when the Corn-
cast P2P Order was adopted-as well as the caption of the released Or-
der--that an IHD investigatory file had been opened for the Free Press For-
mal Complaint and that the file had been directly acted upon by the full Com-
mission.657
Division, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). The functions performed
within the Division include: "Investigating the practices of companies engaged in various
telecommunications-related activities, including common carriers, manufacturers of tele-
communications equipment, telemarketers and other companies utilizing telecommunica-
tions equipment for unsolicited advertisements"; and processing formal complaints arising
from such activities. Id.
653 See FCC, Investigations and Hearing Division, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/ihd (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009). According to the FCC's website:
The Investigations & Hearings Division is responsible for resolution of complaints
against broadcast stations and other Title III licensees on non-technical matters such as
indecency, enhanced underwriting, unauthorized transfer of control and misrepresenta-
tion. In addition, with regard to wireless licensees, the Division is responsible for en-
forcement of rules regarding auction collusion and misrepresentation. The Division al-
so investigates industry allegations of violations of Title II of the Communications Act,
as amended, and FCC rules and policies pertaining to common carriers. In addition, the
Division conducts, or assists in, various other investigations being conducted by the
Bureau and serves as trial staff in formal Commission hearings.
Id.
654 Public Notice, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC to Hold Open Commission Meeting
Friday, August 1, 2008 (Jul. 25, 2008), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-284078A 1 .pdf.
655 Id. (emphasis added).
656 Id.
657 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,028; Id. at 13,065 (Martin, chairman,
statement); Id. at 13,078 (Copps, Comm'r, statement); Id. at 13,081 (Adelstein, Comm'r,
statement); Id. at 13,088 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting). Another seeming pre-requisite to
a properly conducted enforcement action is issuance of either a "Notice of Apparent Liabil-
ity" or an "Order to Show Cause" bearing the IH file number referenced in the caption of
this item. This would have afforded Comcast a formal vehicle for defending against the
allegations. Instead, the FCC relies on its "two public hearings," as opposed to a restricted
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This was the first indication that the Commission had instituted a formal in-
vestigation of the Free Press Complaint. Yet, it remains unclear how the agen-
cy purported to be acting upon this IH file within the WC docket, the sole
docket referenced in conjunction with the August 1 Commission meeting and
identified in the Comcast P2P Order. Again, WC Docket No. 07-52 was initi-
ated by the Wireline Competition Bureau upon the Commission's adoption of
its Notice of Inquiry-not an NPRM-into broadband network management
practices.658 The Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling and the Vuze Peti-
tion for Rulemaking were added to that docket where they remain pending.659
The Comcast P2P Order addresses these procedural irregularities as fol-
lows:
Because the questions addressed in the Free Press Complaint and in the Free Press Pe-
tition are substantially similar and because Free Press and Comcast have used WC
Docket No. 07-52 as the vehicle for filings related to both the Complaint and the Peti-
tion, we address both here and consolidate the records of the two proceedings. We
also note that the Free Press Petition could be considered in part an informal com-
plaint pertaining to Comcast 's conduct.
660
In effect, what the FCC has said is that because the Free Press Complaint
and Petition addressed substantially similar questions and because the respon-
dent, Comcast, filed in defense of the underlying conduct in the docket housing
the Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry and the Free Press Petition, the
Commission is free to consolidate the records of the two proceedings and ad-
judicate the Complaint in a rulemaking docket.66' That is, the FCC may do a
mash-up of adjudication and rulemaking-an adjudi-making. This is untenable
factual investigation of the allegations, before rendering its decision. See Comcast Order
Press Release, supra note 10, at 1.
658 See Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, at 7894. The Broadband
Industry Practices Inquiry states its purpose was to better inform the Commission about
broadband industry practices and whether there is a need for "net neutrality" regulations.
See id. 1. In other words, it was solely an information gathering exercise.
659 Free Press Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra, note 11, at 1; Vuze Petition, supra
note 109, at 1. It appears that the separate issues raised by Vuze remain pending before the
FCC. In addition, a related Public Knowledge January 14, 2008 Petition for Declaratory
Ruling that Text Messages and Short Codes are Title II Services or a Title I Services Subject
to Section 202 Nondiscrimination Rules was given a Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
docket number and, although listed as a related petition on the FCC's "Broadband Network
Management Practice" webpage, does not appear to have been the subject of the FCC's
August 1 vote. See FCC, Broadband Network Management,
http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork-managementlWelcome.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2009).
660 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 11 n.40 (emphasis added).
661 See id. Its concluding premise, that it could consider the Free Press Petition to be in
part an informal complaint pertaining to Comcast's conduct is also revealing. Id. The FCC
has rules for adjudicating informal complaints, but chose not to comply with them in this




Again, most importantly, what WC Docket No. 07-52 lacks-as noted by
Commissioner McDowell-is an NPRM that proposes specific rules of con-
duct for broadband network operators and seeks public comment on both its
proposals and the FCC's jurisdiction to enact such rules.663 That is, assuming
that the FCC has ancillary jurisdiction to adopt network management or other
net neutrality rules-a doubtful proposition-it has not yet done so. It is evi-
dent, however, that the FCC has declared that Comcast has violated a norm of
behavior for network operators in contravention of the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement, the very declaration sought by Free Press in both its Petition and
Complaint. Using the cover of a public rulemaking docket to gather evidence
for use in what might ordinarily be a restricted investigation into the identical
allegations against the same party is at least unorthodox and at most against the
APA.
2. Lack of Fair Notice
As the D.C. Circuit has explained:
The Commission through its regulatory power cannot, in effect, punish a member of
the regulated class for reasonably interpreting [FCC] rules. Otherwise the practice of
administrative law would come to resemble "Russian Roulette." The agency's inter-
pretation is entitled to deference, but if it wishes to use that interpretation to cut off a
664party's right, it must give full notice of its interpretation.
The manner in which the FCC handled the Free Press Complaint raises
troubling questions concerning whether Comcast received proper notice that
the agency intended to enforce the Internet Policy Statement against the com-
pany prior to the FCC codifying the policy principles into rules and publishing
them in the Federal Register. These questions extend to the type of notice
Comcast was provided concerning the nature of the proceedings against it. For
example, was the company notified that the evidence taken in the public en
banc hearings concerning network management practices would be used
against it in adjudicating the Free Press Complaint, or did the company rea-
sonably believe that these were legislative hearings to be used in the Broad-
band Industry Practices Inquiry docket to formulate generally applicable rules
that would then be tested in a public notice-and-comment rulemaking proceed-
ing?
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ..
662 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
663 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,090 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
664 Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
665 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The D.C. Circuit has interpreted the Due Process Clause as "prevent[ing]...
deference from validating the application of a regulation that fails to give fair
warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires." '666 Even when an agency's in-
terpretation of a statute is permissible, "if it wishes to use that interpretation to
cut off a party's right, it must give full notice of its interpretation." '667 For notice
to be valid, the regulation must be "sufficiently clear to warn a party about
what is expected of it."66 As the court reasoned:
Where . . .the regulations and other policy statements are unclear, where the peti-
tioner's interpretation is reasonable, and where the agency itself struggles to provide a
definitive reading of the regulatory requirements, a regulated party is not 'on notice'
of the agency's ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and may not be punished.
[The agency] thus may not hold [the petitioner] responsible in any way--either finan-
cially or in future enforcement proceedings-for the actions charged in this case.669
As the D.C. Circuit elaborated, "[t]he Commission through its regulatory
power cannot, in effect, punish a member of the regulated class for reasonably
interpreting Commission rules."67
The Comcast P2P Order relies principally on the fact that the FCC had
warned in its Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order that the Internet Policy
Statement "contains principles against which the conduct of Comcast ... can
be measured,"' thereby suggesting that Comcast should have been on notice
that the principles would be enforced against it in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing.67' Missing from the FCC's citation of the Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast
Order, however, is its explicit acknowledgement that "the Commission chose
not to adopt rules in the [Internet] Policy Statement."'672 Hence the emphasis is
on principles against which conduct can be measured. However, a significant
legal distinction exists between a regulatory agency measuring the conduct of a
private entity against principles and judging conduct for conformity with a
binding rule of law. Commissioner McDowell observes that even if the FCC's
formal complaint rules were applicable to Comcast, they would require dis-
missal of the complaint because of its numerous defects, especially its failure
to cite the specific provisions of the Communications Act alleged to be vio-
666 Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 790 F.2d 154,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
667 Satellite Broad. Co., 824 F.2d at 4.
668 Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen sanctions
are drastic ... elementary fairness compels clarity in the statements and regulations setting
forth the actions with which the agency expects the public to comply."); see Radio Athens,
Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398,404 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
669 Gen. Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1333-34.
670 Satellite Broad Co., 824 F.2d at 3-4.
671 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 27 (quoting Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast
Order, supra note 85, T 223).
672 See Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order, supra note 85, 223.
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lated.673 That is, the complaint failed to provide adequate notice.
The case law is clear on proper notice requirements, yet the FCC argues,
"Comcast's complaint here that it has not been afforded fair notice and due
process is quite remarkable." '674 What is remarkable is the FCC's apparent dis-
regard of established procedure and law. It is not sufficient notice to a potential
defendant that the policy principles could support a future adjudication, by ref-
erencing passing statements in other dockets to that effect, because the FCC
repeatedly stated that the Internet Policy Statement was unenforceable. The
FCC's transmittal letter to Comcast, which presumably did little more than
refer Comcast to the Free Press Complaint, likely cannot be considered suffi-
cient notice of the rules allegedly transgressed because the Free Press Com-
plaint itself did not cite any statutory provision that Comcast had violated.675
The Free Press Complaint simply cited the Internet Policy Statement.676 Free
Press was not even clear on what it meant in the complaint, as it had to subse-
quently clarify that when it referred to enforcing the Internet Policy Statement,
it really meant "making policy based on announced principles set fourth in a
Policy Statement by using adjudication to enforce rights guaranteed to con-
sumers, and which the FCC must ensure because of obligations imposed on the
FCC by the Communications Act." '677 Surely such linguistic acrobatics cannot
be considered "sufficiently clear to warn a party about what is expected of
it.
678
The FCC has "struggle[d] to provide a definitive reading of the regulatory
requirements" at issue.679 Its stance on the enforceability of the Internet Policy
Statement was not even completely consistent the day the policy was intro-
duced. When the FCC issued the Internet Policy Statement, Chairman Martin
himself admitted, "policy statements do not establish rules nor are they en-
forceable documents.""6 ' In the separate Wireline Broadband Order released
the same day, the FCC stated, "[s]hould we see evidence that providers of tele-
communications for Internet access or IP-enabled services are violating these
principles, we will not hesitate to take action to address that conduct. ' 68' These
673 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,089 n.3 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
Formal complaints must contain a "[c]itation to the section of the Communications Act
and/or order and/or regulation of the Commission alleged to have been violated." 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.72 1(a)(4) (2007).
674 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 35.
675 See Free Press Complaint, supra note 11, at 2-9 (citing FCC policy as a basis for the
complaint, but listing no authority under the Communication Act).
676 Id.
677 Free Press June 12 Ex Parte, supra note 129, add. 2 at 2.
678 Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
679 Id. at 1334.
680 Martin Statement, supra note 24.
681 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 24, 96.
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statements can be reconciled only if the FCC's threatened action is understood
to be a further rulemaking proceeding to develop the Internet Policy Statement
into actual rules. Yet the FCC now argues that the Wireline Broadband Order
together with the Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order provide the industry
sufficient notice that it would enforce the Internet Policy Statement.6"' Because
the FCC cannot issue unenforceable proclamations and then wait for a rainy
day to enforce them, it was reasonable for Comcast to believe that the Internet
Policy Statement could not and would not be enforced against it.
3. Thin and Conflicting Evidence
The evidence cited in the Comcast P2P Order indicates that a disputed issue
of material fact emerged during the FCC's en banc hearings and in the Broad-
band Industry Practice Inquiry docket on whether Comcast reasonably be-
lieved that its network management practices were consistent with the FCC's
reasonable network management exception. As Comcast stated in a July 10,
2008 ex parte letter, "it is very difficult to determine exactly what happened to
cause the observed behavior of the network and applications; ... even some of
the most highly credentialed and experienced computer scientists are not im-
mune from improperly diagnosing a situation on the network.
68 3
The record available to the decision-makers was contradictory on critical is-
sues: (1) how often Comcast employed its traffic management practices; (2)
the types of traffic it managed-uploads versus downloads; and (3) how man-
agement practices actually affected customers. Answering these questions is
essential to determining whether Comcast's actiois merely delayed peer-to-
peer applications or whether they outright blocked them.6 Reports on the per-
centage of traffic Comcast's management practices affected ranged wildly,
from 10% to 75%.615 Comcast claimed that its practices "merely delay[ed] uni-
682 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 13, 34, 35, 39 (arguing that the Adelphia/Time
Warner/Comcast Order supplied Comcast notice that the FCC would enforce the principles
contained in the Internet Policy Statement through case-by-case adjudication).
683 In re Broadband Industry Practices, Ex Parte Communication of Comcast Corpora-
tion, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 4 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Technical Ex Parte]
(citation omitted) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). The letter was
discussing a situation where researchers from the University of Colorado concluded they
were receiving reset packets from Comcast's network equipment, but subsequently discov-
ered that they were actually receiving reset packets sent by their own network equipment.
Id.
684 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 44 ("We do not agree with Comcast's char-
acterization [of merely delaying peer-to-peer applications] and instead find that the com-
pany has engaged in blocking.").
685 Id. 42 (stating that "independent evidence suggests that Comcast may have inter-
fered with forty if not seventy-five percent of all such connections in certain communi-
ties."); Comcast Technical Ex Parte, supra note 683, at 3 (claiming that "even for the most
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directional uploads, and then only during periods of peak network conges-
tion" '686 and estimated that in the worst-case scenario, the delay would be
"anywhere from a few milliseconds to a few minutes. 687 Yet one Comcast cus-
tomer reported that "all of the customer's Gnutella upload requests were
thwarted and approximately 40% of all his BitTorrent established upload con-
nections were reset" and that "the level of interference with his use of peer-to-
peer applications was approximately equal, regardless of the time of day or
night, regardless of the day of the week, and despite the presumable differ-
ences in network congestion during prime time and non-prime time hours of
use."
688
In support of its conclusions, the FCC cites only five Comcast customers
claiming that their Internet downloads were affected by Comcast's network
management practices, two of which "had to wait hours if not days to down-
load open-source software over their peer-to-peer clients. 6 89 This hardly
amounts to evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, let alone carry a
burden of persuasion. But that begs the question as to why the FCC did not
designate this disputed issue of material fact by hearing designation order for
resolution by an Administrative Law Judge, as it would be compelled to do in a
proper adjudication.
Finally, although the Commission did not conduct a proper investigation of
Comcast's actions, it based its decision on facts presented as unsworn state-
ments during its public en banc hearings. The FCC claims "[it] tailors [its]
analysis here to the particulars of the dispute at issue.""69 As the FCC explained
in the first paragraph of the Comcast P2P Order, "under the facts of this case.,
. [W]e conclude that the company's ... practice.., does not constitute rea-
sonable network management."69' The Comcast P2P Order later states that "the
heavily used P2P protocols, more than 90 percent of these flows are unaffected by Com-
cast's network management."); see also MAX PLANCK INST. FOR SOFTWARE Sys., GLAS-
NOST: RESULTS FROM TESTING FOR BITTORRENT TRAFFIC BLOCKING, pt. 5 (2008), available
at http://broadband.mpi-sws.mpg.de/transparency/results/ (finding that Comcast terminated
between twenty and eighty percent of peer-to-peer uploading TCP connections, depending
on the time of day).
686 Comments of Comcast Corporation, supra note 556, at 31.
687 Id. 32.
688 Comeast P2P Order, supra note 9, 9 (citing In re Petition of Free Press, et al. for
Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Pol-
icy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Reasonable Network Management";
Vuze, Inc. Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broad-
band Network Operators; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of Robert M Topolski,
WC Docket No. 07-52, WC Docket No. 08-7, at 3-4 (Feb. 25, 2008)).
689 Id. 42.
690 Id. at 36.
691 Id. I (emphasis added).
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evidence reviewed above shows that Comcast selectively targeted and termi-
nated the upload connections of its customers' peer-to-peer applications and
that this conduct significantly impeded consumers' ability to access the content
and use the applications of their choice. Thesefacts are the relevant ones here.
* . .,692 Given the Commission's claims of focusing on the facts, it is strange
that it never did its own investigation and never presented those facts to Com-
cast in the form of a notice of apparent liability or order to show cause. As
Commissioner McDowell stated:
Even if the complaint was not procedurally deficient and we had rules to enforce, the
next step would be to look at the strength of the evidence. The truth is, the FCC does
not know what Comcast did or did not do. The evidence in the record is thin and con-
flicting. All we have to rely on are the apparently unsigned declarations of three indi-
viduals representing the complainant's view, some press reports, and the conflicting
declaration of a Comcast employee. The rest of the record consists purely of differing
opinions and conjecture. As the majority embarks on a regulatory journey into the
realm of the unknowable, the evidentiary basis of its starting point is tremendously
weak, to the point of being almost non-existent. In a proceeding of this magnitude, I
do not understand why, in the absence of strong evidence, the Commission did not
conduct its own factual investigation under its enforcement powers. The Commission
regularly takes such steps in other contexts that, while important, do not have the
sweeping effect of today's decision.693
Wholly apart from its lack of ancillary jurisdiction to intervene in this mat-
ter, the lack of rules to enforce, and the fact that Comcast and BitTorrent had
reached an agreement, it is inconceivable that the FCC failed to do its own in-
vestigation.
4. Fundamental Unfairness
The foregoing procedural irregularities raise serious questions concerning
the basis upon which the FCC judged Comcast's actions, and the conclusions it
reached. Companies should be able to expect some type of consistency and
fairness in how matters are handled by the FCC. If the FCC is resolving a for-
mal complaint, the adjudication needs to be fair and follow its established rules
of procedure.6 94 What is so unusual about the action against Comcast-and so
grossly unfair-is that it appears to be an enforcement action arising out of a
rulemaking-type proceeding without the benefit of even of a notice of proposed
rulemaking. A policy group, rather than the agency's enforcement staff has
apparently conducted almost the entire proceeding. Such arbitrary actions by
the nation's top communications regulator can hardly assure industry, inves-
tors, financial markets, or the citizenry that the laws are being faithfully carried
692 Id. 44 (emphasis added).
693 Id. at 13,092 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
694 See supra note 646.
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out in their interest.
Even if the FCC correctly claimed that it could make policy decisions in the
context of adjudications, it does not appear to have conducted a proper adjudi-
cation in this instance. En banc public hearings, with unsworn presenters or
participants selected by the adjudicator are not adequate substitutes for the sort
of formal hearing one would anticipate in a matter of this magnitude.695
Although the FCC repeatedly cites the voluminous record before it, the re-
cord in a public notice and comment rulemaking is far less rigorous-from an
evidentiary standpoint-than the record created in a formal adjudication, with
its requirement of testimony and opportunities for cross-examination.696 As
Commissioner McDowell observed in his dissent to the Comcast P2P Order,
"the FCC does not know what Comcast did or did not do. The evidence in the
record is thin and conflicting." '697
These issues do not reflect simply a difference of opinion over regulatory
policy. Given the FCC's compliance plan ordering Comcast to "[d]isclose the
details of its discriminatory network management practices to the Commis-
sion, ' it confirms that the FCC did not conduct a factual investigation under
its enforcement powers. Rather, the FCC engaged in a legislative process sup-
porting only prospective, industry-wide rules of behavior, but wholly insuffi-
cient to support an adjudication against a single company under our Constitu-
tion and system of law.
Nonetheless, the FCC professed that with respect to Internet network man-
agement issues, adjudication is more appropriate than rulemaking because ad-
judication would target only the bad actors, avoiding problems of over-
breadth.699 In other words, the FCC claims that it took the most targeted and
least regulatory means of protecting the open nature of the Internet.
695 A formal adjudication via hearing involves a hearing before an ALJ, pursuant to a
Commission-adopted "Hearing Designation Order," conducted in accordance with recog-
nized rules of evidence and procedure. Cf Admin. Law and Regulatory Practice, Am. Bar
Ass'n, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 21, 27
(2002) (discussing the necessary procedures for formal hearings under the Administrative
Procedure Act and the role of an Administrative Law Judge).
696 In several cases, "expert witness" testimony constituting little more than an extended
legal essay on the intersection of Internet architecture and public policy has been deemed
inadmissible. See, e.g., JOSEPH MENNN, ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FAN-
NING'S NAPSTER 236 (2003) ("In a long essay that was more legal advice to Judge Patel than
expert testimony, and was therefore deemed inadmissible, [Lawrence] Lessig said that the
early architecture of the Internet was both a serious threat to copyright protection and an
unprecedented boon to free speech."); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
697 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,092 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
698 Comcast Order Press Release, supra note 10, at 3.
699 Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,067 (Martin, Chairman, statement); Id. at
13,083-84 (Adelstein, Comm'r, statement).
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Why is this so alarming? Because what the FCC has done is to proceed nei-
ther entirely by adjudication or rulemaking, but by some unnatural combina-
tion of the two--"adjudi-making" or "rule-ication"-where the loose world of
legislative fact finding is used to convict a leading industry participant in the
court of public opinion. And it was done prior to the establishment of rules of
behavior or a factual investigation conducted under the Commission's en-
forcement powers in accordance with due process of law and the APA.
V. CONCLUSION
One can only hope that both the Congress and the courts will take a long,
hard look at exactly whether and how the FCC saved the Internet from the
clutches of private network operators. The ink was barely dry on the FCC's
August 1, 2008 Press Release when stories indicating that bandwidth caps,
metered and tiered bandwidth pricing was almost inevitable7" in the wake of
the FCC's apparent ruling that deep packet inspection and RST Injection net-
work management tools are not acceptable behavior."' Unfortunately, rather
than saving the Internet, the FCC sacrificed both the rule of law and imperiled
the unfettered Internet, undermining long-standing federal Internet policy.
Inasmuch as the FCC lacks ancillary jurisdiction pursuant to sections 1, 201,
230(b), 256, 257, 601(4) and 706 of the Act to adjudicate the disputes regard-
ing Comcast's cable modem network management practices, and the Internet
Policy Statement has no binding legal effect, it is very likely that the courts
will find the Comcast P2P Order to be ultra vires. As the Internet Policy
Statement cannot be classified as an interpretive rule, it cannot be enforced
against Comcast in an adjudication.
Serious flaws exist in the legal and procedural means that the FCC em-
ployed to find Comcast guilty of violating its Internet Policy Statement, which
established Internet users' rights to access lawful Internet content and utilize
the applications of their choice. The FCC claims to be acting under its ancillary
jurisdiction and has stitched together a patchwork quilt of regulatory jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis. The procedural vehicle chosen was a
self-styled Formal Complaint filed against a non-common carrier, alleging acts
of unreasonable network discrimination in contravention of an unenforceable
Internet Policy Statement. This Formal Complaint was, at some point, mysteri-
ously--or mystically-housed within a public notice and comment proceeding
initiated by a Notice of Inquiry concerning industry-wide practices7 2 that lacks
a notice of proposed rulemaking informing the public of the nature of the rules
700 See MOFFETr, supra note 553, at 1-3; Make, supra note 553.
701 Comcast Order Press Release, supra note 10, at 2.
702 Broadband Industry Practices Inquiry, supra note 24, 8-11.
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under consideration. Nonetheless, the FCC claims that Comcast had adequate
notice that the Commission would entertain complaints concerning network
management practices because the FCC stated as much in the unchallenged
2006 Order approving the transfer of Adelphia's FCC licenses to Comcast and
Time Warner, in which the FCC declined to impose specific network neutrality
or network management license conditions.7"3 The FCC suggests that by com-
pleting the underlying transaction, Comcast waived its right to challenge the
warning.T Further, the FCC claimed that Comcast had an "opportunity to be
heard" along with the other FCC-selected presenters at the two en banc public
hearings hosted by the Commission on network management." 5 The FCC be-
lieved that this was adequate process upon which to adjudicate the Free Press
Complaint. °6 To the contrary, it was both far too much undue process and far
too little due process to satisfy even the most basic legal requirements for fair
governmental action.
Not only did the FCC lack rules to interpret in its adjudication of the Free
Press Complaint, it lacked established procedures for adjudicating formal
complaints against non-common carriers like Comcast. °7 The FCC created
new procedures and applied them against Comcast, establishing a new frame-
work for adjudicating similar complaints in the future.0 8 As if that were not
enough, the FCC has essentially deputized the complainant, Free Press, and the
rest of the populace of the nation to keep an eye on Comcast and report any
new violations. It is Kafkaesque when the law is unknowable or revealed only
703 See Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order, supra note 85, 223.
704 See Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, at 13,091 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
Commissioner McDowell stated:
"For the same reasons, the majority's arguments that the Adelphia-Time Warner-
Comcast Order somehow constituted notice of the Commission's intent to adjudicate
the Policy Statement, and that Comcast's consummation of the merger approved in the
Adelphia-Time Warner-Comcast Order constituted a waiver of its right to challenge
such an adjudication, fail. The Commission can not possibly be seen to have given no-
tice to Comcast (or any other party) of a preference to adjudicate the Policy Statement
because the Commission lacks the authority to adjudicate the matter in the absence of
rules."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
705 See id. at 13,078-79 (Copps, Comm'r, statement) ("Surely no one can credibly claim
that this process has not provided the parties ample opportunity to present their cases.").
706 See id. 1, 10, 11 (Memorandum Opinion and Order); see also id at 13,078-79
(Copps, Comm'r, statement).
707 See supra note 649. Comcast P2P Order, supra note 9, 17-19.
708 Id. at 13,065-66 (Martin, Chairman, statement). Chairman Martin stated that the
Commission adopted a framework, in that the burden of proof shifts to the broadband opera-
tor to show that its network management practices are reasonable if the Commission deter-
mines that legal content has been arbitrarily degraded or blocked and the broadband opera-
tor claims network management as its defense. See id. at 13,066.
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in the actions of the nobility.7
Policy choices and goals will differ over time-the desirability of regulation
will wax and wane depending on economic conditions and the technological
capabilities of networks-but the desirability of fair and predictable legal pro-
cedures to implement and enforce policy goals is constant. Regardless of
whether one believes that government-mandated norms of behavior for band-
width providers7 are good or bad policy, the only acceptable means by which
government may impose such mandates is by remaining in conformity with the
rule of law and by scrupulous compliance with its own procedures. Unlike the
nobles in Kafka's parable, in our system of government, government officials
do not "stand above the laws." If the government fails to comply with the rules
constraining its behavior, how can it reasonably expect compliance with its
mandates by regulated entities?
709 See KAFKA, supra note 1, at 437-38; Parker B. Potter, Jr., Ordeal by Trial: Judicial
References to the Nightmare World of Franz KaJka, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 195, 198, 210 (2005)
("Kafka's vivid portrayals of faceless absurd bureaucratic institutions have resonated so
deeply that his name has become an adjective .... In this vain then, invocations portraying
predicaments as Kafkaesque do so by stressing more specifically the (a) inescapability, (b)
inscrutability, (c) incomprehensibility, and (d) inanity of situations.").
71°Tim Wu, Op-Ed., OPEC 2.0, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2008, at A17.
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